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Abstract
As a relatively new phenomenon compared to other ways of executing an 
international strategy, Strategic Business Alliances (SBAs) lack the theoretical 
support that most of their longer-established counterparts enjoy. Yet, it is our 
belief that the widespread use of SBAs in a large number of manufacturing and 
service sectors necessitates the development of a theoretical foundation. One of 
the contributions of this thesis is the assessment of the suitability of an established 
theoretical framework: Nalebuff and Brandenburger ’s game theoretical “Co- 
opetition”. Whilst the authors had a much wider domain than SBAs in mind when 
they developed their theory, we will argue that Co-opetition can be an extremely 
suitable theory to assess deciding developments with regard to SBAs. Our 
empirical analysis of the major telecommunication SBAs does, thereto, not only 
provide a comprehensive overview of the most prominent alliance activities in this 
sector but it also serves as input to assess Co-opetition’s suitability as a theoretical 
framework on developments related to SBAs. Besides the overall suitability of 
Co-opetition we will further assess which of the two extremes of the theory’s 
central notion of the new Mindset, peace and war, best represents developments 
we witness in the telecommunication industry. In order to achieve that we have 
selected two theories that provide a clear representation of the two extremes. The 
comparison of the applicability of these two representing theories leads us to 
conclude that regarding SBAs in telecommunications the “peace element” of Co- 
opetition’s Mindset is more applicable than the “war element”.
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Chapter 1
Research interest and research objective
Introduction
In today’s world businesses co-operating is so common that it largely escapes our 
attention. So is the computer that I am currently using to write this thesis 
undoubtedly the product of at least a few partnerships and, very likely, depending 
on several Strategic Business Alliances (SBAs). Such forms of co-operation may 
refer to the hardware part (i.e. the computer and its component) or to the software. 
But not only computers and their software are to a large extent the result of 
corporate partnerships. It seems that daily attributes as cars, medicine and even 
simple foodstuffs nowadays cannot emerge without high level co-operation 
between companies that some decades ago were able to produce these products on 
their own. Moreover, it is not only in the case of products that this silent 
revolution is taking place all around us yet managing to escape our perception.
The service sector is also laden with examples of strategies that lean heavily on 
cross-cofporate partnerships. This is most obvious when the airline company 
where we book our plane ticket with is not the same as the one that we are offered 
a seat on. The connecting flight may be with yet another company and, with a little 
luck, the return flight can be handled by company number four. Whilst such 
alignment can be detected by the consumer similar partnerships between banks 
and insurance companies or in the telecommunication industry are completely off 
our individual radar screens.
Research interest
It is particularly that last industry that has caught our interest in relation to the 
subject of SBAs. Not very long ago, telecommunications meant little more than 
making expensive calls from home, office or a booth in the street and sending a 
fax was the high end of the industry. Nowadays it is hard to find any relatively 
sophisticated product or service that does not have some sort of link to
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telecommunications. The transformation of the fairly stale telephone and telex 
companies into one of the main carriers of our high technology information 
society has taken place with dazzling speed. The combination of this service 
industry and the earlier mentioned silent “alliance” revolution makes for a 
fascinating academic subject, albeit a highly challenging one.
Thesis set-up
Our thesis commences with a brief review of the most important changes in the 
global economy as far as international business concerns. It is due to these 
changes that SBAs have made their entrance in international business in the mid 
till late 1980s. Additionally, these changes have impacted on a number of 
industries, including telecommunications. Much of the dazzling turnover we just 
referred to is due to these changes. After that review we abandon the macro 
economic level to evaluate the ways companies can adopt to execute an 
international strategy. Some basic differences between these ways will serve to 
enhance understanding why SBAs emerged as an alternative to those longer- 
established options. A listing of some of the most prominent reasons why ' 
companies engage in SBAs will complete that picture. The first chapter will then 
devote attention to a discussion of the issue of ownership and control. This is an 
important academic legacy subject stemming from the rise of the corporation in 
the 1930s via the rise in trans-national corporations (TNCs) in the 1960s to await 
its application to contemporary SBAs. We will explain that new paradigms are 
needed for SBAs with regard to the discussion on ownership and control because a 
simple extension of the applicability to TNCs does not suffice. This section ends 
with a basic division of alliances that will provide a rudimentary framework of 
alliance before theoretical contributions will be assessed.
In chapter two we present the theoretical side of our treatment the subject. Much 
like the first steps of an enthusiastic toddler, the initial attempts to find a suitable 
theory to link the topic, SBAs in telecommunication, were short, unsteady and did 
not reflect much sense of direction. Retrospectively, this is largely due to the fact 
that such suitable theories are still.under construction. Familiarity with Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger’s Co-opetition changed the stumbling into a more decided
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tread: Co-opetition became the central theory of our thesis. Its authors present 
tools to address contemporary challenges in business through an approach that 
balances co-operation and competition. The reason why we assumed suitability of 
this theory is because SBAs are the epitome of a phenomenon that combines 
elements of co-operation and competition. There is, however, a caveat. Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger’s theory concerns business in general and approaches its 
analysis from a macro level. After having concluded that the international business 
environment has changed, the authors present a theory that should be considered a 
tool to deal with the new challenges that the macro-level changes are posing. They 
assert that through a new mindset that combines competition and co-operation 
firms will set more effective strategies. Our interest, however, was not the overall 
strategy level of companies but one specific phenomenon, SBAs. Whether the 
proclaimed general application of Co-opetition would include a specialised form 
as alliances became our problem set. In other words, we placed at the centre of our 
research the question whether Co-opetition’s valuable contribution at an overall 
strategy level could be extended to the specific micro-level phenomenon of SBAs. 
A positive answer to that question will provide us with either analytical theoretical 
contributions or practical ones. In either case would the subject of SBAs be served 
since, as we indicated, the supply of suitable theories to that subject is still fairly 
meagre.
Besides our main theory, Co-opetition, we will assess two other theories that are 
more specifically targeted towards alliances, on their suitability in that same 
chapter. The appearance of these theories is serves two purposes. On the one hand, 
they should be considered as a back-up in case the conclusion of our main 
problem set (Co-opetition’s suitability to analyse SBAs) is met with a negative 
answer. If it appears that Co-opetition is too broad or too general there will still be 
two “proper” alliance theories to match with the cases. Perhaps more interesting is 
the second role these theories will perform. Much in Co-opetition is derived from 
what Nalebuff and Brandenburger call the “peace” and “war” mindset. In this 
mindset peace refers to co-operation and war to competition. Together they form 
the book’s central theme of co-opetition. As a supplementary problem set we 
would like to assess whether the telecommunication alliances we feature are more 
closely related to the peace or to the war notions. This we will not be able to
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research using Co-opetition alone. We have, therefore, selected two theories, each 
representing one of the two Co-opetition mindsets. We will see that Hamel’s 
theory on inter-partner learning is an adequate (yet radical) representative of the 
war mindset and for Madhok’s theory on trust counts the same but then for the 
peace side of the mindset.
Because Nalebuff and Brandenburger are not exclusively concerned with 
partnerships in their Co-opetition book, they do not devote much detailed attention 
to a presentation of the variety of SBAs. In order to indicate which, among the 
wide variety, type of SBAs we will focus on, we have selected a most appropriate 
theoretical contribution by Yoshino and Rangan to fulfil this aim. This is a 
supplementary section to Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory and this addition 
provides a useful classification that positions our types of alliances amongst other 
ones and compares their characteristics with such other types of alliances.
Just before we turn to the cases we address one reason that is behind the highest 
profiled issue relating to alliances: their often-cited instability. The rationale of 
their instability is that alliances are difficult to manage and therefore prone to fail. 
Before looking at our cases, we will discuss the issue of different agendas in some 
detail. The aim of this exercise is to be in a position after the cases have been 
presented to assess whether those scenarios feature in our cases.
At that point the presentation of the cases will follow and the three cases will be 
described and analysed in chapter three. At the start of this chapter we indicated 
our special interest in the telecommunication industry with regard to the SBA 
phenomenon. Besides the interesting aspects of service industries in general, in 
case of telecommunications, as opposed to much of what occurs in the case of 
airlines, many of the SBA activities may be outside the awareness of the customer 
or consumer of the service. Furthermore, the all-encompassing and pivotal role of 
telecommunications -  no sophisticated or even semi-sophisticated product or 
service is exempt from at least some sort of telecommunication service -  added to 
our fascination with this sector. An enormous transformation within the sector has 
taken place well within a two-decade timeframe. The transition of the sector meant 
that a shift from stale and homogeneous providers of limited services that had
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shown marginal transition for about one century to a host of diverse, cutting edge 
providers that both in scope and scale affect all aspects of personal and corporate 
life.
With the target sector decided, we needed to choose the cases from that sector.
This choice was made on basis of a number of criteria that, through a process of 
elimination, resulted in the eventual outcome. The main cluster of criteria was of 
relative comparability. In order to assess Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory on 
its validity of a certain type of SBAs, we had to ensure that the alliances we would 
put to the test would all fall within the same group of SBAs. Therefore, a first step 
to enhance the likelihood of ending up with comparable SBAs was to choose 
comparable companies. The most important factors we considered in this respect 
were the size of the company, the historic role and development of the company, 
the regulatory framework the company was (or rather: the SBA would be) 
subjected to and, at the time of our choice, relative exclusivity with regard to 
involvement in alliances.
Size o f  the company
This criterion was fairly loose in two respects: a) with regard to the size groupings 
and b) with regard to the actual importance of the actual company’s size (relative 
to factors related to the size of the company). To explain these two qualifications it 
is important to keep in mind that this criterion served the purpose to enhance our 
prospects of ending up with comparable SBAs. Below, in chapter two, we provide 
a classification of alliances. That will show that there are many types of alliances. 
We believed that it would augment the validity and credibility of our research if 
we avoided the “apples and pears” combination of comparative material. 
Therefore, starting off with case companies that differ substantially in size, there 
would be an added risk that the difference is size would be reflected in a 
difference in alliances strategy of the individual companies. One example to 
illustrate that point is the consideration that a prominent reason for companies to 
engage in alliances is to enhance their impact on the sector. For an already sizable 
company in a particular market this could mean forming an alliance with a partner 
of its own size. Such an alliance could then be one based on equality (provided 
both partners bring equally-valued assets to the alliance). However, for a small
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player in a market to enter into an alliance with the aim of enhancing its impact on 
the sector it could be left with little option than to ally itself to a much bigger 
partner.1 That would, most likely lead to a partnership of inequality -  for example, 
a so-called “sun and star” alliance where the latter, representing the smaller 
partner, only shines due to the larger partner’s strength (again, subjected to what 
individual partners bring to the alliance). In order to prevent comparing sun and 
star alliances with alliances of equality we included the size criterion as one of the 
first shifters. With that in mind, regarding size groupings we were merely 
interested in avoiding the occurrence of such unbalanced comparison and settled at 
broad categorisation. In other words, we decided to only divide potential players 
into two groups: large and small and steer away from potential hybrids in our 
selection of case-companies. With regard to the relative importance of the other 
size-related aspect we distinguished in the beginning of this paragraph, the actual 
importance of looking at the size of the company was regarded as having relative 
importance because it was present mainly to serve as an indicator of an underlying 
factor. We intended to research comparable telecommunication markets. In 
relation to size, this meant that we sought to prevent comparing miniature with 
massive markets. The different dynamics of two companies that reside in 
substantially dissimilar-sized home markets were possible candidates to influence 
and distort comparability in alliance formation and alliance strategy. We could be 
assured that, especially by restricting our choice to incumbent operators (see 
below “Historical role and development”), the size of the telecommunication 
company would be related to the size of the home telecommunication market. In 
other words, the size of the company was not the focus of interest but it was a 
likely and rough reflection of the size of the home telecommunication market it 
served before developing an alliance-based strategy. Therefore, indirectly, the 
rough size of the company mattered: it enhanced the likelihood of obtaining 
comparable home markets and, consequently, it enhanced the likelihood of 
focusing on companies that had comparable alliance strategies. Based on this
1 One other alternative would, of course, be partnering with a number of similar sized smaller 
companies. However, due to the added challenges of alliances (for example, managerial, 
infrastructural, strategic and so on) it may be illusory to reach the necessary number of small players in 
an alliance of equals to carry the desired level of clout in the sector without seriously jeopardising the 
alliance’s stability.
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criterion we rejected all operators but the larger ones of the larger developed 
markets.
Historic role and development
Besides considerations related to the size of the company, a further criterion to 
enhance comparability was the type of telecommunication companies we would 
feature. As we indicated, in the last two decades -  and particularly in the last 8-iO 
years -  diversity within the group of telecommunication service operators has 
exploded. Again, our aim was to take first steps in assessing Co-opetition in 
relation to SBAs on its validity as a theoretical framework and its contribution to 
practical management. This would best be served by using one type of SBA rather 
than all its possible variations. Even after focusing our research on a particular 
sector, telecommunications, there would still be a multitude of types of alliances 
we could feature due to the large variety of types of telecommunication providers. 
It was our belief that in this initial phase of alliance-theory building a solid 
assessment of one species of alliances would be more appropriate than a more 
dispersed and, almost automatically, weaker evaluation of a large number of 
alliance types. For that reason we focused on one important type of alliance (the 
so-called competitive alliances, see Classification of alliances, chapter 2) and a 
group of comparable companies.
Regarding the companies, we opted for choosing incumbent former monopoly 
providers as our cases. These providers were interesting and suitable targets for 
our research to concentrate on for a number of reasons. Compared to other types 
of telecommunication providers, these companies had been in existence for a 
longer time and, in almost all countries, as the sole provider had represented the 
entire telecommunication service sector before its radical overhaul. Also, these 
providers had similar features which were absent with the more recent arrivals in 
the telecommunication market. Such features include universal service provision, 
(former) public sector company /civil servant legacy and a sizeable labour force. 
Moreover, all incumbents had undergone some sort development caused by the 
forces of liberalisation and privatisation (see further in this chapter). Pressures due 
to liberalisation and privatisation combined with the special features of the
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incumbents could emerge as a possible explanation for these operators to engage 
in SBAs.
The regulatory framework
A further criterion to include in our choice of the cases was the regulatory 
framework. As will be discussed below, regulation has always had a large impact 
on the telecommunication sector. This was not likely to be any less with regard to 
the phenomenon of alliances in the sector, particularly since alliances per se are 
under regulatory influence, even in scarcely regulated sectors and industries. The 
comparability factor with regard to regulation does not in first instance refer to the 
company that we sought to include as a case study. The continued (in spite of the 
highly globalised outlook of the telecommunication sector) existence of different 
and separate national regulatory environments was not a concern to us. More 
importantly was the regulatory framework that would be applied to the SBA the 
case company would be involved in. We considered that it would be beneficial for 
our definition of alliances and enhance the conceptual make-up of what we 
considered an SBA within our research if we chose alliances that were subjected 
to the same regulatory regime. In countries or regions where collusive and anti­
competitive behaviour is met with less regulatory opposition than in other parts of 
the world misrepresentations may occur: we could end up comparing alliances of 
one region with what would be considered cartels in the other (Morasch, 2000). 
Lifting all our alliances to the level of a highest common denominator would 
benefit homogeneity amongst our cases.
We considered both the regulatory frameworks in the United States and the 
European Union as appropriate especially considering our other criteria. The 
practice of subjecting cross-Atlantic alliances to both regulatory regimes was an 
added homogenising factor and, considering the cross-Atlantic interest to ally with 
operators of the other region (European to American and vice versa), we decided 
to focus on European companies as our cases. That way we harmonised cases even 
more and prevented possible clashes with the “Historic role and development 
criterion.
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Relative exclusivity
Based on those criteria we were left with a number of European incumbent 
operators as possible cases. They were the operators of the larger European Union 
markets2: Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia, BT, France Telecom and Telefonica 
de Espana. A final criterion to achieve comparability was selecting the cases on 
basis of relative exclusivity with regard to their involvement. This exclusivity 
criterion was relative in the sense that we would not eliminate potential cases if 
such a company would meet the other criteria and make for a valuable case yet the 
exclusivity criterion was not met throughout the entire surveyed period. In other 
words, seeking such exclusivity would be a guiding criterion but not an absolute 
case for rejection. We were aware of the highly fluid nature of alliance formation 
in the telecommunication sector and posing to severe restrictions on the five 
remaining candidates would be counterproductive given the scenario we had 
chosen till that point. Within the group of remaining candidates Deutsche Telekom 
or France Telecom were the only two companies that had been involved in the 
same alliance for a prolonged period and including both companies would violate 
the exclusivity criterion. Our research angle was not to compare different strategic 
interpretations of the same alliance by its members but assessing separate alliances 
in the light of Co-opetition. Including both Deutsche Telekom and France 
Telecom would in our case merely mean more of the same. We, therefore, had to 
eliminate one of the two incumbent operators from our selection of potential case 
companies and decided to include the German and exclude the French operator.
Accessibility to potential source material
In addition to the cluster of criteria that related to the comparability of the cases 
we included one secondary criterion at the final stage. Considering the important 
role that written source material would play in our research, accessibility of such 
material needed to be maximised. By illustration, much of the national regulatory 
regime is codified in the national language only. In other words, access to such 
material requires the appropriate language skills. Similarly, much of the 
background information relating to the individual telecommunication companies
2 This process took place well before May 2004 when, amongst others, the EU membership was 
augmented with Poland, another sizeable country. Whilst probably qualifying in size, there is at least 
one criterion on which its incumbent TPSA would not be included as a case company.
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and their markets may only be available in the national language. For these 
reasons we assumed that it would enhance the quality of the research if  we 
included as cases those companies that originated in countries that were covered 
by our language capabilities. The stronger presence of German than French and 
the absence of Italian from such capabilities eventually led to our three cases: BT, 
Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica de Espana.
Retrospectively, our selection of cases has enabled us to include all major 
telecommunication alliances due to the developments in partner selection. 
Deutsche Telekom was involved in two major alliances (the second was an 
extension of the first) but never partnered BT or Telefonica (thereby maintaining 
exclusivity). BT was involved in two other major SBAs and, although very briefly 
partnering Telefonica, allied with the two largest US companies. Furthermore, all 
major SBAs in the world included at least one European partner and at all times 
one of our three selected companies was involved. Telefonica’s involvement in 
alliances was probably the least prolific but included membership with alliances 
that our other cases did not possess and, thereby, drew in additional alliances for 
our assessment. Finally, potential other alliances that did not include any of our 
cases, such as the announced alliance between Cable & Wireless and Telecom 
Italia in 1998, faltered in the negotiation phase.
The empirical chapter on our cases is followed by chapter four in which we match 
our cases with the theoretical section. That will allow us to conclude on Co- 
opetition’s suitability to analyse alliances. If this turns out to be the case, we will 
be presented with some case by case examples of how PARTS -  which is at the 
centre of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory and, as we will see below, stands 
for Players, Added Value, Rules, Tactics and Scope - provides theoretical or 
practical contributions to those with an interest in alliances. We will also be able 
to conclude on the issue of the mindset: are our cases more a manifestation of the 
war mindset or of the peace one? A supplementary analysis will come from 
applying the instability factor we focussed on by checking our cases against the 
issue of different agendas. In the final part of chapter four we will summarise and 
conclude our findings.
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Research objectives and methodology
There is a number of objectives we endeavour to achieve with this research. They 
can be divided in those related to SBAs and those related to the 
telecommunications industry.
We fully realise that large gaps in academic knowledge due to its nascent state on 
SBAs will not be wiped out with one doctoral thesis. It is our aim to increase, even 
if marginally, the reader’s understanding of this interesting mixture of competition 
and co-operation that is present in SBAs. For this reason we have taken an eclectic 
approach in which we review SBAs origin (the changes in the global economy), 
its theoretical legacy (ownership and control) and its highest-profiled dimension 
(the instability factor). For the theoretical dimension of the subject we selected a 
theory with an acclaimed reputation (Co-opetition) but that has not been linked to 
SBAs so far. Part of the research objective is to see whether there indeed is a 
defensible case to link Co-opetition to SBAs and if so what contribution does Co- 
opetition have for the subject of alliances.
As for the telecommunications industry, our research object includes the provision 
of insights in some of the dynamics within this industry, from the angle of 
alliances. Supplementary to that, a wider objective is to present a relation between 
Co-opetition and alliances in a number of industries. Within that objective, the 
application of the telecommunication industry should be considered a first attempt 
to be followed by other industries, for example the airline industry, 
pharmaceuticals, automotives or the defence industry. Such cross-industrial 
studies will substantially increase our understanding of both industries and 
alliances.
Given those research objectives we have chosen the methodology that we deem 
will best serve the attainment of the objectives. Our approach reflects the 
combination of theoretical and empirical research objectives. Regarding the 
former, we have opted for a qualitative approach in which we aim to test one 
central theory and annex two smaller ones. The testing of those three theories is 
done through setting a number of hypotheses after a review of the respective 
theories. With regard to the empirical part we recognised early on in the research
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trajectory that heavy reliance on obtaining the information of those involved in the 
alliances would be a risky strategy. The chances that essentially sensitive 
information of largely strategic issues would be revealed to us were not considered 
to be great. Nevertheless, we considered the potential appeal of subject too great to 
allow possible challenges of data collection to override the intension to research 
the topic. As a consequence, much emphasis has been placed on the mining of a 
large variety of sources varying from trade press to shareholder reports. 
Information obtained from a small number of interviews was merely used to 
assess whether acquired knowledge from different sources was accurate. In the 
case of Deutsche Telekom our contact provided us with a large amount of internal 
reports on Global One’s strategy.
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Changes in the global economy
Introduction
The types of SBAs we feature in this thesis have only been a feature in 
international business for the last two decades. Traditional joint ventures -  
typically between Western TNCs and local firms, often resided in the developing 
world -  have been in existence for a longer period. There is a number of reasons 
why SBAs came into existence in international business when they did.
Essentially, such reasons find their roots in the structural changes that have taken 
place in international political economy: globalisation. It is not possible to fully 
understand the SBA phenomenon without grasping these changes. Those changes 
are truly global because their impact is felt not just in a certain group of countries 
(e.g., just the industrialised ones), but in countries from different regions in the 
world and of different economic strength. We will, briefly, review the most 
important structural changes in international political economy. These changes 
have shaped the environment of international business in such a way that on a 
number of occasions SBAs have become a necessary and preferred way of 
executing a strategy. In addition to that, our review of these structural changes also 
assists in explaining the outlook of the telecommunication industry in the part of 
the thesis that deals with the cases.
Reasons fo r  the running o f industrial sectors by the state 
There is a number of reasons why states have been involved in the running of an 
industry. An important reason lies in national security considerations. These 
considerations have been dominant in the airline industry. Governments have 
always been anxious to keep a firm grip on what is allowed to invade the country’s 
territory via airways. In different countries this has led to protecting their 
respective national airline. In most cases it has gone far beyond mere protection 
and states ended up running the airline company.
3 In accordance with Strange (1988) and the official term used at the United Nations we prefer to use 
the term trans-national corporations (TNCs) rather than the more popular multinational corporations 
(MNCs). The latter may arouse the suspicion that such companies have more than one nationality, 
which was denied in the influential Barcelona Traction case. See International Court of Justice, Case 
concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Ltd. In the second phase -  judgement 5 
February 1970 - it was determined that companies have one single nationality which is where the 
company is incorporated and its head office is registered. The term TNCs indicate that the company’s 
activity stretches across national borders and is more correct terminology, in our opinion.
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Precisely in the airline industry one can find another reason for the state to get 
involved in the running of industrial sectors: safety and consumer protection 
considerations. Besides different utilities, another sector that has been subjected to 
governmental control is the financial sector. Specifically for our thesis, in 
telecommunications a special form of quality consideration, universal service 
provision, played a major role behind the rationale of governmental interference.
A final reason for governmental interference can be found in the concept of the so- 
called natural monopolies. In sectors such as telecommunications or gas and 
electricity supply, it proved that in many countries the provision of the service (or 
product) by more than one supplier was illusory. The basic problems in these 
cases were those of the enormous networks necessary to set up and maintain such 
a service. Not only were the costs involved in doing so often too high to have a 
number of companies engage in the provision of the service, it was also not always 
desirable from the point of view of creating the network, especially in the days 
when electricity and telephone cables had an impressive physical presence. In 
those cases where the service was run or the product was offered by a single 
company, the state protected the consumer against misbehaving by the 
monopolist, such as through excessive pricing and offering sub-standard quality.
The liberalisation wave
Liberalisation is the opening up of a service or product to more than one supplier 
often under the control of the industry regulator. This means that before 
liberalisation the service or product was offered in a certain market by one single 
supplier. The supplier could be a state-owned company or a private company, 
which activities in the pre-liberalised phase were totally or partially, yet 
substantially, regulated by the state. The general reasons for state interference in 
the market have been indicated in the previous paragraphs. In many cases such 
reasons are currently still present. In some cases they have even become stronger 
caused by the increasing importance and enhanced exposure of industries as the 
airline, the financial and the telecommunication ones. This is all the more true for 
protective arguments in the financial sector. Financial mayhem due to systemic 
risk in the last two and a half decades has secured governments interference in the
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sector.4 In order to find the reasons why, in spite of the persistent presence of the 
reasons for state interference, liberalisation did take place, a broader focus on the 
international political economy is needed. Explanations for the start of a wave of 
liberalisations in the 1980s have either an ideological or an economic 
background.5 Both had to be present for the liberalisation wave to commence 
despite the continuation of the reasons for state interference. By opening up the 
market in combination with privatisation and deregulation (see below) 
governments expected to spur competition.6 This was a necessary condition to 
create a situation whereby the role of these governments could be reduced and 
hence their total spending curbed. The only safeguard that needed to be built-in, in 
order to prevent a return to a situation with one single provider (monopolist) in the 
industry, was a good functioning regulator.
Ideologically, influence on the liberalisation process was also asserted by the 
development of the trade rounds conducted under auspices of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Since the Kennedy Round trade barriers 
in a number of sectors had fallen and had made a number of industries more open 
on an international level. The GATT included clauses and procedures that were 
considered to make worldwide liberalisation inevitable. Companies in countries 
that liberalised early, “first movers”, would then have an initial disadvantage over 
those that held off liberalisation because their markets had been opened up 
unilaterally for competition. But at a later phase, the first movers would benefit 
vis-a-vis “followers” due to experience gained from operating in a competitive 
home market.
4 Examples include the Savings and Loans scandal in the US, the Middle Eastern Bank BCCI in the 
City of London, Barings in Singapore, copper firm Codelco in Chile, Orange County in the US, 
collapse of a nation-wide Pyramid scam in Albania. Related to this, yet more an issue of failed 
corporate governance than systemic risk are the highly profiled cases of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, 
Adelphia and Arthur Anderson in the US, Italian Parmalat and Ahold from the Netherlands.
5 The approximate concurrent leadership of three neo-classical leaders in the US, UK and Japan -  or 
the Triad countries (Ohmae, 1985) during most of the 1980s provides the ideological background that 
enabled the liberalisation wave. The economic background was provided by a widespread need 
amongst countries to reduce the scope of government as a means to reduce public spending and control 
the spiralling deficit.
6 Again, the Triad countries often took leading roles. Most relevant to this thesis, in the 
telecommunication industry, particularly the year 1984 played an important role in all these three 
countries: UK’s BT became a privatised company, AT&T from the US was broken up into a number of 
regional telephone companies and in Japan, parliament passed the bill to privatise NTT (Gottinger and 
Takashima, 2000).
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The privatisation wave
The UK privatisation programme had an influence on economic policy throughout 
the world. Privatisation programmes were initiated in Asia, South America, and 
Africa, as well as in Europe and North America. From the mid 1990s the Central 
and Eastern European countries also adopted large scale privatisation 
programmes. Privatisation was considered a necessary condition to move from 
socialism to capitalism (Bishop, Kay and Mayer {eds.}, 1994). In the UK, the 
Thatcher Government made it as a comer-stone of its domestic industrial policy. 
Underneath the neo-liberalist umbrella we can identify a number of reasons for 
privatisation. These include reducing the involvement of government in decision­
making regarding industrial activities, reducing the public sector borrowing 
requirement, encouraging workers to own shares in the company they are working 
for, attempting to increase competition and efficiency in certain industrial sectors. 
Most of the reasons fit, one way or another, within the following four main 
rationales that lie behind the reasons to privatise.
Firstly, an important rationale is an attempt to improve the financial situation of 
the government. Central point here is the reduction of government borrowing in 
order to reduce inflation. In the case of loss making state-owned enterprises, 
privatisation leads to double relief from a governmental point of view. In addition 
to this, the revenue that comes from the sale of such public-owned companies will 
also help bringing down public sector borrowing. A second rationale why 
privatisation is opted for finds its origin in efficiency considerations. Many of the 
public enterprises were inefficient in the 1970s. Privatisation, especially if 
accompanied by liberalisation and thus increased competition, would, so was the 
argument, enhance the efficiency of the company. The idea is that labour costs and 
operating costs of privatised firms go down while labour productivity goes up in 
these situations. Public sector managers may be under pressure to consider social 
issues as the provision of employment to obtain political support for the 
government in power.7 A further reason why privatisation can be implemented by
7 Under scrutiny, however, the empirical evidence shows that it is not necessarily privatisation that 
leads to increased efficiency but rather the entry of more competition, in order words the introduction 
of liberalisation. Some scholars claim to have found evidence that there is no difference between public
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governments has a theoretical foundation in the principal-agent theory in 
economics. According to the theory, there is a problem regarding information and 
monitoring on the side of the principal (owner of the firm) concerning the perfect 
incentives to fully motivate the agent (the manager of the firm). In those cases 
where privatisation is introduced to enhance the possibilities of attaining the aim 
of profit maximisation, it is based on the assumption that the principal-agent 
relationship in the private sector is subjected to fewer difficulties than when this
o
relationship takes place in the public sphere. Finally, there can be a more 
sociological reason why privatisation is pursued by governments: “popular 
capitalism” (Grout, 1994). The possibility for the majority of the citizens to own 
part of a company, albeit modestly, will enhance the public’s involvement as 
consumers as well as employees.
Consequences for regulation
Particularly the service sector in countries all across the world changed as a 
consequence of those two waves. Governments considered it necessary to adjust 
their policies due to those changes; they regulate industrial activity. The linkage 
of the notions liberalisation, privatisation and regulation goes as follows. For 
reasons mentioned in the paragraph on liberalisation, governments may decide to 
introduce liberalisation in a certain industry. If hitherto the monopolist that 
controlled supply in that industry was a state-run enterprise, the government could 
choose to pass on its responsibility to a private company. In the more liberalised 
market the new provider would have to compete with other private companies. In 
specific sectors, such as transport, energy and airlines, markets were partly 
liberalised to entail a mixture of public and private companies. In either case, 
governments may adopt a variety of tools to shape the newly emerged market 
structure to their preferences in order to achieve a desired outcome: regulation.
There are many different ways of regulating sectors and industries. Of the various 
types of regulation, the one dealing with the regulation of natural utility
and private companies regarding efficiency (Saunders and Harris, 1994; Swann, 1988; Veljanovski, 
1987).
8 The main reason for this lies in the assumption that political forces stimulate governments to act with 
a short-term vision which harms the long-term development of companies. Furthermore, agents of a 
state-run enterprise can rely on public bailouts when bankruptcy looms. Additionally, contrary to the 
private sector, there is no takeover threat to correct inefficient management of the state-run enterprise.
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monopolies is closest related to this thesis. This is because we draw our cases from 
the telecommunication sector which, certainly in the countries we feature, evolved 
from such a monopoly status. Regulation is not a new concept. It is one of the 
tools governments generally have used to take control of their markets. Ways of 
doing this included (and include) the setting of tariffs, which has a direct influence 
on price, and the setting of technical and safety standard, which has an indirect 
affect on price. What is new compared to more historic forms of regulation is the 
role of regulation in a created privatised environment. In the more traditional 
regulation governments’ main role usually was that of producer of services. 
However in the new situation with the government no longer performing the role 
of (sole) provider its tasks have largely vanished or strongly diminished. The role 
that remains for the government is the one of regulator which, in this new context 
is a crucial one. At stake now is the promotion of competition and the government 
has to create optimal market conditions for this to take place. Additionally, it 
needs to protect the customers from substandard service by the new and private 
provider.
Earlier we set out the reasons to change the market structure and monopolist 
provider by liberalising and privatising the industry. Such transformations will 
necessitate regulatory changes. In case of a natural monopoly, typically the 
situation in many telecommunication sectors before the liberalisation and 
privatisation waves, the biggest market failure is the occurrence of high entry 
barriers. High entry barriers are problematic in this situation because in this case 
an increase in demand might not lead to an ending of the monopoly in the market. 
Such high entry barriers could be a consequence of extensive sunk costs. The 
objective of regulatory policy will then be eliminating such entry barriers in order 
to enhance competition in the market. The underlying assumption in this situation 
originates from neo-classical economic theory which advocates that competition 
enhances customers’ welfare because it creates allocative and productive 
efficiencies (Whish, 1993, Robinson, 1999).
Technology’s role in the globalization process
The increasing globalised character of contemporary business is evident in many 
respects. Many markets are global markets forcing companies to cross their
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national borders and even operate beyond the limits of their region. The global 
character of businesses refers to their customers and their operations. Technology 
plays an important role in enabling firms to sell and operate globally. It facilitates 
the conditions that has enabled firms to oppose challenges that otherwise would 
have prevented them from adopting global strategies. These challenges include: 
operational distance, operational complexity, geographical complexity and 
operational capacity.
Operational distance
The application of technology to means of transportation has had enormous 
consequences for business. The availability of cheap, yet reliable, air transport, 
due to technological improvements, enhanced managerial mobility. A greater 
mobility of managers has increased the level of control over foreign subsidiaries. 
The level of control was further enhanced by technology-related communication 
media. Also, the possibility to build corporate IT networks globally that replicate 
local on-site networks has brought overseas offices “closer” to home. 
Technological developments in containerisation and air freight enable cross- 
Atlantic transport of bulky products and products in high volume. That has made it 
more attractive for companies to relocate production stages to low-wage areas and 
transport manufactured goods to markets with demand and higher labour costs 
after completion.
Operational complexity
Technology has also diminished operational complexity. Through just-time- 
production and parallel engineering it has enabled companies to customise their 
mass production processes in design and custom-made output compared to the 
pre-IT era (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990).
Geographical complexity
A higher volume of international trade is on its own not a necessary manifestation 
of globalization: production needs to be globalised, too. However, for this to 
materialise, geographical roadblocks needed to be taken. Technology has enabled 
the coordination of assembly, production and rationalisation activities. Hence, full
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advantage can be taken of global differences in wage levels, workforce skills, tax 
regulations and availability of natural resources.
Operational capacity
Finally, technology has made an impact on the supply of new or modified 
products by firms operating globally. The storage capacity of micro chips is 
constantly increasing and chips used in contemporary goods are much smaller than 
their counterparts were in the early 1970s. The higher capacity enables firms to 
produce goods of smaller size than before at a cheaper price. This has led to 
companies revitalising mature products and supply those on a global market. The 
decrease in production cost due to such miniaturisation has made it now 
financially feasible to sell certain products to consumers worldwide in markets 
with lower levels of disposable income.
Summary on globalisation
In these introductory paragraphs of this thesis we have briefly reviewed the most 
important developments related to the globalisation of business. Together they 
form the wider setting and create the background in which strategic business 
alliance came into existence. We described the reasons why a wave of 
liberalisation occurred. Once present, it forced monopolist operators to seek 
redress for actual or looming loss of revenue on their home turf. This push factor 
drove the (former) monopolist to the initiation of business across its national 
borders and thus outside its home market. Concurrently, liberalisation offered a 
pull factor for businesses to start operating abroad. Liberalisation in foreign 
markets provided new entrants with opportunities - even without the need to offset 
falling market share in the home market. Therefore, even firms that were not 
operating as a monopolist had incentives to conduct business activities abroad. We 
also drew attention to the reasons behind the privatisation wave. Transferring 
public ownership of enterprises into private hands across large parts of the world 
provided an opportunity for foreign business to obtain business assets. This pull 
factor also led to global changes in a number of industries and sectors, including 
the telecommunication service sector (as we will witness in our chapter on the 
cases). Finally, with regard to the “globalisation waves” we explained the 
emergence of the need by governments to install regulation in liberalised and
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privatised sectors. We ended the section on the changes in the global economy 
with a brief description on the important technological changes. Globalisation of 
business would not have been able to take the shape it has without those changes. 
In turn, without globalisation of business, strategic business alliances would not 
have featured as a worldwide way for companies to execute an international 
strategy. We will now turn our attention to the dominant strategic options open to 
companies that operate in global markets.
Ways of executing an international strategy
After the review of the most important forces behind the globalisation of business 
it is time to assess how this globalisation of business has taken place. Once a 
company’s management decides that economic rents are to be gained from moving 
the company across its national borders, there is a variety of traditional options 
open to transfer such aspirations into corporate action. Traditionally, there is a 
choice from three approaches, with further variations. Firstly, the company can 
choose to serve foreign markets from its home country. Secondly, it can build and 
or buy overseas operations. And thirdly, it has the option to use cooperative 
contractual agreements to enter international markets.
Serving foreign markets from the company's home country 
This strategy often is especially attractive for small and medium-sized firms that 
either have been subjected to increased competition from foreign firms in their 
home market (which is a passive or reactive strategy) and seek to respond to that, 
or assume potential gains from entering foreign markets due to their product 
specificity (which is an active or positive strategy). Such smaller firms usually do 
not have the necessary financial resources to engage in any of the other options or 
may decide against other options for a different reason.9 There are two principal
9 A firm may, for example, prefer to remain small and nimble rather than increase the size of its 
hierarchy (Williamson 1985). Another reason for a company to opt for serving foreign markets but 
doing so without establishing a foreign presence may be a reluctance to involve the company or its 
reputation (either in a cultural or political sense) in that market.
26
ways for a firm to market its products abroad in this direct way: exporting or 
setting up turnkey operations.
Building and buying overseas operations
Amongst all possible options, wholly or partially owning an operation abroad is a 
frequently chosen strategy for firms to do business across the borders of their 
home market. Certainly in regions where restrictions on foreign ownership, in the 
form of formal investment barriers, are modest or absent, such foreign-owned 
operations can be prospective. Also, as a counterpart to exporting, the existence of 
local content rules facilitates the presence of foreign-owned operations. Such 
operations can be in the form of highly standardised activities with low value 
added features (“screwdriver-plants”). Conversely, companies can establish them 
for high value added motives, as is the case when various research divisions are 
moved abroad to cluster areas where the infrastructure and specific conditions for 
such divisions are more favourable.10 We distinguish two different strategies in 
this category: foreign direct investment (FDI) and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). Due to the fact that the latter is closely associated with the strategic 
business alliances, we will provide a brief expansion on M&As.
Mergers and acquisitions
In the case of a merger or acquisition, two or more separate entities are 
transformed into one. When it concerns an acquisition, the only entity left is that 
of the acquirer. Management, hierarchy, name and culture of the acquired firm 
will be absorbed by the acquirer and the firm that is taken-over ceases to exist. 
Strictly speaking, in the case of a merger the result is also one remaining entity 
instead of two (or more) as it was before the merger. However, in the case of 
merger it is more two firms smelting together than one absorbing the other one.11 
The advantage for the individual firm in the case of M&As lies in the possibility to 
compensate the firm’s shortcomings in technological know-how, financial capital 
or infrastructure. Where creating such assets itself may be costly, time-consuming
10 Examples of this are Silicon Valley, Seattle (also know as Silicon Forest), Bangalore, Tel Aviv and 
Taipei’s industrial park Hsinchu.
nIn practice the boundaries between the two forms are not always as divided and the concepts are fluid. 
It may, therefore, be useful to speak of mergers and acquisitions with “merger by combination” and 
“merger by acquisition”.
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or virtually impossible, a merger or an acquisition can prove to be a more 
attainable strategy. Other advantages are the possibility to realise growth relatively 
quickly, which will add to shareholders’ wealth and, in the case of acquisitions, 
the maintenance of control and ownership over the acquired entity. Finally, M&As 
allow increased access to finance and managerial talent, as well as to qualified 
researchers. M&As have the disadvantage, however, that this type of investment is 
often expensive. Also, it could be politically sensitive in certain cases. Especially 
with international acquisitions the acquiring firm could face administrative and 
popular hostility. Additionally, the negotiation process that dictates the conditions 
under which the merger or acquisition will take place and that eventually has to 
lead to the shape of the ‘new’ company, can be lengthy and difficult.
Cooperative contractual agreements
A firm seeking access to foreign markets can dismiss the options of serving that 
market from its home country because there is a greater need to acquire 
knowledge on the foreign market(s) than such strategies will be able to provide the 
company with. At the same time, building or buying overseas operations may 
require investments the firm is not able or willing to make for the moment. In such 
cases cooperative contractual agreements provide an option for the firm. With a 
cooperative contractual agreement the company that owns the product or service 
sells or ‘contracts’ the rights to produce or sell its products or service to a, in our 
case, foreign company. Subject of the sale can be a product or a form of 
intellectual property (such as trade marks, business design, patents or technology). 
It will depend on the conditions of the contract to what extent the buyer acquires 
control and ownership after purchase. The three most adopted methods in this 
strategy are licensing, franchising and sub-contracting (or outsourcing).
Before featuring strategic business alliances we have two remarks. Firstly, it is 
beyond the scope of our current research to evaluate in our cases whether, before 
arriving at the conclusion, an assessment has been made to determine what 
strategy will best serve the companies goals. We assume, however, that at the very 
least a marginal or implicit assessment has taken place before it was concluded 
that entering into an SBA was the best option. Secondly, scrutinising certain 
executions of international strategies by firms exposes that some “SBAs” are in
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actuality not much more than a licensing agreement or, alternatively, are 
essentially mergers or turn into a full merger after an alliance phase. That 
highlights that the concept of SBAs is a fluid one and can have any position (or 
score) between contract and status as well as being used as a vehicle to move from 
contract to status. We will return to this below in the section on ownership and 
control.
Strategic Business Alliances 
Introduction
So far we have reviewed the setting in international political economy that 
provided the background against which -  as we will witness later - SBAs came 
into existence. We then assessed ways open to companies’ management to cross 
the borders of their home market after they concluded that doing so would be in 
their companies’ benefit. Some of the ways we highlighted have been established 
practices with firms for many decades; other ones have a shorter lifespan. We 
purposely omitted one further way for companies to move abroad, engaging in 
SBAs, because we will assess this way in greater detail since it is the topic of our 
thesis.
Compared to its competing alternatives SBAs are a fairly recent phenomenon. As 
will become clear below, the formation of partnerships in general has been 
included in corporate strategies for well over a century. One form of partnerships, 
the international joint venture, received substantial attention in academia after it 
became a widely applied strategic tool to nascent trans-national enterprises. 
However, prior to unravelling partnerships in general to concentrate further on 
SBAs in particular, a definition of SBAs needs to be established. We are certainly 
not alone when we observe that the task of defining what constitutes an SBA is a 
daunting one.
Many writers on strategic alliances do not define what they are, giving writers the flexibility to talk 
about any kind of inter-firm links, be they mergers, acquisitions, majority- owned ventures, minority
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equity participation, equal or co-owned joint ventures, or licensing. The approach makes it difficult to 
provide general guidelines to the readers (Yoshino and Rangan: 1995: 207, footnote 4)
As indicated above, SBAs are a relative new phenomenon. The confusion Yoshino
and Rangan indicate could be a sign of the theory of SBAs suffering from growing
pains. However, the passing of time has not eliminated the confusion. In an article
as recent as 2001, mergers and acquisitions are considered synonymous to alliances
(Wilcox, Chang and Grover, 2001). Another problem arises when scholars sidestep
the issue of defining the phenomenon altogether by omitting to provide one
completely. A combination of these two problems occurs when scholars fail to
define SBAs but imply a too broad definition on basis of the types of corporate
1
behaviour they include in their treatment within SBA literature (Reuer, 2000) or 
when a definition is not only broad in terms of scale but also in terms of scope. By 
illustration, assess the following, very recent, definition. From it, it appears that 
besides mergers and “full partnerships” (acquisitions?) almost anytime two 
companies cross each others’ path an alliance is formed:
A strategic alliance is “an agreement between firms to do business together in ways that go 
beyond normal company to company dealings, but fall short of a merger or full partnership” [...]. 
Strategic alliances generally represent inter-firm cooperative agreements aimed at achieving 
competitive advantage for the partners. These alliances range from informal “hand shake” agreements 
to formal agreements with lengthy contracts in which parties may also exchange equity or contribute 
capital to form joint venture corporations. (Elmuti, Abebe and Nicolosi, 2005:115)
Not meant to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive the following list 
with entries nominated by scholars to be included in the definition of alliances will 
indicate how wide the selection of items is that are covered by the term SBAs: 
research agreements, licensing agreements, development plus licensing agreements, 
joint research and manufacturing agreements, research plus marketing agreements, 
supply agreements, joint ventures, franchise agreements, management contracts,
12 Reuer does not provide a definition of what type of partnerships or corporate behaviour in general is 
considered to be applicable to his research. From the article it becomes clear that he accepts a wide 
approach (for example wider than the traditional or “old style” international joint ventures to include 
more recent forms of co-operation). Implicitly, the only two forms of corporate behaviour that are 
certainly excluded are licensing agreements and acquisitions.
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turnkey contracts, custom contracts, equity partnerships, relationship-enterprises, 
virtual firms, consortia, constellations, international co-operative ventures, etc.
All these remarks indicate that with the absence of a basic agreement on which
corporate links and which strategies constitute SBAs, establishing a universally-
accepted definition of SBAs still appears to be far behind the academic horizon.
However, we are obliged to provide our definition of SBAs within this thesis to
clarify our position within the continuing discussion of what SBAs are. Moreover,
the aforementioned proves that there are vast differences in existing interpretations.
Subsequently, we are left with definitional loopholes and conceptual booby-traps. In
order to reduce potential confusion with the reader of this thesis we will, therefore,
peg those floating characterisations down to one we subscribe to. Our definition
considers SBAs essentially “form-free”. This means that it could include the buying
or swapping of equity but this is not a necessary condition. Similarly, it may often
involve establishing a new and separate legal entity (i.e. joint venture) but again this
1is not a defining criterion either. The area or areas of co-operation must refer to the 
companies’ core strategy and should, therefore, not be of merely tactical relevance 
or refer to non-core areas. This criterion may contrary to the vision of some 
scholars, lead to the exclusion of many of the contractual arrangements from our 
definition. Our third requirement is that the partners to an alliance maintain control 
over their overall corporate independence. As such, mergers and acquisitions fall 
outside our definition. In sum, we consider an SBA a form-free corporate 
partnership that refers to the companies’ core areas of activities in which the 
partners maintain their statutory independence.14
Prominent reasons fo r  firms to enter into SBAs
Management literature distinguishes a variety of reasons why companies engage 
in alliances. Many of the main reasons build on thoughts developed in classic
13 Whilst essentially form-free, arrangements that are too loose may be an indication of the absence of 
the strategic requirement.
14 We can not totally eliminate the possibility that in some distinct cases even after an assessment of the 
requirements of our definition doubt may remain about the suitability of a particular partnership as an 
SBA. In case of such doubt (e.g. with regard to specific buyer-supplier relationships because those can be 
of varied composition) we provide an extra tool that may assist in deciding on whether such a partnership 
should be considered an SBA. Measured against the company’s resources, the more substantial 
commitment of capital, physical resources, senior personnel and such to the partnership are, the more 
justification there is to label the partnership an SBA.
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economic theories. There are, however, also reasons that are based on other 
disciplines mainly political economy and its power-related reasons. Generally, 
most rationales will fit within the following broad reasons:
Advantages of scale
Widening the scale of activities can bring a company straightforward benefits. 
Much of the literature on transaction costs is based on this premise (Williamson, 
1975, 1985; Carroll, Spiller and Teece, 1999). The part of total costs that has a 
fixed character decreases per unit when the company’s output rises. Leaving aside 
possible limits a company may face in increasing its scale (for example, shortage 
of any of the natural or physical resources or the presence of legal restrictions) the 
larger the component of fixed cost is within the total cost, the more imperative it 
will be to increase scale, provided the offering of additional products and services 
does not drive down profits per unit. Staying with international strategies, there is 
a number of ways for a company to increase its scale of which one is forging a 
strategic alliance. To be sure, in this case entering into an alliance is not the only 
way to increase scale. Other possibilities are discussed in the section on “Ways of 
executing an international strategy”. The choice for any of the options in particular 
depends on additional factors as indicated in that section and it needs to be 
assessed what the optimal way to execute the chosen strategy is. If such an 
assessment leads to opting for an SBA one likely -  and perhaps intended -  
consequence could be an increase in the customer base. The alliance partners may 
choose to produce a product or supply a service and market and sell that in the 
countries covered by the alliance agreement. The scale advantages are largest 
when the co-operation leads to synergies. Synergy occurs when the combination 
of the separate parts (i.e. the individual companies together) creates extra added 
value over the straightforward sum of the parts. Synergy can be considered as the 
prime reason behind companies engaging in SBAs.15
Technological imperative
In addition to entering into an alliance to spread the fixed component of overall 
costs (for example those related to R&D) over a larger product base, alliances may
15 However, due to an inflation of the term, any form of co-operation (including those that merely 
generate added value of the straightforward sum of the individual parts) is prone to be trumpeted as 
synergetic.
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also come into existence for technological reasons. One such a reason comes from 
the dynamics R&D itself poses on companies’ strategic behaviour. Particular 
industries are strongly subjected to the impact of technology. Its manifestation can 
be twofold: decreasing economic life-cycles due to technological innovation and 
technological convergence.
a) economic life-cycles
A product (as opposed to a service) has two types of life-cycles: a physical and an 
economic one. The former refers to the time-span the product is sufficiently intact 
to enable its use for what it originally was set out to be used for. More important, 
however, is the economic life-cycle. This refers to the product’s time-span in 
which it makes economic sense for the company to continue producing the 
product, when alternative products could be considered. In the last three decades, 
technological developments have shortened such economic life-cycles 
substantially (Ohmae 1990). This has led to increased pressure on companies. 
These pressures are coming from two directions. On the one hand, the costs of 
R&D have risen in most of the global industries but, on the other hand, the time 
for companies to earn back such investments has shortened. In other words, firms 
have less time to compensate a higher spending on R&D. As a consequence, firms 
seek a broader base to supply their products in the often relatively short period 
they are granted by the market to do so. Forging an alliance with a partner that 
enables the company to increase its market share can provide a way out of this 
technology trap.
With actors in the global economy realising such double pressures, different 
institutions are engaged in different types of R&D activities. Two scholars found a 
correlation between the type of institution that conducts a certain R&D activity 
and the possibility to exercise property rights of the fruits of the R&D conducted, 
i.e. the resulting “inventions” (Ouchi and Bolton: 1988). Essentially these 
properties can take three different forms. First there is private property. In the case 
of private property the owner can exercise property rights fully and unrestrictedly. 
(S)he can appropriate the product fully or transfer its ownership, should (s)he wish 
to do so. This type of ownership is radically different from what the authors call 
the public property form. In this case it is impossible for the inventor to
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appropriate the product. A third and final property is the leaky property. Leaky 
property refers to those types of inventions the owner can only appropriate for a 
relative short period of time. The period is relatively short with regard to the time 
available in order to earn a return on the investments of the inventions.
These different levels of ownership impact on the likeliness of different 
institutions to conduct certain kinds of R&D. The (single) private firm is the most 
likely institution to conduct R&D with private property characteristics. Public 
property prospects are most typically associated with research conducted in 
universities or government laboratories. For leaky properties inventions, industry 
groups (constellations) or strategic alliances are the most appropriate institutions. 
In other words, against the background of increased importance of technology, the 
possibility and level of exercising property rights over an invention has culminated 
in the emergence of SBAs.16
b) technological convergence
With regard to technology there is a second reason for companies to join forces as 
opposed to adopt a go-it-alone strategy. Besides the costs and the speed of 
technological developments, increasing convergence of technological application 
plays a role in a company’s decision making process regarding what strategy to 
use to enter foreign markets. Especially between such industries as information 
technology (especially data-processing), telecommunication and media the overlap 
is substantial. For individual firms it often proves to be too challenging and indeed 
undesirable, to develop activities in all related sectors. Teaming up with a 
company that possesses ownership advantages in any of such sectors could make 
economic sense via the creation of synergies. When such synergies link 
complementary characteristics of different companies, alignment provides a sound
16 Recent literature on strategic alliance has produced a relatively new academic stream: university -  
industry collaboration. To be sure, the phenomenon is not new. The biosciences, aeronautics and the 
defence industry have been co-operating with universities for several decades. But the explosion in 
literature of the last few years is a novelty. Some of the recent works include: Elmuti, D.; Abebe, M. 
and Nicolosi, M. (2005), “An overview of strategic alliances between universities and corporations”, 
Journal o f Workplace learning 17 (1); Brennan, L. (2003), “The view from the ivory tower: what do 
university alliances offer technology firms?”, Academy of Management Executive 17 (1); George, G.; 
Zahra, S. Wood, D. Jr. (2002), “The effect o f business -  university alliances on innovative output and 
financial performance: a case study of publicly traded biotechnology companies”, Journal o f Business 
Venturing 17: 577-609; Lee, Y. (1998), “University -  industry collaboration on technology transfer: 
view from the ivory tower”, Policy Study Journal 26 (1): 69 -  84.
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alternative to appropriation of all necessary skills and assets by one single 
company (James and Weidenbaum, 1993).
c) technological standard-setting
R&D in IT-related areas can lead to new applications of existing technology or 
even totally new areas. In either case the absence of a technological standard could 
potentially cause the emergence of different standards when different companies 
enter the new field via their own R&D. It is in the first mover’s advantage to have 
its technological standard adopted as the industry-wide standard, either through a 
formal process (de jure) or in actuality (de facto). Such a position gives the owner 
of the technology that is set as the industry standard an advantage over its 
competitors and may generate royalty revenues. Therefore, the first mover has an 
incentive to co-opt peer companies or important actor positioned downstream the 
newly created field. Hence the occurrence of this type of alliances between 
software developers and computer manufacturers.
Avoid market barriers
In their choice on which of the available ways to execute an international strategy 
companies take into consideration potential problems with regard to entering 
foreign markets. There is a wide variety of barriers of entry that a company can be 
faced with whilst it attempts to establish operations in a foreign country. In some 
of those cases, using an SBA as a vehicle of entry may by-pass the barriers and 
allows establishing a presence in the targeted country. The two typical situations 
in this respect are trading blocs and emerging markets.
a) regional trading blocs
The presence of trading blocs has proliferated since the 1980s and their impact is 
steadily growing. Currently there are approximately ten major regional trading 
blocs. They differ in size, scope, membership, selection criteria and intensity. But 
by their very nature, they all have an impact on international business. Ever since 
their proliferation opposing views have existed with regard to whether such 
trading blocs facilitate trade, investment and other cross border activities of 
companies on a global scale, or whether they hamper such activities (Lawrence, 
1991). Irrespectively of one’s stance on that issue, undisputed is the fact that
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companies with a presence inside the protected walls of such trading blocs enjoy 
certain benefits vis-a-vis outsiders. Entry barriers are usually the highest for 
trading activities (see our discussion on exporting in the aforementioned section). 
Hence the choice of many firms to physically establish their enterprise within the 
areas of trading blocs via foreign direct investment, through a merger or 
acquisition or any of the contractual arrangements discussed above. However, 
entry barriers may include physical presence as in the case of foreign direct 
investment or restrict such a presence through such investment to a degree that it 
renders it insufficiently beneficial to the entrant. Similarly, barriers can effectively 
restrict entrance via a merger or an acquisition investment (these vehicles are in 
certain countries and regions often difficult to achieve due to regulatory resistance 
or due to the structure of the financial markets). The adoption of licensing or 
franchising can be unattractive due to a lack of adequate intellectual property 
protection rules within the trading bloc area. Entering a country within a trading 
bloc through an SBA may circumvent obstacles that make other options less 
feasible.
b) emerging markets
An argument similar to the one applicable to trading blocs can be addressed to 
entry barriers of emerging markets. In fact, of all types of corporate partnerships, 
joint ventures with the aim of entering emerging markets are the most traditional 
ones and have been established the longest. Western oil companies have had such 
linkages with local enterprises in order to enter developing countries, including 
emerging markets, since the turn of the century (Sampson, 1988; Yergin, 1991). 
The Western companies often could only enter the country they sought access to 
through such partnerships. In case of the oil companies the main reason for 
seeking access to the developing country with entrance requirements was to 
exploit natural resources. When companies enter emerging markets by means of a 
partnership with the objective exploitation of natural resources, it is referred to as 
a vertical or complementary partnership. Usually a state-controlled company or, at 
times, a private company with a mandate from the host country’s government 
becomes the foreign company’s partner. The host country’s government may insist 
upon the use of a partnership as a mode of entry because it anticipates additional 
benefits to its own population which other modes of entry will not deliver. The
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local company in the partnership, it is hoped by the government in such cases, will 
gain from its alignment with the (usually Western and more-endowed) partner.
The expected benefits could entail the local company being able to gain 
knowledge and hands-on expertise from the foreign firm due to its operational 
proximity. Comparatively, in a situation in which the foreign firm had entered 
through the foreign direct investment mode, close contact of a local firm would 
have been less likely. Beyond the benefits for the individual local enterprise, wider 
benefits can be drawn for larger sections of the host country’s economy. Through 
moving up the learning curve the local company will assist in making the country 
become less dependent on foreign companies to exploit its natural resources in 
future.
Inter-partner learning
The earlier-mentioned technological convergence has resulted in the need for 
companies to master a number of different technological applications in order to 
produce the products or provide the services the global market requires.
Companies can attempt to create the technology and subsequently master such 
technological applications by means of greenfield investments, or acquire a 
company that possesses the technology and has the know-how to apply it. 
Alternatively they could obtain the technology through co-operative agreements 
(for example, licensing) and subsequently master its application.
Where the ability to produce the technology and / or master such technological 
know-how is absent the company will assess whether this is possible within an 
economically viable timeframe. If such prospects do not exist, the need to 
integrate this ability from outside arises. As will be shown in the next chapter on 
theory within this thesis, gaining access to technology is conceptually different 
from being able to integrate technology within the company’s activities17. Firms 
may enter into alliances in order to learn from their partner how to produce the 
right technology that can be integrated with the aim to decrease dependency on 
supply from others. Of all reasons listed here, this is arguably the one that 
potentially can cause the highest level of contention between partners in an 
alliance. Especially in those occasions where one partner does not know that the
17 See the section on Hamel’s theory, below.
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declared motives for entering the alliance by the other are not the actual ones: 
there is a hidden agenda (we will expand on this below). Not only does the 
company that is not aware of such ulterior motives risk not achieving what it 
expects to achieve through the alliance, it may also contribute to the development 
of a future competitor.
Pre-empt competitive threats
Entering into SBAs in order to create scale advantage enhances Pareto
■ 1 ftefficiency. Trading blocs are not Pareto efficient but a company that engages in 
an alliance in order to enter a trading bloc may be left no alternative but to act in 
such a manner. A different case is when a company with alternative options 
chooses to act inefficiently in the Pareto sense of the word. In a strict economic 
liberalist tradition this reason should not exist.19 However, we believe there is little 
doubt that not all alliances are exclusively about Pareto efficiency. When a 
company enters into an alliance to pre-empt a competitive threat it is not acting in 
a Pareto efficient manner. However, strategically such a move may be justifiable. 
There are, however, two problems with this. One is that a company’s management 
will need to justify entering in strategic partnerships to shareholders. Those 
shareholders would require more convincing that their value is not in the process 
of being destroyed if the sole justification is pre-empting a competitor. In other 
words, management will need to have at least an additional motivation if it 
distinguishes pre-emption as a motivation. This is related to the second problem, it 
will be difficult to prove ex ante that pre-emption is the main motivation for 
management to enter in an alliance. Explaining the need to enter in an alliance by 
using transaction cost economies will, if  convincing, be an acceptable reason. 
Saving unnecessary expenditure and cutting cost are consistent with creating 
shareholder value. In the presentation phase, prior to the actual running of the 
alliance, company management appears to have little trouble showing how 
alliances will bring economic benefits through transaction cost economies. This
18 An outcome is considered Pareto efficient if no alternative outcome can enhance the situation of one 
actor without, at the same time, leading to another actor being worse off. So, alliances have a role to 
play were alternative options lead to less optimal outcomes (for example, prevent a service from being 
offered by a single company due to the high cost associated with it provision). In those cases where the 
SBA enables the offering of the service that society would otherwise be deprived of the alliance is 
Pareto efficient.
19 See Gilpin (1987) for an elaborate discussion on economic liberalism and realism.
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provides a convenient justification for the alliance, even if the major, or only 
pressing, reason is pre-emption of competition. When, ex post it appears that 
predicted transaction cost economies were overestimated it may be due to 
management erring genuinely. However, we believe that the existence of pre­
emption of competition as a reason to enter alliances exists in spite of its dubious 
status and its difficulty to expose.
Minimise the costs of exiting an industry
This reason is less common than some of the other ones we have discussed; 
nevertheless it is an existing one. When a company exits an industry or sector it is 
likely to incur costs in doing so. Even if the exiting company is fortunate enough 
to sell its part or its entire business on, it may still have to write off value due to a 
lower price. Frequently, the exiting company may only be able to sell part of the 
business to a new owner. One associated problem with exiting an industry and 
selling assets on is the pricing of such assets. The new owner seeks to minimise its 
risk exposure whilst the former owner endeavours to recoup all its investments in 
order to limit the destruction of shareholder’s value. SBAs provide a way for the 
two companies involved to work out an optimal exit and entry strategy. An 
alliance between these companies allows the new owner to assess the business for 
the duration of the SBA in a more precise way than in case of a spot transaction. 
Furthermore, during the alliance, the new owner can learn more about the 
company and, particularly if the new owner is a new entrant, also about the 
industry it is poised to enter. Additionally, the customer base may be retained by 
the new owners. More generally, the new entrant is eased into the industry more 
gently than if  it had done so after an abrupt sale of the business. The exiting 
company has the opportunity to demonstrate the actual value of the company and 
may, besides more adequate compensation for its tangible assets, also obtain 
additional earnings from intangible assets, including patronage. Agreements of 
alliances that facilitate an exit strategy would normally include a sunset clause (an
20 Perhaps even more controversially, we take a similar position on the existence of “herd behaviour” 
with regard to the formation of alliances. In other words, we believe the existence of a certain dynamic 
that spurs actors on to engage in alliances in period of alliance frenzy where they would have refrained 
from doing this had their industry not been alliance-laden. It will, however, remain outside the scope of 
this research to expand on the pre-emption argument or on the presence of herd behaviour.
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explicit date of the termination o f the alliance and a scaled hand-over from the old 
to the new owner).
Before we assess SBAs in greater detail we will present a skeleton division of 
alliances that provides an orientation of what SBAs entail. When we turn to the 
theory and subsequently to the cases, more specific features will emerge.
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Ownership and control and the need for new paradigms
Introduction
An important element of the alliance phenomenon is the issue of ownership. To a 
certain extent, this can be seen in the light of the issue of ownership in the TNC. 
Traditional literature has dealt with this issue. However, in the case of alliances 
additional factors play a role. It is therefore our suggestion to test existing 
literature on ownership of TNCs on its validity regarding alliances and amend, 
adjust or alter the literature there where necessary. The next paragraphs will 
provide a first step in the direction of assessing the applicability of traditional 
theories on ownership and control to alliances.
As early as the 1930s, attention was paid to the divorce of ownership from control
• 0 1 with regard to businesses . The separation of these two crucial elements of the
firm led to scholars expressing concern about this development. The fear
concentrated on the perceived inability of the owners to maintain control over
executive powers within the organisation. At first, these works dealt with this
issue from a national perspective: it initially concerned large companies with
operations in their home market. After the introduction in academia of the growing
importance of the American TNC and the challenge of this to Europe an expansion
of the literature on the issue of ownership to include TNCs followed. This placed
the discussion in an international context. A central element became the relations
between a firm's headquarters and its overseas subsidiaries (Brook and Remmers,
1970).
To a large extent, the contribution of these works has merit to assessing the same 
issue in the context of alliances. Similar to SBAs, with TNCs there are potential 
problems due to the fact that those who supply the capital for the organisation 
differ from who determine how this capital will be applied. As companies grew 
larger, organisations became more complex. In more complex organisations, the 
owners require more support from specialised managers that are able to handle the 
organisational, communicational, logistical and technological challenges typical of
21 Berle and Means addressed this issue in their work 'The Modem Corporation and Private Property1.
which as published in 1932.
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such organisations. There clearly is some analogy with alliances: they too need 
specialised managers that have the ability to meet the challenges of that complex 
type of organisation.
In the theories of ownership and control regarding TNCs, a geographical 
dimension was added to Berle and Means’ theory. The basic reason for the 
expansion of the theory was that the geographical separation in addition to 
statutory separation would disperse power even more. Similarly, in the case of 
SBA, the relation between ownership and control is one of the aspects at the heart 
of the phenomenon. Where, however, alliances differ from the more traditional 
complex organisations as TNCs is in the potential presence of an additional 
separation of the command structure. Following Weber’s normative works on 
public administration, literature on organisational economics has often emphasised 
the importance of unity of command. Individuals, as well as groups or units within 
an organisation fare best when they report to one single superior only instead of 
two (Perrow, 1986). More contemporary management and organisational thinking 
has led to the introduction of less hierarchical and more flexible command 
structures. In certain cases this has led to the emergence of dual (or even triple) 
command structures. The Matrix structure is the most prominent example in this 
respect (Bartlett and Goshal, 2003). In the case of the Matrix structure, the 
application of the dual command structures manifests itself in the headquarters- 
subsidiary issue. While that relationship could be considered comparable to the 
relationship between a joint venture and its parent company, two important 
notions need to be stressed.
First, a joint venture is just one among many different types of alliances. In the 
case of a joint venture a separate (legal) entity is created and this makes 
comparing joint ventures with subsidiaries possible. However, there are other 
forms of alliances that do not result in the creation of a separate entity. This can be 
the case with certain equity alliances. If one company purchases shares into 
another company without obtaining a majority share holding or a majority in 
voting rights the analogy with a subsidiary is absent. There may nevertheless be a 
change in the ownership and control structure, due to this investment. The 
conceptually new situation caused by this type of alliance needs to be compared to
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traditional ownership and control conceptions. Where it appears that theoretical 
contributions are an inadequate, existing theory needs to be adjusted.
Secondly, even in the case of joint venture alliances, which, as we indicated could 
make for an adequate comparison with the traditional headquarters and subsidiary 
relationship, there is an added feature. A split in command as featured in the 
Matrix structure can lead to contention due to different interests. This occurs when 
two units or superiors at headquarters level (for example the regional manager and 
the product manager) have different goals or agendas vis-a-vis the subsidiary that 
needs to report to both actors. In such cases, corporate structure is normally as 
such that one actor (person or body) ultimately will decide how the clash should 
be dealt with in terms of preference or compromise. Hierarchical structures and 
ultimate unitary direction at the strategic apex level will make such a decision 
acceptable for all parties. In the case of an alliance there are two or more 
companies involved. There is therefore not always one single unitary direction at 
the top level because each company has its own dynamics and goals and those of 
the two separate companies may deviate. The closest to the situation of 
headquarters - subsidiary relationships is the situation where a separate board has 
been set up to decide on such occasions. However, the level of trust among 
partners in an alliance will in contentious situations be less than that of contending 
parties in the headquarters - subsidiary relationship. In situations of conflict, 
suspicion may arise because complete convergence of goals is not assured and 
partners may act with a hidden agenda (see below in the section on instability of 
alliances). In other words, even with the creation of such an umpire to mimic the 
headquarters -  subsidiary situation it still remains that there is a possibility for the 
existence underneath of ultimately deviant goals, directions or agendas between 
partners in an alliance. Therefore, even after stretching the analogy with the 
headquarters - subsidiary relationship as much as possible, there still remains a 
major difference between traditional organisations or hierarchies and SBAs with 
regard to the separation of ownership and control. This requires a conceptually 
different treatment of the issue of ownership and control in the context of SBAs 
than in the case of traditional literature.
Ownership
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The concept of ownership comprises the following three basic elements. First, 
ownership refers to the legal title to possess an asset and the right to enjoy its 
fruits, unless differently arranged by contract. Second, ownership includes the 
right to exercise control over the owned asset. Third, ownership provides a legal 
title to alienate the asset or parts thereof. Particularly the second element is of 
importance to the current discussion.
A legal title of ownership can be based on a contract between parties or follow 
from general legal provisions, which the proprietor can exercise towards all. 
Within the subject of alliance, a common example of ownership based on a 
contract between parties is an equity investment by one company in another. 
Another example is a shared production facility between two or more companies. 
Ownership from general provisions of the law includes the right to exercise 
control against others. In this case the rights are not derived from conditions 
specified in a separate contract entered into by two parties. It should, rather, be 
considered as a virtual contract between a company and the entire society 
(including other businesses). Unlike in the case of the actual and specific contract 
between two parties, in this case the contract is tacit at best and any relation 
regarding enforcing ownership rights stems from general legal provisions. A 
presence in the same society (or market) as the company with the right of 
ownership presupposes adhering to the conditions of ownership as well as 
accepting the conditions attached to that “contract”. Examples of this type of 
contracts are patents, trademarks, copyrights and other intellectual property rights.
This division in the underlying basis for ownership bears relevance. Ownership 
stemming from contractual relationships corresponds with the traditional way of 
perceiving the firm: a portfolio of product market entities. However, as indicated 
by Hamel, a firm could also be seen as a portfolio of core competencies (Hamel 
1991). Ownership based on general legal provisions (as opposed to based on 
contracts) is related to such a perception of the firm. Ownership structures 
originating in patents, proprietary technology, brands, managerial skills and the 
like refer to such core competencies.
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Companies in the process of forming an alliance, as well as those that participate 
in an alliance need to assess all ownership-specific advantages (Dunning: 1993). 
In accordance with the above, this should be interpreted as assessing both 
ownership based on contractual agreements and ownership based on general legal 
provisions. While the former are usually apparent and not difficult to value, the 
latter may be covert and more difficult to value. Additionally, some ownership 
structures can have the characteristics that will at some times classify them in the 
one, but at other times in the other category. Technological know-how usually fits 
within the non-contractual ownership structures. However, when, as part of the 
alliance agreement, one of the companies involved in the alliance transfers 
technological know-how to the other, ownership of technology amongst the 
partners creates contractual relations. The same can be argued in the case of 
brands. Brands are intellectual property and are, therefore, enforceable towards all 
without the necessity for a multitude of separate contracts with all members of a 
society. However, the right to use a brand name or symbol can be an explicit part 
of the alliance agreement.
Control
Ownership usually comes to the surface when control is exercised. The two types 
of ownership described above, impact differently on the exercise of control by the 
owner. In order to fully understand the concept of control within alliances, it is 
important to distinguish the different elements it is composed of. These are focus, 
extent and the mechanisms through which control is exercised (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1989). Focus refers to the areas that are encompassed by control through 
the parent companies of the alliance. In other words, it relates to what part of the 
business does and what does not fall under the terms of the alliance. The wider or 
deeper the focus is, the more encompassing the alliance. The extent of control 
refers to autonomy level of the alliance vis-a-vis the parents of the alliance. 
Typically, a mature and successful joint venture enjoys more autonomy than a 
recently established shared production facility. There are no blueprints for 
autonomy per alliance type, however. It will depend on the situation and the 
demands of the parties what level of autonomy will emerge (Mohr and Spekman, 
1994; Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Reuer, 2000). In addition to this, control is also 
subject to cultural factors. Generally speaking, Japanese parent companies
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exercise more control than European parents (Wiersema and Bird, 1993; Parkhe, 
1993). American parents are somewhere in between the Europeans and the 
Japanese in this respect (Reich and Mankin, 1986).
The issue of control has been dealt with in the literature on alliances through the 
concept of the economics of transaction costs. This concept acknowledges that 
there are costs involved in exercising control. Incurring such costs is considered 
viable when they decrease opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Parents to an alliance 
will build in control mechanisms in order to assure maximisation of the output of 
the alliance, from their individual point of view. Control will be exercised in the 
relation between parent company and alliance but also in the relation between the 
two alliance partners (Hamel, 1991). The costs attached to the concept of control 
on the one hand, and the benefits of control on the other hand, indicate the essence 
of control in alliances: it is driven by a cost-benefit analysis. This analysis 
determines the place of alliances on the spectrum of costly control (hierarchy) and 
less cost-effective autonomy (market). The more control is exercised, the closer 
the alliance (or alternatively, the relation between partners22) resembles a 
hierarchy, the less control is exercised the more the relation resembles an arm’s 
length situation.
The earlier mentioned analogy of contemporary alliances (including joint 
ventures) and old-style headquarters-subsidiary relationships makes research in 
this part of the subject less novel. New features in today’s alliances require a 
different paradigm and existing literature on ownership and control needs to be 
amended. However, that is outside the scope of this thesis. We have merely 
stipulated the issue to indicate that a direct application of the traditional ownership 
and control theory does not fit well with SBAs and that further development of 
those theories is necessary to include the features of his new type of organisation. 
Although the issue of ownership and control plays an important role in SBAs, for 
the purpose of our research a more refined theory is not a priority: we can 
concentrate on our focus without the need to repair the failures of the traditional
22 As indicated, exercising control refers to the relation between partners and alliance, but also to the 
relation amongst partners. The markets and hierarchies paradigm can be applied to either situation.
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notions on ownership and control. We will end this section with some associated 
issues that are of direct relevance to our treatment of SBAs.
From contract to status
An important feature of SBAs regarding the relation between ownership and 
control is that in alliances ownership often does not only refer to tangible assets 
but also to intangible assets as knowledge and skills. When such assets form the 
basis for the alliance to one or more of the partners involved, the challenge of 
control has a special dimension compared to control of tangible assets. To be sure, 
existing theoretical frameworks have the ability to integrate intangible assets 
within the ownership structure of a firm (Dunning, 1993). But theory on 
controlling such assets in an SBA setting remains wanted. One central question for 
managers involved in strategic linkages with other companies, including fierce 
competitors, could be how not to expose intangible assets (for example 
information on efficient working practices in an area outside the scope of the 
alliance) that do not require exposure for the alliance to work. Assessing 
ownership versus control within SBAs is more complicated than a similar analysis 
in the case of a single firm’s relation with its wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
Depending on the type of the alliance, the level of complication is higher. In the 
case of the creation of a separate legal entity where the staff, site, and information 
infrastructure are separate, controlling information from the individual company’s 
point of view is generally less challenging than in a situation where it concerns a 
firm that has part of its equity owned by another firm and representation of that 
firm on its board of directors.
As has been indicated in the part on defining SBAs, the definition of the 
phenomenon has not provided management literature with a uniform outlook. We 
indicated the existing wide variety on this matter. Related to those definition 
issues and to our earlier assessment of the ways companies can execute their 
international strategy, some consider SBAs on par with contractual agreements; 
others consider SBAs as a form of building or buying operations. SBAs have in 
fact characteristics of both types of strategies. They share features of M&A with 
regard to adopting an approach that does not strictly rely on generic growth of the
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firm. Where an SBA distinguishes itself from an M&A, however, is the lower 
level of hierarchy. In the case of a merger or an acquisition, as explained above, 
there is one single entity. The merged firms form one company and the acquired 
firm becomes part of the firm that has acquired it. The single entity has a 
hierarchical structure. In the case of an SBA, there is more than one entity 
involved, with, as we saw above, all the difficulties of managing this is 
accompanied with. The companies do not relate in as clear hierarchical structures 
as is the case with M&A. The position of the (formerly) separated parts of a 
merger or acquisition is based upon a status: the parts of the (newly created) 
company relate to each other on the basis of a certain hierarchical structure.
The contractual status of licensing and franchising also has similarities with the 
SBA strategy. Whereas licensing and franchising merely have tactical motives, in 
the case of SBAs the partnership concerns the heart of the companies’ activities.
In terms of markets and hierarchy, the position of contractual agreements is closer 
to the market side than that of SBAs. The parts involved in a license or franchise 
agreement relate to each other on basis of a contract. This places SBAs not only 
between a market and a hierarchy but also between these two different ways of 
executing an international strategy. As a consequence it is possible for companies 
to migrate from using a contractual agreement via an SBA to a merger or 
acquisition (from contract to status).
After we discussed the important changes in the global economy that both created 
an environment for SBAs to emerge and, at the same time, made them a necessary 
alternative to more traditional organisational modes (ways of executing an 
international strategy) we reviewed some of the reasons why SBA are created. We 
followed with a brief discussion on ownership and control because the interaction 
between these two notions is important to understand the SBA phenomenon. We 
will now turn to our theories which will be tested against our case-studies.
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Chapter 2 
The theories
Introduction
In the previous chapter we presented our definition of SBAs. There we mentioned 
that we consider SBAs form-free corporate partnerships that refer to the companies’ 
core areas of activities in which the partners maintain their statutory independence. 
The fact that the companies remain independent results in a number of challenges 
related to this type of partnerships. This requires a different approach from 
management than in the case of unitary hierarchical situations (Draulans, de Man 
and Volberda, 2003). Another important feature of SBAs can be their 
concentration on reducing costs in some way. Williamson (1975,1985, 1996) has 
provided an academic framework relating organisation to minimising costs. A 
reflection of the current academic literature on SBAs will reveal a heavy 
concentration on managing risk (in its widest sense), TCE-related considerations 
underlying (the choice for) SBAs or a combination of these two. We, however, 
will turn our attention to one game theoretical application. Our central theory is 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Co-opetition. One central notion in their book, a 
new Mindset, combines war and peace. In order to expand on this notion we have 
selected two theories, each representing one dimension of the Mindset notion. 
Those two theories will also be tested against our cases. Ultimately we intend to 
draw conclusions from the applicability of our central theory, Co-opetition, and of 
the theories representing the war and peace Mindset with regard to the cases we 
have selected for this thesis.
Co-opetition
Introduction
Nalebuff and Brandenburger wrote a book that approaches business from a 
different angle than standard strategy literature does. They base their thesis on the 
premise that two central elements in business impact on companies’ activities: 
creating value and capturing value. Creating value is the establishment or the 
enlargement of demand in a particular market or market segment. Popularly,
49
creating value is referred to as “creating the pie”. Capturing value is essentially 
dividing up the pie. One of the first observations the authors make is the duality 
that exists as a consequence of these two central elements in business: they see 
creating value as an inherently co-operative process, whilst capturing value is 
inherently competitive. In other words, it takes two different types of mindset for 
companies to deal with the central elements of business.
Particularly the authors’ stance on creating value differs from most standard 
strategy literature. Most other scholars will consider creating the pie as a 
competitive process first and foremost.23 Those scholars see less of a duality in the 
firm’s behaviour when it comes to deal with the two central elements because it 
does not take two different mindsets in their approach. In Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s vision it is essential for companies to recognise their 
interdependence when it comes to creating value. In order to be successful in 
creating value, firms have to align themselves with a number of other actors 
(Players) and co-operate with them. But when it comes to dividing up value, the 
more traditional competitive approach for market share is prevalent. Capturing 
value could mean that the firm has to compete with the same actors it co-operated 
with in order to create value. The realisation of this requires new paradigms for 
firms in their relations with other actors.
The potential contribution o f  Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Co-opetition to our 
thesis
Based on these basic notions of what Nalebuff and Brandenburger set out to 
illustrate with their theory, there is justification to scrutinise their work for 
applicability to our subject SBAs. Central theme of their theory is the ability to 
create value in business that can be captured by the firm. To support the two 
central elements (creating value and capturing value) the authors make use of 
game theory because game theory offers ample flexibility.24 More specifically, 
there is another justification to scrutinise Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory. 
Their theory refers to the macro level: it sets out how the structure of the economy
23 Most notably, the works of Michel Porter build upon this premise.
24 They build on works originated by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstem.
and the state of (international) business dictates the behaviour of firms that aim to 
create value and subsequently divide that value. Due to the structure of the 
economy and the state of business, firms operating in contemporary business need 
to co-operate when they attempt to create value and compete when value needs to 
be divided. These very same macro-level dynamics may also apply to the micro 
level of a firm’s strategy when a firm opts for an SBA. An SBA too, tries to 
perform both functions at the same time: it aims to create value and is a vehicle to 
divide up the value that has been created. The creation of value refers to either 
enlarging existing market shares for the alliance partners or creating a new market 
for the partners’ benefit. Besides creating value, companies engaged in SBAs use 
these co-operative membranes as a vehicle to make arrangements on how to divide 
value after it has been created. In other words, what Nalebuff and Brandenburger 
see as the theme of co-opetition and what they consider as a duality that 
characterises contemporary business could be considered as a feature within 
SBAs. Essentially, in our thesis we will consider whether Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s macro-level analysis applies to SBAs (a micro-level form of 
organisation) of the kind that are present in the telecommunication industry.
The new mindset: war and peace
In order to appreciate Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory one first needs to 
dismiss the traditional one-dimensional notion that business is competition at all 
times. The popular analogy that follows the assumption that business can only be 
considered in competitive terms is that of equalling business to war. That, in turn, 
comes with the vision that business is about win-lose situations. Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s theory rejects such a strict interpretation of business where there 
only is room for winners and losers. In fact, the normative part in their book 
suggests that in business all could be better off if win-win approaches are sought 
constantly. In order to achieve such win-win situations, co-operation is necessary. 
Viewing business merely in terms of win-lose and warlike circumstances will 
hamper the development of such win-win situations. There is a word of caution, 
though. While business is not a constant state of war in the sense of the traditional 
literature, it is not about peace and co-operation all the time, either. There is a 
guideline to determine when business needs to be of a competitive mindset with a
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win-lose mentality and when business is of a co-operative mindset with a win-win 
mentality. This guideline is provided by the aforementioned separation between 
creating value or creating the pie, on the one hand and dividing up value or 
dividing the pie, on the other hand. When it comes to creating value the right 
mindset is co-operation and “peace” and when it comes to dividing up value the 
right mindset is competition and “war”. With this in mind, the authors continue 
that in order to increase one’s success in playing, it may be necessary to change 
the game one finds oneself in. A game refers to the situation in which one has to 
deal with players and elements of the game. Before presenting the interaction 
between the company, its players and other elements of the game, Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger present their creation named Value Net to identify the mixture of 
competition and co-operation, or co-opetition.
Understanding the Value Net
Traditional management literature overlooks one group of actors (or players), in 
the games of business. Customer, suppliers and competitors receive ample 
attention but players that provide complementary products and services are 
generally ignored. A new word is introduced as a mirror image of a competitor: a 
complementor. Nalebuff and Brandenburger define a competitor as: “a player that 
makes it less attractive for a supplier to provide resources to you when it is also 
supplying the other player than when it is supplying you alone” (p i6). This 
definition differs from mainstream definitions that focus on the production side 
and describe competitors as those that make the same or similar products.
Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s definition has the advantage that it can comfortably 
deal with situations in which companies that make the same product are 
complementors (i.e. not competitors) in one or more issue areas as well as with 
situations in which companies that make different products end up competing with 
each other. In similar fashion as the authors define a competitor, they define a 
complementor as: “a player that makes it more attractive for a supplier to provide 
resources to you when it is also supplying the other player than when it is 
supplying you alone” (pi 6). Nalebuff and Brandenburger place great importance 
on complementors. They consider an important role for supply-side 
complementaries between firms in the current information economies. They
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predict that such supply-side complementors will increasingly become the norm
and make the difference in industries where big up-front investments are necessary
for research and development. A further observation regarding complementors is
that they are always reciprocal. So it cannot be the case that one company is a
complementor vis-a-vis the other while the latter is a competitor vis-a-vis the
former. The authors describe a number of cases in which complements have made
0 ^the difference between success and failure in business. It is important for a 
business to recognise whether another player is a competitor or a complementor. 
With respect to a company’s suppliers it is important to know whether the 
relationship (or parts thereof) is essentially competitive or complementary. The 
same company can be both, competitor and complementor vis-a-vis the same 
supplier and it is therefore essential to realise what its proper role within the 
relationship is.
Complementors supplement the three other players that do receive ample attention 
in business literature. The four players (customers, suppliers, competitors and 
complementors) are divided over two dimensions. These dimensions indicate two 
fundamental symmetries. Graphically portrayed, the vertical dimension shows the 
customers and suppliers and the horizontal dimension shows the symmetry 
between competitors and complementors. This means that customers and suppliers 
are equal partners in relation to creating value, as are competitors and 
complementors when it comes to the horizontal dimension. The consequence of 
the parity between the players on one dimension is that a popular perception like
Of“the customer always has to come first” is rejected in this theory. A company 
that lifts one actor above the other of the same dimension and grants it sole 
primacy could be causing the destruction of the company’s overall value.
25 However, the authors’ observation that some downtown shopping malls have failed because of a lack 
of convenient parking seems somewhat simplistic. Other factors, like higher rents for downtown 
shopping malls compared to suburban malls, less available spaces for variety display, higher prices of 
displayed products due to less bulk purchase that in case of suburban malls and the need to compensate 
higher costs of products are likely to contribute to the failure of downtown shopping malls, perhaps 
even more so than the unavailability of parking space.
26 For example, the strong focus and primacy allocated to customers in the Six Sigma approach is 
strongly at odds with Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s vision.
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Customers
Competitors <4 Company ______ ^  Complementors
Suppliers
Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Value Net
Strictly speaking, this is just part of the Value Net; in fact it is a simplification of 
actuality. The actual Value Net needs to be extended with the company’s 
customers’ customers, the company’s suppliers’ suppliers, the company’s 
competitors’ competitors and the company’s complementors’ complementors. To 
be even more accurate and inclusive, the suppliers of the company’s suppliers’ 
suppliers need to be considered, too and so on. However, including these multiple 
perspectives would hamper the graph’s clarity. For that reason those second and 
third tier actors have been omitted. But companies are well advised to include 
these actors too in order to fully assess the game they are in. Another important 
function of the Value Net is that it helps to untangle complex relations that are the 
consequence of players occupying more than one role. A player occupying more 
than one role occurs more often than one might imagine. It is counterproductive to 
typecast an actor as having one particular role in the Value Net without taking into 
full consideration that the same actor can have multiple roles and thereby ignoring 
any of the other roles that an actor plays. Understanding the multiple roles actors 
can take and assessing their role appropriately will enhance a company’s ability to 
look for complementary opportunities as well as competitive threats.
27 Nalebuff and Brandenburger describe the example of the movie industry to illustrate a misjudgement 
in this respect. Initially, in the early 1980, this industry considered sales of videocassettes as a threat 
(competitor) only. It later discovered that, rather than a mere substitution good for movies, videos were 
often used in a complementary fashion: people would see a film in the cinemas as well as on video. 
After this observation the videos were made cheaper to benefit from opportunities to enlarge the pie.
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Special role o f  the government
The government is the ultimate example of an actor occupying multiple roles and 
able to occupy every position of the Value Net. It can appear in the role of 
customer (when buying military equipment), supplier (selling radio spectrum), 
competitor (when it competes with the private sector for personnel) or 
complementor (in the position of providing civic order). Moreover, Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger consider government extra special because it has the power to 
make laws and regulations that govern transactions amongst other players (the so-
-no
called behind-the-scenes role of the government). We would like to challenge 
the speciality of this governmental feature. It is unclear why this ability of the 
government is substantially different from the ability of companies to make (or 
change) the rules of the game. The government’s rule-making ability can be 
integrated in the framework instead of being considered a special feature outside 
the authors’ framework.29 The only difference in the case of the government vis-a- 
vis other actors is that the mandate to make rules has a stronger base because 
ultimately it comes, albeit indirectly, from the entire population of a country. But 
in essence the influence of the government’s rule-making ability on the game is 
the same as with other actors: it changes the game.
The new mindset and the Value Net
Nalebuff and Brandenburger link their war and peace mindset to the Value Net 
and pose two stem warnings. Firstly, whilst complementors are essentially 
positive because they can help to enlarge the pie, they become a liability when 
they appropriate more than they added to the pie in the subsequent phase where 
the pie is divided. The second warning refers to competitors and flags the 
likelihood of lose-lose outcomes in case of exclusively approaching one’s 
competitors with a war mindset. Such a mindset may also favour the adoption of
28 This role ties in with the parts on regulation we presented in our first chapter. Moreover, we will see 
some actual consequences of this role in the case of telecommunication alliances in the next chapter.
29 For example, when the government is a customer its ability to change the rules of the game may be 
linked to Added Value o f PARTS. Another example, when government acts as a complementor, its 
ability to create laws and regulations could be seen in combination with Scope of PARTS. In any case, 
there is no compelling reason why government should have an “extra-Co-opetition” position when it 
can be fitted in the theoretical framework.
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head-on price cutting strategies which only in exceptional cases lead to the actual 
elimination of a competitor. More common is that it merely damages the 
competitor’s operation. The competitor will then have less to lose and may 
become more aggressive in its operations towards the player that cut prices as well 
as towards other competitors. This, in turn, could lead to yet more aggressive 
behaviour within the industry leaving all actors/players ultimately worse off.
Whilst we agree with the authors’ premise that the adoption of the war-like 
mindset in all occasions is counterproductive, we do feel that not enough credence 
is given to the fact that there are sufficient examples of companies faring well due 
to the adoption of price cuts. Neither in their introductory discussion of the Value 
Net nor later on when Nalebuff and Brandenburger discuss the Players of their 
PARTS framework do they appear to acknowledge or allocate adequate weight to 
this reality. Furthermore, they do not devote much attention (or value) to the 
positive effects of price cuts to consumers. To Nalebuff and Brandenburger such 
positive effects are short-lived at best and will be detrimental in the long term.
This is because they will lead to the elimination of players in the market or will 
lead to lower investment levels for product or service improvement (e.g. through 
R&D) because subdued profits will hamper .such efforts. The former justification 
runs somewhat counter to their claim that such eliminations in the market are 
sporadic when they assert that the actual elimination of a competitor is rare. 
Evidence of the latter position is not produced and there is reason to adopt a 
contrary view. The airline industry provides a number of examples (some of which 
they indicate themselves in their book) of increased efforts to improve services 
against an overall backdrop in revenues due to price cuts. Another observation we 
would like to make, relates to the authors suggestion of an alternative approach to 
the always-on competitive mindset that will benefit all. They argue that, at times, 
it makes logical sense to let your competitors do well. This can be done through 
working together with them, as opposed to competing with them, in order to 
develop a common complement. Another way of enabling competitors to do well 
can be letting them succeed as competitors. In other words, refrain from activities 
that will frustrate the successful execution of their strategy. The first method is, in 
our view a stronger one than the latter. Particularly pressure from higher
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management levels or of shareholders may make the latter way of enabling 
competitors to do well an unrealistic one.
The Value Net, the new mindset and cartels
In sum, far from advocating the lose-win scenario of being nice and expecting 
others to reciprocate, the authors acknowledge that relationships among 
competitors are essentially win-lose. Incumbents lose when others enter the game. 
They point out that losses can be minimised if win-win interactions with new 
entrants are sought. Another point they stress is that whether it is a customer, 
supplier, competitor or complementor, no actor should be considered as friend or 
foe in all cases. All relationships exist of duality, reflecting the multiple roles of 
the actors. A final and related point they argue is that actors are complementors in 
making markets (creating the pie) and competitors in dividing up markets 
(dividing the pie). Nalebuff and Brandenburger claim that these notions are 
applicable to all types of organisations. They do, however, at no point address the 
cartel phenomenon or place it within their theory. A possible explanation for this 
is because it makes for an awkward customer in their framework. In the case of a 
cartel the market is divided up as a way of co-operation. In other words, here we 
see a cross section of the Nalebuff and Brandenburger framework. Their way out 
might be that a cartel is an illegal form of organisation but illegal or not, one 
should still be able to provide an explanation for this type of organisation.
o 1
Introducing game theory
The aforementioned discusses the authors’ presentation of the Value Net. We 
consider this presentation largely empirical in the sense that it describes what type 
of relationships every actor (business or any other organisation) has with other 
actors. The aforementioned also discusses the authors’ presentation of the co- 
opetition mindset. We consider that presentation normative: it indicates how every
30 Had we chosen the oil industry as opposed to telecommunications for our case studies, this element 
would have made for a disturbing factor.
31 Game theory started off as a branch of applied mathematics. Game theory is essentially the science 
of strategy and analyses situations in which people’s fortunes are interdependent. Game theory allows 
for a systematic development of strategies when the fate of one actor depends on what other actors do.
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actor should behave in order to create value and capture as much of it as possible. 
The next step is an assessment of a systemic method that will allow an actor to 
change the game it finds itself in. To this effect Nalebuff and Brandenburger draw 
upon game theory. Human activities, including those in the realm of business, can 
be portrayed as games. The actors in a game are called players and their 
interaction culminates in a certain outcome. From the individual player’s point of 
view, it may be beneficial to change the game in order to increase success in 
playing it. In order to change a game one or more of the five basic elements of any 
game need to be changed. Game theory does not only allow for changing the way 
the game is played but also allows for changing the game itself. The relative 
power of the players determines what each will get in a game.
Introducing PARTS
In the discussion of the Value Net, Nalebuff and Brandenburger show the different 
roles actors can perform in games. Thereby they introduce the different types of 
players. There are a number of other elements that play a role in games. In 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s discussion of game theory, and consequently in 
separate chapters, all these elements are reviewed and special attention is paid to 
how they can change the game. Ultimately, these elements are to be seen as 
building blocs that allow for a creative application to a wide variety of real-world 
situations. The five elements are present in any game and are components of a 
single whole. Various elements may seem to overlap in individual cases, which is 
because they are interdependent. It remains important, nevertheless, to assess each 
component individually to assure that none of the elements is being overlooked.
Players
The central issue with regard to this element of the game is that every actor has to 
realise that the game changes upon entering it. This, the authors consider, is a 
point that is often missed by actors before they become a player in a game. Before 
entering, it is important to assess the consequence of entering and, on basis of the 
perceived outcome of this assessment, decide whether it is worthwhile entering the 
game and becoming a player.
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When to enter a game
A sound measurement to determine whether an actor will be able to profit from 
entering a game is determining whether (s)he has Added Value (see below). It 
may not be a straightforward to determine this because the possession of Added 
Value may be covert. An actor may lack Added Value at first glance, yet carry a 
great deal of Added Value in actuality. Nalebuff and Brandenburger indicate this 
through three small cases in which they compare the different reactions of 
companies at a pivotal position with regard to creating competition in a game. In 
those cases one of the players was left without substantial or credible options in its 
game vis-a-vis the other player. None of the companies assessed in the cases had 
Added Value upon entering the game but they could all change the game due to 
the fact that their entrance would raise the level of competition in the game. 
Providing one of the players with an alternative was their Added Value. In two of 
the cases the company did not realise this, or, at the very least, did not react like it 
did and failed to profit from its attempt to enter the game. In the third case, the 
company did take advantage of its competition-enhancing position and got 
rewarded handsomely for doing so. Players should, therefore, always assess 
whether their Added Value may actually be their sheer presence in a game (that 
lacks competition) and if this is the case they should ask the beneficiary of their 
presence in the game to pay them (Nalebuff and Brandenburger call this the “Pay- 
Me-to-Play” strategy). The reason why this is important is because becoming a 
player usually comes with costs. Those could be obvious ones and the costs can be
' i 'y
low or high. In addition to obvious costs there are some hidden costs associated 
with entering a game. These so-called hidden costs of bidding, eight in total, are 
presented in the Players section but play a central role and re-appear in the 
sections of the other elements of PARTS.
As can be evidenced from their repeated quotation throughout the book, Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger place great importance on these hidden costs of bidding. 
However, a first observation is that only the first point is actually a hidden cost of 
bidding itself. The subsequent seven point, realistically, only become cost factors
32 The costs of entering a game can be as low and straightforward as quoting a price over the telephone 
or as expensive and complicated as building a nation-wide rail network from scratch, and of course, 
everything in between those extremes.
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after the bid has proved to be successful. In other word, there is one hidden cost in 
bidding and seven hidden costs of a successful bid. This is not merely an issue of 
wrong labelling. From the way Nalebuff and Brandenburger present the eight 
hidden costs it appears that every time a company makes a competitive bid it is 
subjected to the list of hidden costs. In reality it is only subjected to the hidden 
costs associated with spending time and resources in that case. Only when the 
company actually wins over customers with its bid are the other hidden costs a 
reality.
There is a further observation regarding their eight hidden costs that needs to be 
mentioned. All but one (again the first one) of the eight hidden costs presupposes 
that the competitive bid was based on offering lower prices. Whilst this may be the 
case in a majority of cases, competitive bids are also based on improved products, 
better service or, in line with the authors’ theory, the inclusion of (additional) 
complements. Even if the occurrence of these alternative reasons as the basis for a 
competitive bid is less frequent than a straightforward lowering of price, still 
seven of the eight hidden costs of bidding have a more limited value than may 
appear at first glance.
Bringing other players into the game
A company may have sound reasons to bring other players into a game. Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger’s discussion of this part is a mixture of reasons why and ways 
in which such actors can be brought in. The circumstances will dictate which of 
the actors a company may seek to bring into the game but any of the actors in the 
Value Net could be reviewed as a possibility to bring into the game.
Bringing in customers
First and foremost a company may attempt to bring in more customers. Bringing 
in customers has two advantages from a company’s point of view. First, it 
increases potential revenue (makes the pie larger). Second, it decreases the Added
33 To be sure, the three benchmark considerations (where Nalebuff and Brandenburger state the 
disadvantage associated with the fact that existing customers, new customers and rivals will all take the 
low price the bidder sets in order to take the business away from an incumbent as a benchmark) could 
be extended beyond a competitive bid based on price to include a competitive bid on improved service. 
However, the authors explicitly focus on price-related competitive bids and seem to disregard other 
types of competitive bids.
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Value of the existing customers, thereby increasing the position of the company 
vis-a-vis all its customers.
Bringing in suppliers
Like with customers, there are a number of ways to bring in suppliers. In this case 
too, an extra supplier improves the bargaining position of the buyer (the company 
bringing in suppliers) because it makes the incumbent supplier(s) less essential. 
Bringing in complementors
Adding complements to a product or service enhances the value to customers, 
particularly if  the complements are cheap. Nalebuff and Brandenburger indicate 
that in certain scenarios the best strategy may be to become one’s own 
complementor rather than waiting for a third party to offer or develop one. 
Bringing in competitors
It may even make sense to bring competitors into the game. This could be because 
some customers may only be willing to do business unless there is competition in 
the market. Alternatively, competition may be created for an internal purpose: it 
keeps the company alert.
Nalebuff and Brandenburger also discuss the opposite situation: when there are 
too many competitors. To us, this discussion illustrates one of our points of 
criticism towards Nalebuff and Brandenburger treatment of some of the notions. 
We consider that they tend to perceive matters in a too simplistic way, at times. In 
a declining industry acquiring competitors in order to rationalise industry capacity 
is an appropriate way. However, it may be hard to buy up a competitor in an 
industry segment where one of the two (or of the few actors) may soon become 
redundant. Therefore, Nalebuff and Brandenburger suggest considering selling to 
the competitor as a workable solution in such cases. But in many of such cases 
selling will not be without some major hurdles, be those regulatory, managerial or 
imposed by labour unions.34
34 One of the few examples in which it actually happened is the UK cable industry in 2005. On that 
occasion, UK’s largest cable company NTL acquired the country’s rival and number two operator 
Telewest. However, generally, in the service industry regulatory hurdles may make this a far less 
straightforward option than Nalebuff and Brandenburger imply.
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Added Value
In game theory the concept of Added Value plays an important role in 
understanding which of the actors has power in any game. The concept of Added 
Value offers a way to measure what the different actors bring to the game they are 
in. Nalebuff and Brandenburger define Added Value as:
The size of the pie when you are in the game 
minus
the size of the pie when you are out of the game 
the difference is your Added Value
This definition will help understand that it is unlikely for an actor to obtain more 
from participating in a game than its Added Value. Otherwise, the other players 
are better off playing the game amongst themselves and thereby increasing the 
overall Added Value (“size of the pie”). The authors point out some common 
mistakes actors make in assessing their Added Value. One mistake is to only 
consider half of the overall equation. An actor should not only asses how much it 
would be worse off not participating in a game, it should also assess how much 
other actors stand to lose without its participation in the game. In other words, an 
actor should want to find out what its entrance to or presence in the game adds to 
the overall game. Such an analysis will lead to more than a mere focus on the 
minimum pay-off the actor is willing to accept. It will also include what the other 
players are willing to pay to have the actor in the game. Besides assessing how 
Added Values may be influenced by an actor entering the game, Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger also indicate the importance of assessing how Added Value 
changes in case an actor were to leave a game it is in.
Added Value of a monopoly
The notion of competition is important because whether or not a company has 
competitors has a direct impact on its Added Value. For this reason Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger distinguish between Added Value in a monopoly position and 
Added Value in a competitive market. When a company holds a monopoly 
position there is no game without this company. In other words, that company’s 
Added Value equals the entire pie. Other actors may make a claim on the pie, too
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but to what extent they will be successful depends on their Added Value when 
they make their claim vis-a-vis the Added Value of the monopolist. In a monopoly 
market, shortages can play an important role. A monopolist can create shortages 
through undersupplying customers or under-demanding a supplier’s resource. The 
latter is less common than the former.35 Nalebuff and Brandenburger review the 
advantages and disadvantages of limiting the supply (creating shortages) in a 
monopolist position and we can find ourselves in agreement with most of those. 
However, one of the disadvantages they mention is that it shrinks the pie, i.e. 
decreases the overall Added Value. We feel that this should not be classified as a 
disadvantage per se. Much will depend on the game dynamics whether this loss is 
offset by capturing a larger size of a smaller pie.
Added Value in a competitive market
As indicated, Nalebuff and Brandenburger separate their discussion of Added 
Value between the case of a monopoly and that of a competitive market. Attaining 
Added Value as a player in a competitive market differs from doing so in a 
monopolistic market. Above it was shown that for the monopolist Added Value 
equals the entire pie. In case of a competitive market the pie is shared with a large 
number of other actors which each have limited Added Value, at best.
Furthermore, creating Added Value usually comes with a cost-quality dilemma. 
Creating Added Value through improving the product will increase cost. But 
creating Added Value through cutting cost will compromise the product’s quality.
It appears that attempts to engineer Added Value are subjected to this trade-off. In 
spite of the cost-quality dilemma there are still ways to create Added Value in a 
competitive market: trade-offs and trade-ons. Regarding the former, one way is to 
raise the amount customers are willing to pay for a product improvement by more 
than the incremental cost of the improvement. In other words, if, after a product 
improvement, the price customers are willing to pay for the new product increases 
with x, Added Value is created if the extra costs of the improved product are 
below x. Similarly, Added Value is created when cost savings on a product
35 Nalebuff and Brandenburger provide an example. The control of the South African monopolist in the 
world’s diamond market, DeBeers, is used to show how a monopolist can withhold supply and also 
manage demand. Mainly through advertising, DeBeers succeeds in maintaining the belief that 
diamonds are scarce and that a second hand market is frustrated.
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amount to x but customers devalue the product for less than x. In these cases, 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger suggest to split the difference between incremental 
price and incremental cost in the first situation and between cost savings and 
decrease in price in the second situation. That will lead to win-win situations.
Supplier’s cost of improvement =y ^
Added Value is created if x > y
 ► '
Customers willing to pay for improvement = X
Trade-ons are even better than trade-offs. In case of a trade-on the cost-quality 
dilemma is eradicated completely: there is higher quality and lower cost at the 
same time. Trade-ons can be achieved through establishing a virtuous circle. With 
a virtuous circle a trade-off is turned into a trade-on. This happens when, after 
costs of an improved product have risen initially, an increase in sale volumes 
offsets the rise in cost. Because of the higher sales volumes than was the case at 
the outset, more can be invested in attempts to lower the price by benefiting from 
advantages due to higher volumes. By that time the improvement in quality has 
led to lower cost and price of the product. This will increase sales yet more. The 
result is a trade-on in the form of a virtuous circle. Similarly a virtuous circle 
appears when lowered costs lead to an improvement in quality.
Added Value of a relationship
Due to the nature of competition, companies may still fail to gain much premium 
over cost. Particularly companies with substantial fixed costs and low variable 
costs will be affected in those situations. A way to engineer Added Value in a 
competitive market is to engineer a relationship with customers. The airline 
industry was one of the first to recognise and apply this on a wide scale through 
the adoption of frequent-flyer programmes. Other industries have followed the 
same principal adjusted to the nature of their relationship with customers, much to 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s satisfaction because they think every business 
should have loyalty programmes.
Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s deviating stance on the issue o f imitation and long­
term success
Extending on the loyalty programmes, Nalebuff and Brandenburger challenge 
standard business strategy textbooks, once again. They take issue with the
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textbook argumentations that imitation erodes the Added Value of the originator 
and that business strategies cannot generate success on a long-term basis. 
Successful strategies will be imitated and copied by competitors and the originator 
will lose its edge and will need to produce a new strategy. Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger observe that strategy textbooks fail to register “healthy imitation”, 
which is win-win and, instead, consider all imitation harmful and win-lose that 
could culminate into lose-win (when a competitor imitates the winning strategy 
and applies it to the originator) or even lose-lose (in case of competing on price 
because ultimately both competitors lose when they dodge each other price). 
However, although ignored by textbooks, the existence of healthy imitation is 
evidenced by the frequent-flyer programmes. Imitation of the first frequent-flyer 
programme enabled every airliner to have a programme of its own. All had, 
therefore, their own group of loyal customers. In that scenario price cuts become 
less effective because customers are less likely to switch and lose their frequent- 
flyer advantage. It is also less risky to raise the price (slightly) because customers 
are less prone to react to such changes. With less incentive to compete on price 
and less risk for all suppliers to raise price a win-win scenario has appeared. We 
think, however, that Nalebuff and Brandenburger push this point a little too far. 
They advice companies that have invented a win -  win strategy to refrain from 
keeping it a secret. The reason why they advise this is because they argue that the 
more competitors adopt the strategy the better it is for the originator. Whilst we do 
not question the theoretical validity of their conviction, it is at odds with realism. 
Also, Nalebuff and Brandenburger do not address the realistic possibility that an 
adopter of a loyalty programme (e.g. frequent-flyer programme) will not be 
satisfied with the division of loyal customers across the industry. It then becomes 
a matter of whether the dissatisfaction is enough to upset others’ loyalty 
programmes with aggressive competitive behaviour. The threat of unhealthy 
imitation is not always apparent and a company may actually facilitate unhealthy 
imitation through a co-operative strategy. In order to guard itself against the 
occurrence of such leakage, Nalebuff and Brandenburger suggest to acquire stakes 
in those companies that are granted a large piece of the pie. That way part of the 
lost Added Value due to unhealthy imitation can be recouped. This strategy would 
be consistent with the earliest theories that provide room for co-operative 
strategies. Most notably, Williamson’s “Markets and Hierarchies” framework
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states a case for such shareholdings. However, the reasons behind arguing such 
shareholdings differ. In Williamson’s case it is for partners to establish “credible 
commitments” vis-a-vis each other whilst Nalebuff and Brandenburger see such 
shareholdings as a more direct way to create value by boosting earnings.
Rules
Theoretically games can be totally form-free but in practice most games have 
some type of structure in negotiations. In business, games are always subjected to 
rules. These rules come from custom, contracts and law. Rules, like added value, 
are an important source of power in games. Nalebuff and Brandenburger indicate 
that a Player should consider changing the rules if not satisfied with the outcome 
of the game (s)he is in or if Added Value can be increased. It is best not to 
concentrate on those rules that are well-established laws and customs but on the 
rules found in contracts, instead. Inserting or changing a single clause in contracts 
can heavily tilt the balance of power in favour of either of the contracting parties. 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger review a number of rules and analyse their effect on 
the game. In terms of contracts they separate between contracts with customers 
and contracts with suppliers. They also look at mass-market rules and the special 
position the government has regarding rule-making.
Government rules and general positioning
The government makes many rules of the game such as tax laws, patent laws and 
minimum wage laws. These laws govern transactions among all players in the 
economy. Governments also make rules that dictate what rules other players can 
make: the “meta-rules”. This is one role of antitrust laws. In their discussion on 
government rules Nalebuff and Brandenburger devote considerable attention to 
criticising the one of Federal Trade Commission’s yardsticks the so-called 
facilitating practices.37 Our reason for explicitly mentioning this is because the 
treatment of this issue is symptomatic for a more general view the authors have
36 O.E. Williamson (1975, 1985)
37 Nalebuff and Brandenburger reject FTC’s challenging of practices that allow companies to sustain 
prices above variable cost (facilitating practices). It is their opinion that FTC’s stance does not 
recognise the new economics of the knowledge-based economy. Pharmaceuticals, jet engine and other 
knowledge-based products do not fit traditional economic models. They require huge upfront R&D 
cost in relation to the variable cost of making the product. Without having the ability to price above 
variable cost such companies cannot receive a return on their investment.
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regarding business and one that surfaces at a number of places in their book. 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger are fervently opposed to competition on price, 
particularly fierce ones. Their emphasis is on preventing price wars and retaliation 
practices. As long as a market manages to contain dynamics that are detriment to 
price stability, they view the market positively. The fact that price competition can 
have positive effects for consumers is considered myopic by the authors. They 
stress that long term this will be harmful for all: producers, suppliers and 
consumers. We feel that Nalebuff and Brandenburger are perhaps too much on the 
side of the suppliers and producers and that price competition, even a prolonged 
one, can be beneficial to consumers without automatically annihilating the market. 
For example, competition in a sector like computer manufacturing has shown this 
point.
One final notion on Rules deserves attention. The significance of rules and the 
opportunities to change them are underestimated. But the freedom to change rules 
is a double-edged sword. Players should not follow rules blindly but should also 
not count on others to follow rules blindly, either. It is therefore good not to push a 
rule too far. Rules are also under threat when the ruler’s power vis-a-vis another 
Player loses ground. Even the most established rule is subjected to renegotiations 
and if a rule cannot be controlled it is risky to base a strategy on it.
Perceptions
Perceptions are an important element of the game and need to be included in any 
description of a game. A sound analysis does not only include the perception of 
the game by its actors but also how they believe other people perceive it and how 
they believe other people believe the game is perceived. The importance of 
perceptions comes to the forth in the case of negotiations. This can be illustrated 
with the classic negotiation problem of dividing up value.
Texas Shoot-Out
The so-called Texas Shoot-Out is a common rule that attempts to provide a 
practical solution in what otherwise could be a difficult negotiation process. The
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Texas Shoot-Out is a Rule often instated by partners that have set up a business or 
a partnership. In this case the Rule will help if one of the partners wants to end the 
relationship. According to the Rule, the dissatisfied partner states a price. The 
other partner then has the choice to either buy the first one out at the stated price 
or sell the partnership to the first one, again at that price. This way, if the partner 
that sets the price does this at a too low amount, the other partner will be able to 
buy the first partner’s part of the business cheaply. So if  the actor sets the price too 
low, it will sell short. Setting the price too high, however, is not in the price-setters 
favour either. It will most likely result in the other actor declining to buy-out and 
instead choosing to be bought out. The first actor, that set the price, will then be a 
victim of its own inflated price because in the Texas Shoot-Out Rule it will be 
forced to buy the other party out for the quoted price. This highlights that setting 
the price at the “right” level is crucial. This is when perceptions come into the 
equation.
In a $100 million business, a $50 million break-up price is not necessary the best 
price to suggest in case of a Texas Shoot-Out.38 From the point of view of the first 
actor (the “shooter”) not only its perception of the value of the business matters 
but also how the other partner values the business. The right strategy in setting the 
price takes both perceptions into account. So if the shooter who values the 
business at $100 million knows that the other partner values it at $60 million, 
setting the buy-out price at $50 million does not amount to a lot of sense. At $50 
million the shooter is indifferent to buying or selling but the other partner has a 
clear preference to sell its share in the business. Receiving $50 million for its “half 
share” of the business is only $10 million less than its overall valuation of the 
business. So in order to achieve the same effect (buying out its partner), the 
shooter could have stated a buy-out price of $31 million (or perhaps $35 million to 
be on the safe side).
38 Nalebuff and Brandenburger do not address this issue, but a fifty -  fifty split (and a $50 million 
stated price for the buy-out as a consequence) without taking the element of perceptions into account, 
can only meet the same appreciation from the partners if both have contributed exactly the same value 
to the venture in all respects. We expect that in practice this will hardly ever be the case.
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Struggling with the Texan Shoot-Out dilemma
Whilst the authors’ discussion of the Texan Shoot-Out is adequate, they struggle 
with answering the self-imposed question: is it reasonable to presume you know 
your partner’s perception of the value? They indicate that, although the exact 
value may be difficult to determine but one may have a fair idea based on the fact 
that it concerns one’s partner. However if, in a Texas Shoot-Out, any notion of the 
partner’s value is absent, Nalebuff and Brandenburger provide two solutions. The 
first is to fall back on the 50/50 division and a stated buy-out price of half of the 
business value. The other solution they propose is to let the other player shoot 
first. That will provide the advantage of being able to buy or sell at the stated 
price. We believe that neither of these solutions makes good advice. Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger have in fact already provided the problem with the first solution. 
The actual valuation of the business by the partners (which could, of course, differ 
from the valuation of the business by external analysts or, if  applicable, the stock 
market) is bound to produce different results. Above we saw, the consequences 
this can have in case of a buy-out offer based on a single valuation instead of 
valuations of both partners involved in the buy-out situation. In essence what the 
authors suggest with their first solution is to return to a situation without the 
element of perception taking into the equation. As for their second solution, 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger started this premise from the point that one of the 
partners was dissatisfied with the business. It is not realistic that the other partner 
will shoot first since such a position is less favourable then the position in which 
the partner can choose on basis of a stated price. Part of the Texas Shoot-Out Rule 
will be that the partner that indicates its dissatisfaction (first) is the one that will 
need to shoot first. The authors had done better if they had acknowledged that the 
Texas Shoot-Out is not much more than a shot in the dark (or, alternatively, a shot 
from the hip) for the shooting partner if it is not known how the other partner 
values the business. In other words, when attempting to provide a remedy for the 
absence of a perception of the partner’s valuation, Nalebuff and Brandenburger 
break their own rule: not only the actor’s own perception of the game is important 
but also insights in how other actors perceive the game.
Returning to the central point of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s argument on 
tactics, perceptions are fundamental to any game. This is regardless of whether
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they are accurate or not. Perceptions play a central role in negotiations. When 
people’s perceptions change, the game changes. Shaping perceptions is the 
domain of tactics. By “tactics” Nalebuff and Brandenburger specifically mean 
actions that Players take to shape the perceptions of other players. However, the 
entire interplay of actions and perceptions does not always take place in a 
transparent environment. Perceptions often need to be made under uncertain or 
even totally unknown circumstances. Nalebuff and Brandenburger refer to such 
circumstances as fog. From a tactical point of view a Player in the game has three 
options in dealing with the element of fog. (S)he can lift the fog, preserve the fog 
or stir up the fog. Applying the right treatment of fog influences successfulness in 
the game and it is therefore important that a Player chooses the right tactic in 
dealing with fog.
Preserving the fog: hiding information
Once a Player has been able to influence the perception of customers favourably, 
it has an interest in maintaining this perception. Information that leads to 
customers revising that perception needs to be prevented because it is in the 
Player’s interest to preserve the favourable impression. This can be done by -  
what Nalebuff and Brandenburger call: “burying projects that have been turned 
down”. In fact, this is a case of preventing the exposure of information that could 
potentially show a failure on the actor’s side. It is important that harmful 
information that compromises the actor’s good standing does not see the light of 
day but stays buried. Another way of preserving an attained favourable impression 
is by following the herd. That way an actor can not fail alone, failure will 
overcome all (i.e. the entire herd) and no individual loss of reputation is suffered. 
Once again, the fog is preserved. A third and final way Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger indicate to hide information in order to preserve a favourable 
impression occurs when an actor intentionally sets up mechanisms to fail.
Nalebuff and Brandenburger do not expand this last element. Given its place in the 
theory we argue that they refer to actors that fail to make a genuine effort in order 
to achieve something. By not making a genuine effort it remains unclear whether 
the actor does indeed have the necessary capability or not. Again, the fog is 
preserved because the actor hides information on his capabilities.
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Boundaries or Scope of the game
Before linking the issue of boundaries of the game or its scope to game theory, the 
most important observation regarding scope needs to be made. In principal, there 
are no boundaries to a game. But in practice boundaries are drawn for practical 
reasons. Whilst this increases oversight, the drawback is that important parts of the 
game may fall outside the scope and, thus, escape analysis. We will return to this 
below.
Rationality and irrationality
It is a misperception to assume that game theory requires rational behaviour from 
its players. That is not a reflection of reality and game theory attempts to reflect 
reality as much as possible. The early works on game theory were on zero-sum 
games as poker and chess. However, Nalebuff and Brandenburger believe that
<30
games in business are seldom zero-sum. The upshot of this is that it is not always 
about one player winning at the expense of another. Player can succeed together or 
fail together. Within such scenarios a Player will have a vested interest in the level 
of another Player’s rationality. The authors define rationality as: “a person is 
rational if  he does the best he can, given how he perceives the game (including his 
perceptions of perceptions) and how he evaluates the various possibilities in terms 
of game outcomes”40. The authors include motivations as pride, fairness, jealousy, 
spite, vengefulness, altruism and charity as possibilities that still make rational 
behaviour. In fact they condemn those that deem others as irrational when they do 
“crazy” things. Dismissing someone as irrational closes the mind and it is better to 
try seeing the world as the other person sees it, no matter how different that world 
is. However, it needs to be indicated that the authors contradict themselves on this 
point when they dismiss a cab driver in Jerusalem as “simply crazy” when he put 
pride ahead of income.
The issue of whether someone is rational or irrational is irrelevant. Viewing the 
game from all of the Players’ perspectives (multiple perspectives) is what 
counts 41 There is a tendency with actors to view games egocentrically: in other
39 This is an important assumption in Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s point of view.
40p.57
41 There may certainly be merit in doing that but we assert that anticipating the behaviour and 
perspectives of an irrational actor is easier said than done.
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words, focussing on one’s own position. Game theory’s contribution in this 
respect is that it propagates allocentrism: the importance of focusing on others. 
This, however, does not equate to ignoring one’s own position and completely 
placing others’ perspectives at the centre of analysis. Nor does it mean that an 
actor should analyse the game from the perspective of other actors. What it does 
mean is that an actor assesses how other actors analyse the game from their own 
perspective. For this analysis to be complete the actor needs to include the other 
actors’ analysis of the way he would see the world. Furthermore, it requires an 
assessment of how other actors perceive the first actor’s view of the world.
Allocentrism
Nalebuff and Brandenburger link Scope’s element of allocentrism to Added 
Value, Rules and perceptions (Tactics) through the element of Players.42 Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger acknowledge that trying to put yourself in someone else’s 
shoes is “a fundamental challenge” because you know too much about your own 
case. Their solution to overcome this is to have someone assist you. They suggest 
the aid of a colleague in a role-play. They even propose to lift this to a more 
formal level through the setting up of two teams within the company wherein one 
team plays out the company’s strategy and the other team plays the role of a 
competitor. We question the realistic nature of this suggestion. Even if it is 
actually carried out, it is doubtful whether the outcome makes for a valuable 
contribution. The second team (as the first) is still a group from within the 
company with, at least, a certain level of inside knowledge on the company that 
cannot be erased for the purpose of the role-play. How, for example, does one 
erase the “corporate culture” in these circumstances? Yet the company’s corporate 
culture will influence the ability to put oneself in someone else’s shoes. This, in 
fact, is another example of our belief that Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s strength 
lies in their theoretical framework and their weakness in their attempts to find 
practical solutions for weaknesses within their framework. Accepting that the
42 What the conceptual difference is between the consequences of this linkage between rules and 
perceptions is not clear. In the case of Rules they say: put yourself in the shoes of the other players to 
anticipate reactions to your actions. In the case of perceptions (Tactics) the linkage will lead to the 
practice of: putting yourself in the shoes of the other players to understand how they see the game. We 
believe the differences between these two notions to be minimal at best.
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framework has a few shortcomings would have been better than producing forced 
remedies that fail nevertheless.
As pointed out, at a fundamental level, there is only one game. Everything is 
connected. This makes the game enormous. Therefore, in practice games are 
divided in the more workable strategic levers of PART (Players, Added Value, 
Rules and Tactics) but in theory there are no boundaries. Consequently, in order to 
complete Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory, one last element needs to be 
included: Scope of the game. Because there are no boundaries every game is 
linked to other games. A game in one place affects games elsewhere and today’s 
games influence future games. Also, the mere anticipation of future games 
influences current games. It is, therefore, important to recognise the links between 
games. Once a Player has distinguished links, they can be used to its benefit. A 
Player can also decide to either create links or severe existing ones. These actions 
change the scope of the game.43
Links between games
Since PART describes all there is to a game it must be able to describe how the 
pieces of the whole fit together. PART must describe the links between any two 
games and is a way to classify the links. In the case of Players, any time when a 
Player of a particular game is a Player in another game, the two games are 
potentially linked. In order to assess whether the games are actually linked the rest 
of PART needs to be assessed. The player linking the two games could be anyone 
of the Value Net: customer, supplier, competitor, or complementor. Links through 
Added Value can emerge each time customers or suppliers participate in multiple 
markets. There is, however, a caveat to this with regard to Added Value. When an 
actor enters another game, (s)he may become his/her own competitor rather than 
complementor. In that case, (s)he lowers rather than raises Added Value in the 
original game: this is called cannibalisation. Rules constrain players’ movements. 
Through such constraints, otherwise separate games can be linked together. Two 
games can also be linked because an actor intends to do so by way of Tactics. 
Issuing threats or establishing precedents are Tactics that create links across
43 “Create” links is the terminology the authors use but it is a wrong one. This is because the authors 
state that the links are always present. It is more a matter of discovering or acknowledging them rather 
than creating them.
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games. Nalebuff and Brandenburger provide a rather elaborate discussion of links 
through the separate elements of PART.44
Hypotheses
Within the Co-opetition theory, PARTS framework provides the toolbox Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger offer actors and players in order to change the game they are 
poised to enter or that they are in, respectively. Having reviewed those aspects of 
Co-opetition that most likely may find their application to our feature strategic 
business alliances it has become apparent, once again, that the target of the theory 
is not alliances, per se but instead a variety of aspects of business in general. In a 
broad sense, Co-opetition provides the tools for players (and potential players) to 
spot all types of potential co-operative opportunities, as well as tools to watch out 
for competitive threats. A realisation of the value that we hope Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger*s work will have to our thesis depends on whether a shift from the 
macro level (the intended target of the authors) to a micro one (where SBAs 
reside) can be made so that the PARTS framework will generate contributory 
value to developments in the cases we selected. In order to establish whether 
indeed this shift can be made and the Co-opetition framework adds value to the 
main topic of our thesis, we have formulated two hypotheses that link Co-opetition 
to SBAs. These two hypotheses will, in combination with some other hypotheses 
derived from two other theories below, form the basis of our assessment of Co- 
opetition’s relation to SBAs in the telecommunication industry.
1 Schematically, the Value Net provides a clear overview of how a range of 
other Players relate to the featured company.
2 Although constructed for conducting business in general, Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s Co-opetition framework has both analytical theoretical and 
practical relevance for the more specific phenomenon of SBAs.
44 This is not done for Players because it is taken for granted that the games have one or more players 
in common.
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Classification of alliances
Alliances and competition
As we indicated an important branch within the literature on alliances is that part 
of the literature that includes an overview of the different types of alliances one 
can distinguish in the wider field of corporate partnerships. Over time this section 
of the literature has grown in stature and matured in outlook. This maturity shows 
itself in increasingly sophisticated models of classification of alliances that 
currently show a more detailed reflection of reality than earlier models (M. Cauley 
de la Sierra, 1994; M. Y. Yosino and U.S. Rangan, 1995; R J. Mockler, 1999).
The typical aim of authors within the classification literature is to address the 
issues of manageability of alliances. In fact, the indication of the different types of 
alliances, their respective different characteristics and, often also, the reasons why 
companies resort to a particular sort within the classification presented serves a 
double purpose. Firstly, it informs the reader on the wider subject of strategic 
alliances. By providing an overview of the different types of alliances the author 
distinguishes, the reader is presented with a “navigation map”. This map may 
unravel some of the otherwise murky phenomenon of alliances. Besides this 
informative function towards those taking an interest in the question what 
constitutes an alliance, the classification literature has a second purpose. It is 
usually linked to the theme of challenges to managing strategic alliances. We have 
referred to this above in our section on ownership and control. Here it suffices to 
observe that the variation in types of alliances refers to an almost equally varied 
outlook of challenges associated with such different types of alliances.
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) have developed a useful and original model. The 
provision of their ‘integrated framework’ corresponds with the need to classify 
alliances. Their starting point is that there are two managerial dimensions that a 
firm should take into account. Every firm has the choice between co-operation, on 
the one hand, and competition, on the other. Managing alliances is all about 
optimising between these two dimensions. The two dimensions provide the tools 
to obtain the firm’s key strategic objectives. Yoshino and Rangan distinguish four 
categories within the key strategic objectives of a firm: maintaining flexibility, 
protecting core competencies, enhancing learning, and maximising added value.
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Of these four objectives two serve to enhance the firm’s effectiveness, these are 
positive objectives. The other two objectives are defensive in character: they are 
aimed at preventing loss of effectiveness rather than enhancing existing levels of 
effectiveness. One of the positive objectives within an alliance is adding value to 
an activity. The other positive objective is learning from the partner(s) within an 
alliance and thereby enhancing the firm’s strategic competencies. With regard to 
the defensive objectives, a firm must try to strike a balance in between facilitating 
flexibility through its alliance formation yet without becoming too reliant on the 
partner(s). As such this is an objective for the company engaged in an alliance. A 
fourth and final key objective of firms is to guard its core competencies or 
strategic advantages it possesses against appropriation by a partner.
Yoshino and Rangan acknowledge our earlier mentioned observation that non- 
traditional ownership structures play an important role within the subject of 
strategic alliances:
It can be argued, with some justification, that a firm’s competitive edge derives from proprietary 
knowledge. This is obvious in the case of patents; often it is not. Firms rely heavily on 
accumulated knowledge in R&D, manufacturing, marketing, and other areas for competitive 
success. Such knowledge is often not codified, and its confidentiality is critical to firms’ strategic 
plans. To prevent interfirm links from leading to uncontrolled disclosure of such information, 
protection of core competencies must be treated as an explicit strategic objective (Yoshino and 
Rangan 1995:18).
Based upon these strategic objectives, Yoshino and Rangan designed a conceptual 
framework: their typology of alliances.
Typology of alliances
pre-competitive competitive alliances
alliances B
A
pro-competitive non-competitive
alliances alliances
C D
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The diagram is based upon two variables. On the vertical axis (A and B versus C 
and D) the potential for conflict is the dividing criteria. On the horizontal axis (A 
and C versus B and D) the dividing criteria is the extent of organisational 
interaction.
conflict potential and extent of organisational interaction
high potential for conflict and 
low extent of organisational 
interaction 
A
high potential for conflict and 
high extent of organisational 
interaction 
B
low potential for conflict and 
low extent of organisational 
interaction 
C
low potential for conflict and 
high extent of organisational 
interaction 
D
Potential conflict in this typology refers to disagreements due to dividing tasks, 
costs and benefits within the alliance. However, it also refers to potential conflicts, 
which may arise from the fact that partners are competitors in the market at areas 
other than the one(s) specified in the agreement of the alliance. The extent of 
organisational interaction hosts a list of elements all forming part of the overall 
scope of interaction between two or more firms collaborating. This refers to the 
frequency of the interaction, the number of functional areas of each partner 
involved in the alliance, the kind of information that is exchanged and so forth. 
Yoshino and Rangan provide characteristics of their classified types of alliances. 
In general, pro-competitive (cell C) alliances are inter-industrial and vertically 
structured. In most of the cases these alliances are between manufacturers and 
suppliers or distributors. These types of alliances have a low level of 
organisational interaction. Because these firms are not rivals, potential of conflict 
is low. Due to these features protecting core competencies and learning vis-a-vis a 
partner are not the most important objectives within the alliance. Maintaining 
flexibility and adding value to the firm’s operations is of greater relevance. 
Contrary to pro-competitive alliances, non-competitive (D) alliances are usually 
intra-industry connections. These alliances share the fact that partners are not
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rivals with the pro-competitive alliances. The mixture of intra-industry links and 
non-competitive outlook is a consequence of different positioning of the 
companies. Input from the partners is essential to reach the alliance’s goal. The 
level of interaction is high because the co-operation is subjected to a considerable 
share of fine-tuning. Therefore maintaining flexibility is not the most crucial 
element. Learning from the alliance, however, is what partners aim to get out of 
the alliance first and foremost.
In the case of competitive (cell B) alliances, the level of organisational interaction 
is high, too. However, unlike the case of non-competitive alliances, rivalry is a 
dominant feature. The companies are involved with direct competitors in the final 
product market. In non-competitive alliances, size or core market positioning 
differ substantially. In competitive alliance this is not the case. Yet the nature of 
the alliance requires intense interaction and close co-operation, in spite of such 
competitive threats. Hence there is a high potential for conflict in this type of 
alliances. Crucial is the protection of strategic competencies. Learning through the 
alliances is of strategic importance as well. Of the different types of alliances this 
one is the newest type and the alliances that we will be assessing are typically 
from this cell.
Finally, pre-competitive alliances (cell A) are among firms from different 
industries. The firms often do not have the technological or marketing know-how 
to operate individually. Interaction is limited and competitive threats are too in the 
initial phase. In this phase flexibility, which enables the partners to fully explore 
what to do with whom, is the most important strategic objective. However, as 
product development proceeds, the phase of market commercialisation enters, 
competitive pressures increase. By that time the partners have gained more insight 
into each other’s core strengths and protecting the core competencies of the firm 
becomes the most important objective within the alliance.
This final observation indicates one of Yoshino and Rangan’s important 
contributions. Their model is not static. Firms can migrate from one cell to 
another. For example, pre-competitive alliance can turn into a competitive alliance 
over time, migrating from cell A to cell B in other words.
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The Mindset
Mindset I: “War”
Introduction:
Hamel’s model on inter-partner learning45
Hamel’s research reflects an interest in skill-based competition and has both 
complemented and challenged research on collaborations. Although not the first 
on the subject of inter-partner learning, Hamel’s approach to the subject has set a 
benchmark in this stream within the theory on SBAs.46 Particularly some of the 
more recent literature on alliances has taken Hamel’s angle on the subject on 
board and, perhaps still in an embryonic stage, it appears that a branch of inter­
partner learning is emerging in the literature.47
The following notions provide the distinctive vision of Hamel and his justification 
for alliances. Hamel’s vision on alliances is that the phenomenon is not so much 
an optimal compromise between markets and hierarchies (and here he challenges 
Williamson and his followers) but a transitional, half-way house on the road from 
markets to hierarchies: a dynamic rather than a static process.48 The difference is 
that in Hamel’s case internalisation (essentially of skills, not assets) should be the 
main aim from the individual firm’s point of view. For Hamel an alliance is not an 
alternative to market-based transactions or full ownership but an alternative to 
other modes of skills acquisitions. Such alternatives include acquiring the partner; 
licensing from the partner; or developing the needed skills through internal efforts.
45 Not everyone is convinced that inter-partner learning exists, in the first place. Cf. Weick for example. 
Although he is not addressing SBAs specifically he is doubting the existence of inter-partner learning 
(Karl E. Weick. (1991), The non-traditional quality of organizational learning, Organizational Science 
2(1): 116-124.
46 For example David Teece, also an eminent scholar in the TCE stream of theories on SBAs, preceded 
Hamel with theoretical contributions in inter-partner learning.
47 Cf. for example: Pierre Dussauge, Bernard Garrette & Will Mitchell (2000). Learning from 
competing partners: outcomes and duration of scale and link alliances. Strategic Management Journal 
vol. 21, issue 2; Prashant Kale, Harbir Singh & Howard Perlmutter (2000). Learning and protection of 
proprietary assets in strategic alliances: building relation capital. Strategic Management Journal vol.
21, issue 3; Andrew Inkpen (2000). A note on the dynamics of learning alliances: competition, co­
operation, and relative scope. Strategic Management Journal vol. 21, issue 7.
48 This is not to say that Williamson outright dismisses shifts on the market and hierarchies continuum.
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Crux of the matter is that for some skills, the so-called invisible assets, the costs of 
internal development may be almost infinite.49 Only through close observation of 
a successful partner can complex skills, based on tacit knowledge and arising out 
of a unique cultural context, be acquired. In this respect, alliances are effective 
tools to attain the firm’s goals of internalisation due to their timeliness and 
efficiency advantages. Alliances can short-circuit the process of skills acquisition 
thereby avoiding the opportunity costs of being a permanent follower in the 
industry. Internalisation via collaboration is preferred over a straight acquisition of 
the entire firm. This is because when a firm acquires another, the acquirer must 
also pay for non-distinctive assets, and is confronted with a substantially larger 
organisational integration problem.
By and large we agree with Hamel’s rationale (we will test the validity of analysis 
for our cases, below) but we would like to note one point of criticism regarding 
the final notion. Whilst it is true that the costs of acquiring the full firm are 
generally larger than those associated with forming an alliance, alliances come 
with additional costs, too. Alliances with competitors or potential competitors will 
require substantial exertions to protect the company’s core assets vis-a-vis the 
partner. Such exertions (and expenses in time, capital and personnel) will raise 
total costs. These additional transaction costs (in Williamson’s terminology) are 
not present in case of an acquisition.
Capturing value versus creating value
There are two basic processes in any alliance: value creation and value 
appropriation. Value creation depends first on whether the market and competitive 
logic of the venture is sound and then on the efficiency with which the partners 
combine their complementary skills and resources, in other words, how well they 
perform joint tasks. Each partner then appropriates value in the form of monetary 
or other benefits. In general, research has given more attention to the process of 
value creation than the process of value appropriation. This way, the literature
49 See H. Itami and T.W. Roehl (1987). Mobilizing Invisible Assets. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA.
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fails to capture the dynamics that determine collaborative outcomes, and the 
individual monetary and long-term competitive gains taken by each partner.
Hamel distinguishes two mechanisms for extracting value from an alliance: 
bargaining over the stream of economic benefits that stems directly from the 
successful execution of joint tasks, and internalising the skills of a partner. Hamel 
believes that these “value pools” are inter-related. Bargaining power at any point 
in time within an alliance is a function of which of the firms needs the other one 
the most. This, in turn, is a function of the perceived strategic importance of the 
alliance to each partner and the attractiveness to each partner of alternatives to 
collaboration. Depending on the bargaining power a partner will gain a greater or 
lesser share of the fruits of joint effort. An important issue is what factors prompt 
changes in bargaining power. Some factors will be exogenous to the partnership, 
e.g. a shift in the market or the competitive environment could devalue the 
contribution of one of the partners. However, one determinant of relative 
bargaining power that is within the firm’s control is its capacity to learn. Where 
most literature fails is in establishing the linkage between learning and bargaining 
power and the individual firm extracting value from the alliance. If bargaining 
power is a function of relative dependence it should be possible to lessen 
dependency and improve bargaining power by out-leaming one's partner.
The process of collaborative exchange
Hamel sees as alliance as a collective membrane, through which skills and 
capabilities of the partners flow. Access to people, facilities, documents and other 
sources of knowledge forms an ongoing process of collaborative exchange. As 
operating employees interact day-by-day, and continually process partner requests 
for access, a series of micro-bargains are reached on the basis of considerations of 
operational effectiveness, fairness and bargaining power. Most of these micro­
bargains are implicit rather than explicit but they carry great importance. The 
terms of trade in any particular micro-bargain may be only partially determined by 
the terms of trade which prevailed at the time the macro-bargain (the grand 
agreement that established the alliance) was struck by corporate officers. A firm
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may be in a weak bargaining position at the macro level, but may be able to strike 
a series of advantageous micro-bargains, if it possesses the capacity to learn at the 
operational level.
A skill-based view o f the firm
Instead of as a portfolio of product market entities, Hamel considers the firm as a 
portfolio of core competencies and encompassing disciplines. These disciplines 
(such as total quality control and just-in-time production) allow a product to be 
delivered to customers at the best possible price / performance trade off. 
Conceiving the firm in these terms suggests that inter-firm competition is 
essentially concerned with the acquisition of skills. Hamel’s research does not 
address why there are differences in skill endowments but focuses on the role 
international strategic alliances might play in effecting a partial redistribution of 
skills among partners. While skills discrepancies have been recognised as a 
motivation for international collaboration by other scholars before Hamel, the 
crucial distinction between acquiring such skills in the sense of gaining access to 
them and actually internalising a partner’s skills had seldom been clearly drawn 
before Hamel brought attention to this issue. This distinction is of crucial 
importance. Only once a partner’s skills have been internalised can they be applied 
to new geographic markets, new products, and new businesses. For the partners, 
an alliance may not only be a means for trading access to each other’s skills 
(quasi-internalisation) but also a mechanism for actually acquiring a partner’s 
skills (de facto internalisation).
Hamel’s model
With the aforementioned in mind we would like to present Hamel’s model of 
inter-partner learning, which rests on six core propositions that emerged from his 
research. We will review them briefly.
Competitive collaboration
Partners often regard their alliances as transitional devices where the primary 
objective is the internalisation of partner skills. Eventual termination of the 
agreement is in such situations evidence of successful learning rather than of a 
failed collaborative venture. Deskilling partners can be the unintended outcome of
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the collaborative process. In these cases the competitive implications of 
unanticipated (and usually unsanctioned) skill transfers is mostly understood when 
it is too late to prevent such skill transfers.
Hamel indicates he has found evidence for the proposition that partners who 
possess parallel internalisation and international expansion goals will find their 
relationship more contentious than partners with asymmetric intents. Particularly 
in situations of bargaining is the fact that partners possess equally ambitious 
learning goals such contentiousness apparent. In general, whenever two partners 
seek to extract value in the same form from their partnership -  whether in the form 
of inter-partner learning benefits or short-term economic benefits -  managers are 
likely to find themselves frequently engaged in contentious discussions over 
value-sharing. Managers are least troubled by recurring arguments over value 
appropriation when one partner is pursuing a learning intent and the other a short­
term earnings maximisation intent. In these cases the latter becomes progressively 
more dependent on the former. Hamel poses a warning: contentiousness does not, 
by itself, indicate collaborative failure, and an abundance of harmony and good 
will does not mean that both partners are benefiting equally in terms of enhanced 
competitiveness. If a firm merely has an intent to avoid investment and substitute 
its partner’s competitiveness it may be perfectly content not to learn from its 
partner. However, since in Hamel’s vision such a failure to learn will ultimately 
lead to a loss in the firm’s competitiveness or even threaten its independence, such 
contendness should not be considered a sign of collaborative success.
Learning and bargaining power
In a joint study with Prahalad, Hamel found that managers often voiced a concern 
that, when collaborating with a potential competitor, failure to “out-leam” one’s 
partner could render a firm first dependent and then redundant within the 
partnership, and competitively vulnerable outside it. As a consequence a “race to 
learn” emerges within a firm engaged in a competitive alliance. In doing so a firm 
moves towards its goal of independence. The more a firm succeeds in moving 
closer to its goal of independence, the better its position is to successfully raise the 
“price” for its continued participation in the alliance, particularly if its pace of 
learning is faster than that of its partner. Somewhat contrary to the co-operative
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spirit, partners in competitive alliances are more likely to view collaboration as a 
race to get to the future first, rather than getting there together.50
The more experience Hamel’s interviewees had in administrating or working 
within collaborative agreements, the more likely were they to diminish the role of 
the formal agreement in patterns of learning, control and dependence within their 
partnerships. In fact, the formal agreement, due to its perceived essentially static 
character, was placed last in most rankings of importance. This is because, 
contrary to the formal agreement, the race for capability acquisition and control is 
considered to be essentially dynamic. Interviewees indicated that power came first 
from the relative pace at which each partner was building new capabilities 
internally. This was followed by the ability to out-leam one’s partner and then by 
the relative contribution of irreplaceable inputs by each partner to the venture. 
Fuither down the ranking were the relative share of value-added and the operating 
structure (i.e. which partner’s employees held key functional posts), followed by 
the governance structure (i.e. which partner was best represented on the board and 
key executive committees). As said, last in line came the legal structure, such as 
the share of ownership and legally specified terms for the division of equity and 
profits.
Within the propositions regarding learning and bargaining power two propositions 
regarding the longevity of competitive alliances emerged from Hamel’s research. 
In general, the alliance would continue to exist so long as the partners are:
50 Interestingly, in their section on healthy imitation, Nalebuff and Brandenburger echo Hamel’s race to leam to a large extent: 
“Not everything is win- win. [...] The trick is to run faster and faster. You make a better product. Others then copy you. But by 
then you’re a step ahead. You’ve already improved your product. The game isn’t about how good your products are; it’s about 
how good you are at improving them. It isn’t where you are; it’s how fast you’re moving. It isn’t position; it is speed. [...]
What if others copy your improvement process? They become as good as you at improving products. What then? You’ve already 
improved your improvement process. [...] It’s about how good you are at improving your improvement process. [...] It’s [about] 
how fast you can speed up. It’s not about position or speed. It’s about acceleration. And in principal, there’s even improving how 
you improve your improvement process, and so on.”
(Co-opetition, p.143)
84
a) equally capable of inter-partner learning or developing skills independently and 
/o r
b) both substantially smaller than, and mutually vulnerable to, industry leaders. 
Three determinants o f learning
Internalisation is subjected to three determinants of learning: intent, transparency 
and receptivity. Intent establishes the desire to learn, transparency the opportunity 
due to a level of openness and receptivity determines the capacity to learn. In 
addition to these endogenous determinants (the firm can turn these determinants in 
its favour within the alliance) there seems to be some inherent determinant of 
inter-partner learning, more or less exogenous to the partnership itself. This 
determinant plays a deciding role in establishing whether a firm can come to 
positive long-term learning outcomes or will fail to successfully exploit 
opportunities to learn.
Intent as a determinant o f learning
One collaborative intent present in all partnerships is investment avoidance. Firms 
have either an internalisation intent or a substitution intent. In the latter case, the 
firm seems satisfied (at least in the beginning) to substitute its partner’s 
competitiveness in a particular skill area for its own lack of competitiveness. The 
presence or absence of an asymmetry in collaborative goals is important in this 
respect because Hamel found that in none of the cases did systemic learning take 
place in the absence of a clearly communicated internalisation intent. In other 
words, learning takes place by design rather than by default (e.g. through 
structural meetings by the parent company to guide and debrief its employees 
engaged in the collaborative membrane). Skill substitution or surrender by default 
occurs in the absence of design.
Hamel distinguishes four factors for observed differences in intent:
1) whether the firm considers the partnership as a permanent alternative to 
competition or as a temporary vehicle for improving its competitiveness vis-a-vis 
its partner. When a firm perceives the alliance in terms of substitution intents, it 
charachterises the partnership in terms of “role specialisation”, “complementary”
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and “centres of excellence”. These labels indicate a view of collaboration as a 
stable division of roles based on each partner’s unique skill endowments, rather 
than as a potentially low-cost route to replicating partner skills and erasing initial 
dependencies.
2) its relative resource position vis-a-vis its partner and other industry participants. 
It appeared from Hamel’s research that an abundance of resources and a legacy of 
industry leadership (perceived or real) hamper a firm to accept it has something to 
learn from a smaller partner, thus obstructing inter-partner learning.
3) its calculation of the pay-off to learning. If skills that can be acquired from a 
partner are seen as critical to the increase of the entire company’s competitiveness 
and not merely beneficial to enhancing competitiveness of a single product or 
business, internalising intent is the strongest. On the other hand, in those cases 
where competitiveness is defined solely in end product terms and no objectives 
exist to apply acquired skills across the entire company, intent is far less apparent. 
In the latter case alliances are viewed as short cuts to a more competitive product 
line by relying on a partner for crucial components or perhaps entire products. 
Furthermore, the perceived pay-off to learning is sometimes calculated in terms of 
a partner’s calculation of the cost of continued dependence, e.g. the risk of being 
arrested in its development by its counterpart’s pre-emptively ending of the 
relationship or faced with a disadvantaged position when the financial terms of the 
agreement are re-negotiated.
4) its preference for balanced versus asymetric dependence within the alliance. 
This, the weakest developed factor within Hamel’s listing, strongly reflects a 
cultural component. Particularly in alliances between Western and Japanese 
partners Hamel found that trust does not make up for asymetric dependency of one 
partner on another. In those cases where trust was absent or insufficient an intent 
to learn was to undo asymetric dependence on a partner.
Transparency as a determinant of learning
Some partners are more transparent (more open and accessible) than others. Every 
partner expects to share some skills with its opposite number. Even the most 
protective firms accept some degree of openness as a price for enticing the partner
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into the relationship and successfully executing joint tasks. Concerns expressed 
are generally relating unintended and unanticipated transfers. Such concerns arise 
in cases where managers believe their partner’s learning has exceeded what is 
deemed essential for the successful performance of joint tasks. It may turn out that 
a partner’s learning is more intensive and / or more extensive than foreseen in the 
formal agreement.
The asymetry in perceptions of relative openness are influenced by the extent to 
which a firm’s knowledge base is context-bound. Context dependent knowledge 
(e.g. principles of industrial relations in Japan) is less transparent than context-free 
knowledge (e.g. the principles of the transistor). Furthermore, the more clannish 
an organisation is the more opportunities for access will be limited, and the lower 
transparency will be. An employee involved in a partnership will generally 
maintain a sense of identity with, and loyalty to, the parent. When conflicts arise 
which reflect a clash between parent and partner goals, an employee, as a “clan 
member” to its firm, will search for solutions consistent with the parent’s goals.
In addition to organisations, some types of knowledge are more penetrable than 
others. Explicit knowledge is more encodable than tacit knowledge because it can 
be obtained from engineering drawings or extracted from patent filings. Discrete 
knowledge is more easily distracted from a partner than systemic knowledge. 
Generally, specific technologies (e.g. microprocessor chip design) are more 
transparent than deep-seated competencies (e.g. value engineering skills). In sum, 
asymmetry in the nature of skills contributed by each partner can lead to 
asymmetric learning, too.
Transparency to its partner is also determined by the pace of a firm’s innovation. 
In some cases a partner’s speed of innovation out-rans the other’s pace of 
absorption. Also, partners can employ a wide variety of active measures to limit 
transparency, e.g. gatekeeping of partner’s requests for information or its people’s 
access to the other’s staff and facilities. In the case of gatekeeping individuals are 
assigned with monitoring knowledge flows and access across the collaborative 
membrane (non-natural barriers, see below).
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Another determinant of relative transparency is the extent to which the nature of 
joint tasks require regular and intensive intermingling of staff from the partners.
At one extreme there is the situation in which a joint performance is done in an 
atmosphere of intensive cross-membrane interaction. At the other extreme, 
partners provide single “plug-in” components to the overall cooperative product or 
service, with minimal interaction. The former extreme makes partners more 
transparent than the latter does. Firms that can rely on passive or natural barriers 
(such as linguistic or cultural barriers) to transparency have an inherent advantage 
over partners that cannot. This is partly because natural barriers are the most 
difficult to overcome but more so because active measures (non-natural barriers) 
are sometimes regarded by partners as provocative. Establishing contractual 
clauses and other active means to limit transparancy opens the company up for 
partner claims of acting in bad faith or undermining trust. However, a partner that 
possesses passive barriers can claim itself the high ground of trust and openness 
whilst still reaping the benefits from difficult to breakdown barriers to partner 
intrusion.
Receptivity as a determinant o f  learning
An attitude of receptivity, i.e. generating an enthusiasm for learning, depends 
largely on whether the firm entered the alliance as a late-comer or as a laggard,
(i.e. whether the alliance was seen as a proactive choice to support ambitious 
growth goals or, alternatively, as an easy solution to an emerged deteriorated 
competitive situation: the perspective of the late-comer and laggards, 
respectively). In laggard firms, middle managers and operators are more likely to 
adopt an acquiescent attitude towards dependency and learning opportunities. 
Learning may be seen as a laudable goal but little enthusiasm is present for 
learning to take place. In those cases where the laggard firm has struggled and 
failed to maintain their competitiveness, alliances are often seen by operating-level 
employees as confirmation of their failure, and not as a means to rebuild skills. 
Such a stigma of failure is absent to firms using alliances to build skills in new 
areas, i.e. closing skill gaps as opposed to compensating for skills failures. The 
notion of receptivity applies to two levels: the corporate and individual level. 
Individual learning becomes collective (corporate) learning when (a) fragmented
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individual learning is recorded and integrated; and (b) learning is transferred 
across unit boundaries to all those who can benefit from what has been learned.
Determinants o f  sustainable learning
Once a skills gap is closed due to inter-partner learning the challenge is to prevent 
it from re-opening again in a later phase. Indeed, Hamel considers this the greater 
challenge. Whether or not a firm will succeed in preventing this from happening 
depends on several factors. All together they can be labelled “the capacity for 
self-sustaining learning”. Once a firm has successfully intercepted a partner’s 
skills it then needs to match the a partner’s underlying rate of improvement over 
time. In order to do this and ultimately break free from dependence on the partner, 
the firm has to match its pace of absorption to its partner’s pace of innovation and 
then at least equal its partner’s capability for autonomously and continuously 
improving those skills.
Final point regarding determinants of sustainable learning made by Hamel is that 
in order to fully capture the benefits of sustainable learning the lessons learned 
from the partner need to be applied to a global scale, not just regionally.
Hypotheses
In order to assess the suitability of Hamel’s theory for our cases we identify the 
following five hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1:
SBAs are not an alternative to markets or hierarchies but an independent mode of 
organisation. In other words, SBAs are a static mode with no relation to the 
markets and hierarchy continuum rather than a dynamic mode that can take any 
position between market and hierarchy.
Hypothesis 2:
Central aim of SBAs is the internalisation of skills not assets.
Hypothesis 3:
Intangible assets are the primary rationale behind the formation of SBAs.
89
Hypothesis 4:
Inter-partner learning is an endogenous tool parties use to increase their bargaining 
power. There is a constant process in which parties use their (increased) 
bargaining power in order to change the alliance so they can appropriate more 
value from it.
Hypothesis 5:
With the ultimate aim of seeking independence of one’s alliance partner, 
internalisation by both partners will lead to a race to learn.
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portfolio of market portfolio of core
entities (e.g. competencies
Porter) and
encompassing disciplines
(Hamel)
consequence of this view
skill-based inter-firm 
competition is central 
notion
operationalises in the acquisition 
of skills
▲
differs from:
quasi-internalising 
(mainly gaining access to skills) |
What is the role of international strategic alliances?
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compromise between the 
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due to invisible assets:
1) only to be duplicated through 
close observation of the “best
^  in class”
2) in case of acquisition of firm, 
non-distinctive assets also 
included in price
our note: alliances with (potential) competitors come with extra 
“transaction costs”
Mindset II: “Peace”
Introduction
As we indicated at the start of our section on the theory of SBAs, the Co-opetition 
theory from Nalebuff and Brandenburger will serve as the central theory that we 
will assess on basis of the three cases that we present at a later stage in this thesis. 
We acknowledged that Co-opetition was not written by Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger with the sole and explicit aim in mind to apply to SBAs. Hence, 
there may be a possibility that Co-opetition does not contain enough matching 
power with SBAs. With this we refer to a situation in which Co-opetition’s 
structural notions are too remote in concept to apply sufficiently direct to issues 
emerging in the treatment of our SBA cases. Because Co-opetition, by the authors’ 
own admission, is intended to provide a framework with analytical and problem­
solving instruments for all aspects of business, there is a danger that the theoretical 
framework is too broad for an application to the more specific phenomenon of 
alliances that we take interest in. We felt, therefore, a need to hedge our position 
with the extension of the central notion of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory 
through an interpretation of that central notion. In this interpretation we link the 
“peace” versus “war” mindset that Co-opetition is based on with to two articles 
that each represents one of the two mindsets: one on the war mindset and the other 
on the peace mindset. Because both articles deal with partnerships (albeit it not 
necessary the sub-specie that we will feature in our section on the cases) their 
theoretical contributions should make for a relative fluent match with our cases. In 
doing so, an assessment of the appropriateness of those articles, as an 
extrapolation of war and peace in Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s mindset, can be 
presented. It will, thereby, provide a statement on the relation between theory and 
practical experience through the cases. Finally, it could also present us with an 
opportunity to weight the mindset part of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
theoretical contribution against our cases and conclude to what extend we consider 
the theoretical framework appropriate to such type of alliances.
In order to adjust the peace and war mindset from the intended general application 
to all aspects of business (as the authors of Co-opetition seek out to achieve) to the 
more specific business phenomenon of partnerships, we will need to operationalise
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the two extreme notions in elements that fit within the theory of partnerships. In 
the previous section we have done this with the “war” side of the mindset. As we 
discussed there, Hamel has offered an almost Machiavellian approach to alliances 
that is well-suited as an operationalisation for that part of the mindset. In a similar 
manner the “peace” notion will be linked to and, subsequently, explained through 
another scholar’s treatment of a theoretical concept that we consider an 
appropriate way to portray the peace mindset. As in the case of Hamel’s race to 
learn through internalisation of skills (with a dose of suspicion towards the 
partner’s long term intentions) the operationalisation of the peace must be carried 
by a notion that is central to theories on partnerships. This is not to suggest that in 
all theories on partnerships this notion has been allocated a front seat. On the 
contrary, the key point of the implementation is to indicate that different theories 
can emphasise different, even conflicting, notions yet still provide an adequate 
theory on partnerships. It is our intention to assess which of the two extremes 
matches best with the cases we selected.
The notion o f trust as operationalisation o f the peace mindset 
Hamel’s underlying notion is that partners in an alliance will need to co-operate 
for their own benefit but need to be aware of the looming threat of acting in a 
manner detrimental to them when they co-operate. As a consequence, the 
atmosphere between the two (or more) co-operative authorities, i.e. companies that 
form the alliance, will be prone to mistrust51. Opposite to the emphasis on Hamel’s 
notions which, in practice could vary from benign prudent to outright hostile 
suspicious, is an approach to alliances that focuses on the importance of trust in 
the co-operative situations. Here too, in a practical sense, there could be a 
continuum between total and naive trust and openness on the one side and 
conditional trust (bordering benign prudence) on the other side. Neither an 
approach of hostile suspicion nor one of total trust and openness will be conducive 
for the alliance in the long run. Partners will have to decide how far from the
51 We refer to the co-operative authorities because with them such a mentality is prescribed by Hamel 
and deemed to be for the company’s own protection and in its own benefit. However, the atmosphere 
of mistrust can also manifest itself within the collaborative membrane. In other words, besides the 
parent companies of the alliance, those actually involved in the alliance’s operational side can be 
steered by mistrust too. Striking a healthy balance between a fully open and co-operative approach and 
adopting a mistrust-laden strategy may be absent and tipping too much towards the mistrust side if this 
is the dominant mood within the collective membrane.
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centre and in which direction of the two extremes they would position themselves 
in the alliance. After having assessed one half of the continuum through Hamel’s 
approach, we will now elaborate on the other half by means of Madhok’s trust- 
based approach in joint ventures (Madhok, 1995).
Madhok’s theory: introduction
Madhok starts off with the observation that an inconsistency exists with regard to 
international joint ventures. On the one hand, they have increased drastically. But 
on the other hand, managers engaged in such joint ventures express high levels of 
dissatisfaction with them. In his article, Madhok addresses this inconsistency and 
provides an explanation why there is so much dissatisfaction with international 
joint ventures. His explanation is that this is due to an overemphasis on the 
outcome of the joint ventures which neglects social processes that underlie the 
outcome. He pleads, therefore, to adopt a co-operative approach with regard to 
inter-organisational collaborative relations and this approach should be based on 
trust. He applies his theory to -  what we refer to as traditional -  international joint 
ventures, which, essentially, are between a parent company and a subsidiary in a 
foreign country.52 Madhok highlights the point we observed earlier in Yoshino and 
Rangan’s model (see above). The dual hierarchy in partnerships, which is the 
consequence of shared ownership, can give cause to high levels of potential 
conflict. In fact, that dual hierarchy breeds conflicts of interest. Such conflicts 
arise as a consequence of divergent objectives between the partners. Madhok 
argues that the upshot of such conflicts of interest is that firms engaged in joint 
ventures lose flexibility in decision making and that conflicts of interest also 
hamper the firms’ ability to co-ordinate their own activities globally.
Ownership-centred versus trust-centred approaches
Management literature concentrates on two streams to deal with the problems 
arising from conflicts of interest. One approach is the ownership-centred
52 As has been made clear in previous parts of this thesis, our focus is on a more recent form of inter- 
organisational collaborative relations: those between companies engaged in an SB A. Like in the case 
with Hamel, we are interested in the theory because it represents one o f the elements o f Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger mindset and we believe that Madhok’s theory, much like that of Hamel, occupies a 
fairly radical position within its cluster. The fact that Madhok’s focus is not exactly the same sub­
specie of general partnerships is of no concern: the important thing is to use the basis o f the argument 
and later manipulate the cases with this theory.
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approach. In this approach the parent firm’s subsidiary is wholly-owned. That 
provides the firm with unambiguous control which provide it with a tool to 
neutralise the suggested negative consequences of conflicts of interest. Through 
owning the subsidiary fully, the parent firm has enough flexibility to co-ordinate 
its activities on a global basis. Furthermore, the wholly-owned subsidiary also 
prevents loss of decision-making power on the side of the parent firm. Ownership 
enables the parent firm to apply direct means of control and it can thereby avoid 
the occurrence of problems associated with managing conflict in international 
joint ventures.
A contrasting approach focuses more on the social dimension within which the 
relationship is embedded. Where in the ownership-centred approach the desired 
flexibility came through unambiguous control, in the current approach, which is 
called the trust-centred approach, flexibility is a product of the co-operative 
attitude between the partners. In this approach the central notion is trust and its 
related elements are reciprocity, commitment and mutual forbearance. Contrary to 
the ownership-centred approach, the trust-centred approach does not consider 
ownership and control as commensurate with each other. Where the two 
approaches meet each other is in the objectives they seek to achieve. In either case 
the objective is to enhance flexibility and efficiency. Only in the case of the 
ownership-centred approach this is done through hierarchical relations while in the 
trust-centred approach it is done through emphasising the merits of social relations 
between the partners. Ownership-centred approaches are outcome oriented and 
more static than trust-centred approaches. They also fail to encompass the critical 
role social phenomena in inter-organisational relations play.
In his article, Madhok shows how he believes the trust-centred approach has added 
value to our understanding of trans-national ownership and tolerance for joint 
ventures. Before doing so, however, Madhok first examines what he constitutes as 
trust (the “dynamics of trust”).
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The structural and the social dimension o f trust 
Madhok uses Thorelli’s definition to define trust:
Trust is based on a set of mutual expectations or anticipations regarding each other’s behaviour and 
each other’s fulfilment of its perceived obligations in the light of such anticipations (Madhok, 
1995:3).
Trust refers to the probability that an actor (e.g. a partner in an alliance) violates 
implicit or explicit agreements. It refers, therefore, to a perceived likelihood of 
others acting in a self-interested manner. There are two components (or 
dimensions) associated with trust. One is the structural component and the other is 
the social component. The two components differ but are inter-related and 
reinforce each other. In essence, the structural component refers to the 
complementarity of the resources contributed. It is through the synergy of this 
resource complementarity that value added is created, which is the inducement to 
parties to contribute to and maintain in the partnership. The social component 
focuses on the quality of the relationship because that is to be believed having a 
strong impact on the nature and the value of exchange that takes place within the 
partnership. Trust, created through long-term involvement of partners, plays an 
important role in the continued benevolent exchange between parties. Because of 
trust partners behave in a manner that is not based on self-interest and trust also 
reduces the need to monitor the partner. Whenever the partnership is facing 
uncertainty, trust becomes even more important. Also, in those situations where 
performance is difficult to measure, trust can play an important role too. If trust is 
present in such a situation the inability to measure performance is less problematic 
because trust decreases the need to monitor performance.
The way the social component provides the desired flexibility is through acting 
like social “glue” within which economic exchange can occur. When parties invest 
in building trust in their relationship a stock of goodwill is created. Each party can 
draw from that stock in times of need. The realisation that the stock exists for 
either party to draw from creates an atmosphere of reciprocity and a regime of 
trust. That, in turn, encourages flexibility within the relationship. With reference to 
earlier literature, Madhok points to a caveat. For the reciprocal obligations to 
encourage flexibility, over the long term there needs to be an approximate balance
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for the regime of trust to sustain. In Hamel’s theory there is a constant need for 
parties to assess their position vis-a-vis their partner and use their bargaining 
power to increase their slice of the pie (in other words, to appropriate more value 
from the partnership). Such short term gratification is absent in Madhok’s 
interpretation of the trust-centred approach. Parties are not seeking to achieve at 
least equal satisfaction levels with each round but are content when they are 
satisfied with the general pattern of interaction even if this includes spells in which 
their proceeds from involvement are low (for example compared to their 
partner’s). As long as these periods are not too extended and fortunes turn in one 
of the subsequent phases.
The structural component of trust provides actors with an incentive to abstain from 
behaving in a self-interested manner. The incentive not to act that way comes from 
the consequences of that type of behaviour. If parties pursue self-interests they 
will undermine their own success alongside that of their partner, making that sort 
of behaviour costly. Opportunistic behaviour in the form of the pursuance of self- 
interest will deplete the potential value added that would otherwise have emerged 
from the parties’ complementaries. Because this counts for either party, both firms 
are in a mutual hostage situation. Much of this echoes Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s equally positive outlook on co-operation when they emphasise 
parties to use mutual forbearance. But Madhok goes one step further. In his 
social component of trust mutually oriented behaviour is more positive in nature. 
Here partners are not reacting because they are in a mutual hostage position 
(which constitutes a negative motivation) and they are not driven by motives to 
prevent value depletion but, instead, by attempts to enhance the relationship’s 
value. The two components together lower the probability of the occurrence of 
opportunistic behaviour and create trust by doing that. But it is important to realise 
that both components need to feature for optimal levels of trust to be present. They 
cannot substitute each other but rather, they are supplements to each other and the 
one reinforces the other. The structural component makes for the dimension that 
established the relationship. The structural component refers to the fact that the 
two parties have something valuable to offer to each other (something that can
53 This should not come as a surprise: after all we introduce Madhok in order to magnify Nalebuff and
Brandenburger’s peace mindset.
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increase the other party’s value added). This is the basis for any partnership and 
therefore the structural element of trust. Parties will refrain from self-interested 
behaviour because it will be to their own detriment if the relationship breaks 
down. That abstinence fosters trust: there is, as a consequence of the mutual 
hostage situation, a certain likelihood that the partners will act in concert. Absence 
of the structural component constitutes a situation in which at least one of the 
partners does not benefit from the relation. The presence of the structural 
component is, therefore, essential. However, the structural component is not 
sufficient to fnake the relationship sustain. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, 
when trust in the relation merely possesses the structural component and its social 
foundation is weak the potential value of the synergy that can be gained from the 
pooling of assets by the partners will be undermined. This is because in this 
situation contributions to the partnership will be more tentative. Also, the costs of 
each partner associated with the relation will increase. Expectations of the 
partner’s opportunism will increase and, consequently, more will be invested in 
installing safeguards against such opportunism. This rise in costs destroys overall 
value of the partnership. The second reason why the occurrence of a mere 
structural component of trust will jeopardise the endurance of the partnership is 
because it is impossible to continuously match contributions evenly. The social 
dimension of trust needs to perform the role of social glue to tide over periods of 
disequilibrium, provided that such periods are temporary, of course.
Likewise, the social component of trust is not self-sufficient either. A strong 
underlying social foundation enhances the potential value of the synergies the 
partners can create. Often within relations the period of inequity are temporary. If 
the social component is absent in such cases the relationship will falter. But with 
the presence of the social component the partnership will sustain and partners will 
be able to continue deriving value added from it. Had there not been a social 
component the value added obtained from the partnership would have stopped. 
Because over a period of time such inequities are frequent the social component is 
important. But the glue role it performs is not done with “superglue”. In other 
words, the social component is not able to patch together everything but merely 
facilitates the continuation of the relationship during the intermittent periods of 
inequity. Due to the social component the relation becomes more resilient than had
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there not been a social component. However, the structural basis needs to be 
present otherwise the relation will become unstable. So, like the structural 
component, the social component, too is a necessary but not a sufficient 
component of trust. For the relationship to fully benefit from trust and attaining 
flexibility and efficiency from it, both components need to be present. The 
structural component facilitates the underlying synergistic potential and the social 
component facilitates the objectives set in the collaboration. It does this through 
creating more sustained and higher quality inputs as well as through lowering 
conflict and co-ordination costs. From this we can derive what Madhok considers 
necessary conditions for successful inter-firm co-operation:
the potential for the creation of synergies that bring value added must be present; 
there must be a more mutually oriented behaviour that facilitates the creation of a 
pool of trust to tap from and enhance the relation.
Madhok indicates that a trustful relationship only comes into existence through 
gradual evolvement over time and that soft and hard commitments during the 
period of repeated successful interaction are necessary. Partnerships are further 
helped by compatibility of the partners. The greater the compatibility is the higher 
the probability of balance between inducements and contributions will be. Possible 
temporary imbalances will be smoothed out by trust. From the beginning of the 
article we know that Madhok criticises the ownership-centred approach and that 
the wholly-owned subsidiary is not the solution for the problem of dissatisfaction 
with partnerships. Besides the fact that the ownership-centred theories are static 
and that they fail to encompass the critical role of social phenomena in inter-firm 
partnerships it is not explained where those theories really fail. In the application 
of his theory to joint ventures he indicates one problem. The critical issue with 
regard to those joint ventures is that the formal distribution of income through the 
partnership is carried out on basis of the percentage of equity owned by the 
beneficiaries. That is the wrong division according to Madhok. There should be 
more equity and fairness in this division and not simply ownership percentages but 
the process of the relationship should be the lead of how residual income is 
distributed. Without the adoption of this perception of equity it will be difficult to 
encourage mutual oriented action beyond the minimum contractual obligations of
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the agreement. A final observation with regard to Madhok’s theory is on the 
relation between trust and information. Not only will a trustful orientation appear 
as a consequence of a successful pattern of interaction between partners but there 
will also be more open sharing of information. That, in turn, will lower 
information asymmetries and the scope for opportunistic behaviour. A lower scope 
of opportunism will, via a lower perceived probability of opportunism lead to a 
decrease in maintaining safeguards and thus to a higher value added.
Final remarks on Madhok’s theory
We have two brief observations on Madhok’s theory. Firstly, and this is perhaps a 
matter that will be answered when we assess the case. Essentially, our question is 
whether there are practical implications regarding the difference between the 
structural and the social components. Does this really matter or is it merely 
analytical?
The second observation is somewhat less concise and, perhaps, a more important 
issue. Madhok indicates that the structural component and the social one reinforce 
each other. The question is how, though. If we refer back to Hamel, in his theory 
the essential presence of the structural component must be present there too, 
although Hamel would not suggest that this leads to trust. In spite of the fact that 
both partners have to gain from refraining acting on basis of self-interest, Hamel 
would still warn against adopting a trusting attitude towards the partner as a 
consequence. The race to learn prevents a too trusting approach because the 
moment one has been outraced by a partner -  i.e. through inter-partner learning 
followed by internalisation of what it intended to derive from the partnership -  the 
entire basis for further co-operation has vanished. Madhok does not address these 
dynamics. In his view the structural component persists as long as there are 
potential synergies and partners will continue to co-operate as a consequence. This 
is because the mutual hostage situation drives them to act in that manner. But he 
does not indicate when or due to what synergies or potential synergies may 
disappear. Conversely, that is exactly the issue Hamel is most occupied with. He 
considers that the synergy potential is bound to disappear at some point. For the 
individual partner it is therefore best to prevent ending up as the one that has failed 
to internalise the skill sought after before the counterpart has done so. As we saw,
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the upshot of this is the race to learn which, in fact, speeds up the arrival of the 
end of potential synergies for both. Madhok, at the very least, gives the impression 
that as long as partners concentrate on the trust dimensions all will be good. By 
continuing to nurture their social dimension of trust the relationship maintains a 
strong buffer. Admitted, this does not mean that Madhok automatically considers 
the potential synergy to be present indefinitely. In fact, he explicitly indicates that 
it needs to be present as a necessary condition for the partnership to be established. 
But once established he devotes not much attention to how this will sustain other 
than through the social dimension, which, however, he does not explain how this 
process takes place. The crux of this all is that he indicates that the two 
dimensions reinforce each other but he does not expand on this or indicates how 
this reinforcing takes place. This is an important point because if  it is true that they 
reinforce each other then fostering the social component leads to the enhancement 
of the structural component, which, per definition means that the potential 
synergetic conditions remain present. In that case, Hamel’s fears for the 
inevitability of those potential or actual synergies to disappear would be 
unfounded (and the race to learn can be called off!). There is, however, in 
Madhok’s theory no indication how the social component can reinforce the 
structural one and no evidence that it does. If, for example, the dynamic of the 
industry of a partnership are as such that the potential synergetic value decreases 
(and, thus the structural component slides with it), how can the social component 
reverse the market dynamics for the partnership? The answer to that question is 
not provided by Madhok even though it is implied in his assertion. It is 
nevertheless of some relevance because the starting point of Madhok’s article is 
that there is dissatisfaction with regard to alliances. They are unstable and Madhok 
thinks that this is mainly due to the conflicts of interest that are present due to the 
dual hierarchy. Particularly in those cases where the industry changes quickly, 
dual hierarchy may lead to divergent opinions with regard to the interpretation of 
the changes in the industry. That makes the threat to the structural component a 
very real one.
Hypotheses
In order to assess the suitability of Madhok’s theory for our cases we identify the 
following two hypotheses.
102
Hypothesis 1:
Madhok’s central theme is that the presence of a sufficient amount of trust will 
decrease dissatisfaction with alliances. Given this, we will be able to attribute 
possible dissatisfaction in our case alliances to a lack of trust.
Hypothesis 2:
In those cases where we can attribute dissatisfaction to a lack of trust we can 
identify those case where there was an absence of the structural component of trust 
and those cases where there was an absence of the social component.
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The relation between the different theories used in this thesis
N alebuff and Brandenburger’s Co-opetition
Yoshino & Rangah’s typology of alliances
high potential for conflict 
low extent of / 
organisational interaction
hi^h potential for conflict 
\  high extent of 
organisational interaction
Theory of “war” (Hamel) 
Theory of “peace” (Madhok)
low potential for conflict 
low extent of 
organisational interaction
low potential for conflict 
high extent of 
organisational interaction
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Instability and high failure rate of SBAs
In management literature on SBAs, their alleged inherent instability and high 
failure rate are often cited (Das and Teng, 2000; Gill and Butler, 2003; Cauley de 
la Sierra, 1994; Bery and Bowers, 1993; Inkpen, Andrew C. and Ross, Jerry 
200154). In this respect it is often mentioned that alliances impose extra challenges 
to management due to their specific features. Given time, between the partners, 
conflicts of interest are almost a certainty. Also, the two (or more) partners may 
have differences in culture, both national and corporate, and could differ in a 
number of other ways (Gill and Butler, 2003; Koka and Prescott, 2002; Reich and 
Mankin, 1986). When these differences concern important elements to the firm or 
the partnership, for example differences in shareholder relations, it may result in 
the alliance being substantially more difficult to manage than traditional 
organisational mode or single hierarchies. The extra challenges imposed by SBAs 
to management may often be insurmountable. That then leads to the dissolution of 
the alliance which, typically, is interpreted as a failure of the SBA. Due to the 
scale in which this takes place SBAs have acquired a reputation of porcelain: they 
break easily. In turn, this high failure rate is considered to be a reflection of the 
inherent instability of alliances. For that reason, alliances should best be avoided 
or only be considered as a second or third best option compared to other modes of 
organisation, most notably mergers or acquisitions.
Whilst alliances do impose extra challenges on partners involved, it is our belief 
that the high break-up factor is not necessarily an indication of inherent instability, 
or a reason to evade this business organisational mode. For a review of the reasons 
we refer to the literature in the beginning of this paragraph, particularly the study 
by Das and Teng. Although the theme of the alleged instability of alliances is not 
at the main focus of our current research we are nevertheless interested in one 
reason amongst the many: the situation in which the alliance terminates due to 
different agendas on the development of the alliance. This is, however, not just
54 Contrary to most literature on the instability and failure of alliances, these scholars pay attention to 
when alliances should be terminated rather than finding out what alliances are to do to prolong their 
existence by taking out the instability element. Since the instability or failure of alliances is not the 
main focus of our thesis we will do neither. Our intension is to magnify and map one of reasons that 
can be attributed with alliance termination but for analytical empirical reasons rather than with a 
normative agenda.
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one single reason but a collection of a number of different ones. We will expand 
on this with the aim to later review and see whether termination of the alliances in 
our cases can be captured by any of the reasons reviewed in our extended 
assessment.
Different agendas on the development o f the alliance
As stated, there are various reasons why an SBA may be terminated. Moreover, an 
SBA may also be terminated for multiple reasons. Furthermore, some reasons may 
be connected. The issue of different agendas we are about to expand on is, for 
example, connected to reasons of alliance termination that feature changes in 
strategic objectives. Different agendas can also be connected to changes in 
corporate leadership. This dual or even triple reasoning should not impose a 
problem for our treatment even though it will not be possible to completely isolate 
our reasons from other reasons outside the scope of different agendas on the 
development of the alliance. The presence of different agendas on the 
development of the alliance at some stage is arguably the most typical reason for 
dissolution associated with failure of an SBA. However different agendas in this 
respect do not always lead to the dissolution of the alliance.
Status and Contract
It is an easy assumption to make that the parties involved are aware of the nature 
of their agreement, the different roles and their partner’s expectations. This is, 
however, a dangerous assumption. Partners may interpret the agreement and their 
role differently or may assess their partner’s expectations wrongly. Based upon 
such misunderstandings partners could end up with different agendas with regard 
to the alliance. Such different agendas may, amongst others, apply to the benefits 
of the alliance (individually or jointly), the timeframe and the level of 
commitment.
Different agendas can be a consequence of developments over time or can exist 
from the beginning of the venture. In the former case, certain developments can 
lead to divergence of the partners’ interests in the alliance. Where such divergence 
is detected on time and partners harmoniously come to a new agreement these 
changes due to dynamics in business need not have negative consequences for the
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alliance or its partners. However, in those cases where divergence of the partner’s 
goals and ambitions with regard to the alliance remains undetected before a 
confrontation between partners, negative consequences may appear. At the 
extreme this may lead to termination of the alliance. The occurrence of a 
divergence in agenda setting between partners over time is, in fact, a manifestation 
of the dynamic nature of strategic alliances. Just because there are at least two 
entities involved, dynamics within the inter-partner relation often result in shifted - 
and consequently diverging -  agendas. Whilst that can be considered an almost 
inevitability, the other case of diverging agendas is not. This is the situation where 
different agendas are not a consequence of developments over time but a fact from 
the beginning of the alliance. This can lead to a variety of cases, especially when 
one of the parties involved is aware of this fact but does not inform the other party 
(hidden agenda). It is also possible that divergent agendas existed from the 
beginning but neither of the parties realised this.
If a divergence in agenda exists between partners it is essentially an information 
problem manifested in a contracting issue: the current agreement does not reflect 
the actual will of both partners. This is because at least one of them is operating on 
the basis of false information. The original contract was never a proper one since it 
did not reflect the actual will of both parties. In case the divergence came after the 
alliance evolved over time there is a status issue: the partners have changed from 
the original contract and their current status is not reflected in the contract. Whilst 
in this case the original contract did reflect the actuality, due to the changes within 
the alliance it no longer does so.
The variables
We use the variables harmony and conflict as two opposing outcomes to indicate 
how we expect the issue of different agendas will affect the relationship between 
the SBA partners in the different scenarios. We expect that some scenarios of such 
different agendas have a higher likelihood of enhancing conflict between the 
partners than others55. We match these to opposing outcomes with differences in
55 The assumption in this respect is that the differences or divergence of interest come to the surface. If 
this is not the case (but proven by a retrospective analysis of such a divergence) the divergence will not
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time. One situation portrays scenarios in which the different agendas were present 
from the beginning of the alliance. The other corresponds with scenarios in which 
the agendas diverted during the alliance.
We consider the following scenarios in the issue of different agendas:
From the beginning Evolved over time Harmony or conflict
None of the parties 
realised
Early detection of 
divergence
Higher likelihood of 
harmony
One of the parties realised 
(hidden agenda)
(Too) late detection of 
divergence
Higher likelihood of 
conflict
When none of the parties realised that the alliance was based upon different 
agendas from its beginning, detection of the divergence may not necessarily lead 
to an increase in conflict between partners. Most important factor regarding this 
situation will be the extent to which parties will be able to understand and accept 
each other's different interpretations of the alliance based upon the agreement. 
Also important is whether all parties accept that their partner(s) acted in good 
faith. Good faith in this respect stands for genuinely not knowing that the alliance 
was based upon a misreading of actuality regarding the interpretation of each 
other’s agendas and is closely connected to trust (see section on Madhok’s theory 
of “peace”). The size of the disparity will largely determine whether the logic to 
continue the alliance is still in place. If parties decide to continue the alliance, the 
extent of the ability to accept and understand the other's point of view will 
determine whether trust in the partner has been violated. If parties decide not to 
continue the alliance, that same ability will determine whether the termination of 
the alliance will be in harmony or discord (conflict). The nature of the agreement 
in strategic alliances is generally codified in written contracts after intensive 
negotiations. Large disparities between partners from the beginning of the 
agreement are therefore unlikely. In case the contract is terminated, resemblance 
to the legal figure mistake will diminish the occurrence of substantial reparation.
have practical consequences. Changes in terms of more or less harmony / conflict will then not occur
for reasons of divergence.
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In case one of the parties realised the existence of a difference in perceiving the 
alliance from the beginning but refrained from indicating this to the counter party, 
the party with the information advantage is operating on basis of a hidden agenda. 
There are two possible outcomes: the other company discovers this in time (before 
the partner operating on basis of a hidden agenda has reached its objectives within 
the alliance), and the other company does not discover this in time. In the former 
case, there are two main ways of dealing with this. One is, the cheated party does 
not seek a termination of the alliance agreement but merely a restructuring of the 
contents. In the other possibility, which according to our opinion is more realistic, 
the cheated party seeks a termination of the agreement, regardless of whether the 
underlying rationale for the alliance has been irrevocably damaged or not. What 
has been damaged is the element of trust and other considerations are deemed to 
be secondary to that.
It is of course possible that the party operating on basis of the hidden agenda does 
this so well that the opposite party does not discover this element of cheating. In 
this case there are two possible scenarios: the cheated party moves to end the 
alliance or the party with the hidden agenda moves to end the alliance. Alliances 
will sustain as long as parties consider them to be beneficial to their objectives. In 
this case of a hidden agenda one of the parties will seek termination of the alliance 
when the alliance ceases to serve the purpose sought for by the alliance party. For 
the party that is not aware of the hidden agenda, this is until it realises that its 
objectives will not be met by the alliance due to the behaviour of the counter party 
(e.g. non-co-operative or too focused on its own objectives). Frustration with the 
course of the partnership will eventually lead to the ending of the co-operative 
agreement by the cheated party. For the ‘cheating’ party the alliance will lose its 
attraction when the item(s) on the hidden agenda have been achieved. It may then 
be able to go-it-alone or forge an alliance with a different partner to achieve new a 
goal.
The listing of these conceptually different situations has relevance for the 
likelihood of harmony and conflict thereby elaborating the break-up factor. 
Reviewing the above in tables, results in the following display:
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The issue of different agendas 
Evolved over time
Most likely to terminate or 
continue the alliance
Most likely to be 
harmonious or 
confrontational
Continue Harmonious
Will largely 
depend on
Whether the elements that 
led to the companies forging 
the alliance in the first place 
are still present after 
discovery of the divergence 
in agendas and whether it is 
possible to re-direct the 
alliance to mutual 
satisfaction.
Whether both parties see the 
differences in agendas 
developed over time as part 
of the strategic alliances 
phenomenon. Especially if  
both parties are convinced of 
mutual openness within the 
alliance so far, pursuance or 
exit of the alliance will 
prevail in harmony.
Most likely to terminate or 
continue the alliance
Most likely to be 
harmonious or 
confrontational
Terminate Confrontational
Will largely 
depend on
Whether the alliance 
underwent damage in the 
inter-partner relations in the 
period prior to establishing 
the divergent behaviour 
within the alliance due to 
different agendas. If a rift 
has occurred the chances of 
re-directing the alliance are 
slim.
Whether or not partners 
succeed in accomplishing an 
adequate agreement on 
resolving the alliance with 
an acceptable division of the 
fruits of the alliance to all 
partners. However, the fact 
that divergent agendas were 
detected (too) late usually 
indicates that some friction 
has surfaced already. It may 
proof to be too difficult to 
maintain harmony after such 
friction.
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From the beginning of the alliance
Most likely to terminate or 
continue the alliance
Most likely to be 
harmonious or 
confrontational
Continue Harmonious
Will largely 
depend on
Whether parties are mutually 
convinced of each other’s 
‘good faith’ regarding 
misinterpreting the alliance. 
Also important is the size of 
the disparity between parties 
when they realise that the 
occurrence of different 
agendas has been present 
from the beginning. The 
smaller the disparity the 
higher the likelihood that the 
alliance can sustain.
Since this is predominantly a 
contracting issue, it depends 
largely on whether the 
parties succeed in changing 
the agreement so that it 
reflects the genuine 
situation, if the disparity 
allows for closing the gap by 
means of a changing the 
original agreement. Even if  
the disparity is too large to 
cover with a revision of the 
contract, harmony will still 
be in favour: when both 
parties acted under the legal 
figure of mistake it is not 
likely that relations turn 
sour. Only if  the detection of 
the disparity came after a 
period of decreased mutual 
co-operation within the 
alliance will the relation be 
based upon confrontation 
rather than harmony.
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Other party discovers in time
Most likely to terminate or 
continue the alliance
Most likely to be 
harmonious or 
confrontational
(A) Continue Confrontational
Will largely 
depend on
Whether the issue does or 
does not dominate this 
partner’s viewing of the 
alliance. Also the extent to 
which the necessary 
elements to pursue the 
alliance are still present and 
the availability of alternative 
potential partners that can 
deliver the same desired 
value.
It is likely that trust has been 
violated from the perspective 
of the party that was cheated 
and, certainly in the short 
term a harmonious situation 
seems to be unlikely. This 
party will seek confidence- 
building measures from the 
other (in some form of 
compensation) in addition to 
a restructured agreement.
(B) Termination Confrontational
Will largely 
depend on
Whether the cheated partner 
feels that trust has been 
violated beyond any repair 
and that the necessary basis 
for co-operation has 
disappeared. Also, if for the 
partner operating on a 
hidden agenda the alliance 
after discovery of that fact 
becomes less valuable, 
termination is a likely 
consequence.
It is likely that the situation 
has created a rift between the 
partners and soured the 
relation. Termination will be 
determined by legal 
arrangements but will 
generally be in an 
antagonistic environment. 
Absence of an adequate legal 
provision or loopholes 
therein will display the 
confrontational attitude of 
the parties.
Other party does not discovers in time
Most likely to terminate or 
continue the alliance
Most likely to be 
harmonious or 
confrontational
Termination (sought by 
‘cheated’ partner)
Harmonious / 
Confrontational
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Will largely 
depend on
Whether the behaviour of the 
partner that is operating on 
basis of a hidden agenda 
frustrates the cheated partner 
to the extent that it seeks to 
end the alliance.
The cheated party will 
largely determine what the 
atmosphere will prevail. 
Whether the party that seeks 
termination blames its 
frustration on the lack of co­
operative behaviour of the 
other party and the depth of 
the frustration will determine 
how the atmosphere between 
partners will be (harmonious 
or confrontational).
Termination (sought by 
‘cheating’ partner)
Harmonious
Will largely 
depend on
The partner with the hidden 
agenda (the ‘cheating’ 
partner) will seek 
termination of the alliance 
once its objectives through 
the alliances have been 
reached.
If the party that seeks 
termination in this case 
determines the atmosphere, 
it is likely going to be 
harmonious. A scenario 
where the atmosphere may 
be confrontational is in case 
the other party is frustrated 
when it has not been able to 
achieve its objective to the 
same extent as the partner 
has. An ending of the 
alliance could be seen as to 
its detriment whilst the 
partner has been able to 
improve its situation and 
position by means of the 
alliance.
Two final remarks need to be placed with regard to the above hypotheses. Firstly, 
termination of the alliance can take place through separation of the erstwhile 
partners but also through an acquisition of one of the partners by another. 
Although these terminations differ substantially our hypotheses have not been
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expanded to include this difference. Secondly, as indicated earlier, it is important 
to realise that neither the length nor the level of harmony is a measurement for the 
success of the alliance. Success depends on the achievement of the goals the 
individual parties have set and sought to attain through the alliance. Subjectively, 
the level of attainment of these goals in the individual case determines the level of 
success for that particular partner in the alliance. In case both partners conclude 
that the alliance has contributed substantially to attaining their goals56, the alliance 
can be considered successfully from an objective perspective. The above tables 
reflect on the “instability” issue of alliances and indicate how operating on basis of 
a hidden agenda affects this issue.
56 The definition o f the goals may have shifted during the alliance’s time span. A contribution to the 
attainment of the goals, therefore, is not a simple case of comparing the originally list of goals with the 
current state of affairs.
Chapter 3
Telecommunication cases
BT’s international strategy: three stages of Concert 
Introduction
BT’s international strategy evolved for a long time around a dual approach. This 
approach manifested itself on one pillar being its main alliance Concert (with 
switching membership) and the other pillar formed by a number of smaller 
European alliances.57
B T ’s European operations
In addition to entering into one major alliance as the key approach to execute its 
intended international strategy, BT started involving itself in some smaller 
alliances in a number of European countries simultaneously when it started 
developing its main alliance. Based on the motivation to set up these alliances, BT 
applied two types of alliances in its European operations. In most cases European 
alliances were intended to exploit perceived future benefits in the national market 
where the alliance was set up (and not much more than that). In some cases, 
however, an additional reason for these alliances was beyond exploitation 
advantages present - or on the verge of becoming available. In those cases the 
rationale behind the alliance included the exploration of more widespread 
opportunities. Through these alliances BT hoped to gain expertise or knowledge 
that it would be able to apply in other markets in future. The difference between 
these two types of alliances is not as strict as our analysis may make it seem. 
Moreover, due to developments, particular alliances may have made conceptual 
shifts, i.e. originally starting out in one of the types (e.g. pure and exclusive 
exploitation of local benefits) but subsequently shifting to the other type.
Generally, we consider the pure exploitation alliances, or phases in alliances of 
this pure exploitative nature, more as tactical alliances because they are similar to
57 BT also made investments in a number of countries outside Europe, particularly India, New Zealand 
as well as in Singapore (in a joint venture with Japan’s NTT), China, Malaysia and Japan but those 
investments do not form part of a coherent (clear and integrated) strategy.
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the traditional joint ventures, as we described in the theoretical section. Where in 
alliances the explorative content was -  or became -  the dominant feature, the
CO
alliance had a more strategic element.
BT was the first privatised European telecommunication incumbent and the first 
amongst its peers to be subjected to competition in its core markets.59 Anticipating 
upcoming liberalisation of national telecommunication markets in the European 
Union, its first international strategy entailed entering some targeted 
telecommunication markets in the European Union. This way it hoped to benefit 
from the experiences it had gained by operating in a liberalised home market 
(Thatcher, 2004). Such benefits would be twofold: creating added value from the 
markets it entered ahead of the liberalisation date but also, learning from these 
alliances and thereby obtaining first mover advantages over those that would start 
operating in foreign telecommunication markets at a later stage. This strategy to 
enter European markets had a few rules. First, BT would use a variety of 
partnerships to test their effectiveness. Second, BT would not align itself with the 
incumbent operator of the country it entered but rather with potential challengers 
that, ideally, were not telecommunication operators themselves. Third, in order to 
sidestep the need to construct an infrastructure, BT sought partnerships with 
owners of nation-wide networks such as utility companies or railways. Fourth, 
lacking a customer base as a new entrant, BT would seek partners with customer 
bases from other service sectors.
In Germany BT formed a joint venture called VIAG Interkom with the German 
industrial group VIAG in 1995. Initially BT held a 50% stake but when 
Norwegian telecommunication incumbent Telenor entered both original partners 
scaled their involvement back to 45% to grant the newcomer a 10% stake. VIAG 
owned a fixed line business and digital mobile phone license. In Spain, BT set up 
fixed line operator BT Telecomunicaciones in 1994. This was followed by a 
15.8% stake in Airtel, Spain’s second mobile operator. In this consortium BT co­
operated with its biggest UK competitor Vodafone. In April 1995, BT announced
58 Because we are not concentrating our analysis on BT’s European alliances but merely review them in
order to increase overall comprehensiveness we will not expand further on this issue.
59 Spain’s Telefonica was actually the first of the European telecommunication incumbents to start the
privatisation process. However BT’s totally completed privatisation was ahead of that of Telefonica.
116
it would set up Albacom, a joint venture with Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), 
at the time the third-largest bank in Italy. Operations started in the summer of 
1995 and in 1996 Silvio Berlusconi’s Fininvest Group’s media division, Mediaset, 
joined Albacom. Target of the partnership was (and continues to be) the business 
community.
BT has been operating in Switzerland since 1989 (Geneva). Two years later BT 
also started operating from the German speaking part in Switzerland (Zurich). 
BT’s involvement is through a 21% stake in Newtelco, which operates under the 
brand name Sunrise and targets corporate customers. Other Newtelco partners 
include: Tele Danmark, Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Railways and the 
country’s largest retailer Migros. Together with its two Nordic partners from 
other ventures, Telenor and Tele Danmark, BT announced a Swedish joint venture 
called Telenordia in May 1995. The joint venture was established to offer national 
corporate services as well as global solutions from BT’s Concert alliance. A 50-50 
joint venture with Ireland’s Electricity Supply Board (ESB) was set up in Ireland. 
The combination of ESB’s extensive electricity network and BT’s 
telecommunication expertise was to challenge Ireland’s incumbent provider. BT’s 
operations in Belgium started in 1988 when it sought to serve the country’s 
business community. On 16 October 1996 BT entered into a partnership with 
Riverland to pioneer the Belgium market in providing internet and intranet 
services. In the Netherlands BT formed a 50/50 joint venture with the Dutch 
national railway network operator NS (Nederlandse Spoorwegen) in March 1996, 
after this partnership was announced on 22 November 1995. This Amsterdam- 
based joint venture was called Telfort, BV. The target market was the Dutch 
business community. Using NS’ fibre optics cable network, the joint venture 
initially offered corporate solutions and international products from Concert 
Communications Services (see below).60 Finally, in September 1997 BT acquired 
a 26% stake in France new telecommunication company Cegetel, set up by the 
water utility company Generate des Eaux (Chan-Olmsted and Jamison, 2001).61 
Cegetel was established to challenge France Telecom in both fixed and mobile
60 Subject to regulatory approval, end June 2005 Dutch incumbent and the country’s number one 
telecommunications provider, KPN, paid €980 million to acquire Telfort. Telfort had been controlled 
by Dutch investor Marcel Boekhoom, who, in turn, had obtained his 51% stake one year prior after 
Telfort had been acquired by private equity firm Greenfield and by Enertel for €25 million in 2003.
61 In April 1998 the telecommunications, publishing and entertainment divisions of General des Eaux 
changed their name to Vivendi, leaving the original name to the company’s water business.
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(through SFR) services. BT’s other shareholders besides Generate des Eaux, 
which held 44%, were Mannesman from Germany (15%) and US local telephone 
company Southwestern Bell (also 15%).62
The role o f Concert in B T ’s international operations 
Concert’s first stage
BT adopted strategic business alliances later as a tool in its international strategy 
than some of its European peers did (see our other two cases). When BT engaged 
itself in a strategic partnership most of the other incumbent telecommunication 
operators in the European Union had already joined one of the two existing 
European alliances in the two years prior to BT’s inclusion.63 BT, though a first 
mover with regard to operating as a privatised company in a liberalised home 
market, was not a first mover regarding the adoption of strategic alliances. But, 
unlike some of the European countries’ incumbents when the British company 
finally did choose for an alliance and an alliance partner, its choice was highly 
focused and made strategic sense.
On 2 June 1993 BT announced its intension to buy a 20% stake in MCI for 
approximately £4.3 billion (Bonardi, 2004). BT and Washington DC-based MCI, 
which, at the time, was the second largest telecommunication company in the US 
and the third largest international carrier in the world, were to create Concert 
Communication Services (of which 75.1% was to be controlled by BT and the 
remaining 24.9% by MCI). This Anglo-American joint venture’s main market 
segment was the corporate sector (Bonardi, 1999). Particularly the largest TNCs 
because those were considered the companies most in need for the advanced, 
integrated services Concert intended to supply. Also, that segment could bring the 
joint venture the highest margins. On 1 October regulatory clearance was 
obtained.
62 After Mannesman was acquired by Vodafone in 2000 this stake fell in Vodafone’s hands; 
Southwestern Bell changed its name to SBC Communications in 1998.
63 Stet, currently Telecom Italia, was the exception. The Italian former monopoly incumbent did not 
join an alliance until 1997. See case on Telefonica.
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A wave o f  liberalisation in telecommunication markets
Both BT and MCI anticipated an increase of competition in their home markets. In 
the UK, BT was faced with arguably the toughest regulatory regime for a former 
EU incumbent (Bonardi, 1999).64 Oftel (on 1 January 2004 replaced by Ofcom), 
the UK regulator, adopted an approach that facilitated competition in such issue 
areas as interconnection pricing, cable operators’ development and the ability for 
operators as Colt to “cherry-pick” (concentrate on only the most lucrative market 
segments without being hampered by a universal service obligation). As a 
consequence, BT’s position in the UK market came under threat and the company 
sought strategic moves that could offset possible revenue losses at home by the 
development of business abroad. For similar reasons, American operator MCI 
sought expansion overseas. The US 1996 Telecommunications Act (see below) 
provided the company with opportunities to enter a new market segment but it also 
increased competition in the long distance sector from potentially strong 
competitors. Additionally, a number of relatively new telecommunication 
operators, “start-ups” had been very successful in the US long distance market and 
were attacking MCI’s bottom line.
Through Concert, BT and MCI expected to take full advantage of the imminent 
liberalisation of telecommunication markets in the United States, Europe and 
worldwide, thereby offsetting home market losses caused by the changed 
competitive landscapes (Gottinger and Takashima, 2000). Liberalisation of 
telecommunication services in those geographical markets would be the eventual 
final step of a process set in motion in the liberalisation wave described in the first 
chapter of this thesis. BT’s previous international moves had all been in 
anticipation of such liberalisation opportunities. The altered outlook and 
conditions of the telecommunication market since the late-1980s had resulted in 
the perception that full exploitation of opportunities offered by liberalisation could 
not been achieved without a strategic partnership when liberalisation finally would 
become a reality.
64 The only other telecommunications regulator that matched UK’s in terms of toughness within the
European Union was Reg TP, the German regulator. See our case on Deutsche Telekom.
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In the US, preparations were in full swing to produce what would become the 
1996 Telecommunications Act. Both Concert partners were aware that the central 
notion of the Act would be conditional opening of long distance telephone markets 
to local telephone operators and, conversely, conditional opening of local 
telephone markets to long distance operators. The local telephone markets had 
been the sole domain of the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) for the 
last twelve years.65 An alliance with MCI would provide BT access to the US 
telecommunication market, by revenue the largest in the world. The actual 
attraction of the US market to BT was the corporate sector. Gaining access to this 
segment of the US market would bring a number of, potentially lucrative, 
possibilities to BT. First, it would enable BT to provide services for trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) it served in its home market. UK or European-based TNCs 
with offices in the US could then be served by one operator, Concert, instead of 
needing to connect with an additional separate operator in the US. This one-stop- 
shopping approach would be beneficial to the TNC and present a business 
opportunity for BT (and similarly for MCI with regard to its American customers 
with operations in the UK or other parts in Europe where BT had established an 
operation).66 Second, BT, with its US partner, would be placed better to add US 
clients to their customer bases; 30-40% of the companies BT targeted were based 
in the US. Third, BT would be able to benefit from MCI’s marketing expertise, an
fn
area in which the US company had build up a good reputation. From MCI’s 
point of view the Concert alliance, besides the reciprocal advantages to their 
clients with operations in the UK, also provided the company with a stronger 
presence in the European market. Also, although not included in the Concert joint 
venture aims, in the long run, long distance operator MCI anticipated benefiting 
from BT’s 90 year expertise in providing telecommunication services in local 
markets after liberalisation.
65 RBOC are the spin-offs sprouting from the break-up of AT&T on 1 January 1984, after an antitrust 
suit launched by the Department of Justice on which AT&T settled by accepting to break itself into 
eight smaller companies, the RBOCs or Baby Bells on 8 January 1982.
66 See our section on the role of globalisation where we mention cross-Atlantic expansion of US and 
European firms since the 1960s.
67 The most obvious example of BT gaining from its relationship with MCI in this respect is the 
adoption of the successful programme BT’s Friends and Family, which BT copied from MCI.
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Following the 1992 Green Paper on telecommunications, the European 
Commission had issued a Directive on competition in markets for 
telecommunication services on 28 June 1990.68 In this Directive the date for 
liberalisation of telecommunication services and equipment within the Union was 
set at 1 January 199869. Not included in this Directive and not subjected to its 
liberalisation conditions were satellite services, mobile telephony, paging services, 
radio broadcasting, TV broadcasting and voice telephony services to the general 
public. Separate Directives dealt with such services and stipulated to what extent 
they would be liberalised.
In addition to the national liberalisation in the United States and regional 
liberalisation in the European Union, worldwide liberalisation took place 
simultaneously. After three years of negotiations and periods of crises including 
when the US delegation walked out of the negotiating talks in April 1996, there 
finally was success. On 15 February 1997, sixty nine World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) members agreed to open up their national markets of basis 
telecommunication services to international competition. This move liberalised 
93% of global trade in telecommunication services with a value of $700 billion in 
one stroke and included the important Japanese market (Sasamoto, 1998). The 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications came into force on 5 February 1998 and
7 0provides a framework for liberalisation in a number of phases. Particularly 
important to foreign operators, it also provides a framework of regulatory 
principles.
Concert’s second stage
In 1996, supported by a strong balance sheet and pushed by criticism that it did 
not put its financial strength to sufficient use for its shareholders, BT stepped up
68 This Commission Directive, 90/388/EEC, has been of crucial important for the liberalisation process 
in EU telecommunication markets. After having been amended by subsequent Directives (e.g. 
96/19/EC and 96/2/EC), 90/388/EEC is no longer in force.
69 Luxembourg (1 July 1998), Spain (30 November 1998), Portugal and Ireland (1 January 2000) and 
Greece (31 December 2000) were offered an extension of liberalisation deadline because their 
telecommunication markets were considered to be too underdeveloped and their incumbents not 
prepared enough to meet full competition on their home turf. However, Spain waived the right to 
exercise the suggested grace period and liberalised its telecommunication markets at the same time as 
the 10 EU members that did so on 1 January 1998.
70 Sixty eight o f the sixty nine members ratified the agreement. Argentina withdrew after a dispute with 
the US on Argentine beef, textiles, peanuts and shoes.
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activities with regard to its international strategy. The first notable evidence of this 
was the negotiations with Cable and Wireless (C&W) to come to a £35 billion 
merger company. Although C&W is a UK-based telecommunication company, 
too, the merged entity would have had a sizeable international presence with 
C&W bringing operations in the Caribbean and Far East to those of BT. Talks 
collapsed, however and were called off formally on 2 May 1996.71
On 3 November 1996 Concert partners BT and MCI officially announced their 
plans to create the largest merger in corporate history after signing the definitive 
merger agreement. Under the terms of the agreement each MCI share was to be 
converted into 0.54 of a Concert American Depository Share which would have a 
value of 0.54 of a BT share converted Concert American Depository Share plus 
$6.00 in cash (PR Newswire, 1996). The merger was in fact an acquisition by BT 
of the remaining 80% of the shares it did not own already. The mixture of cash 
and shares BT offered had a value of approximately $21 billion, which meant that 
BT valued MCI in its entirety at $24 billion (Whiterow, 1996).72 
The merger was to continue under the name of the alliance between the two 
telecommunication operators, Concert. The merged entity would have its 
headquarters in Washington DC and London. Concert’s board of directors would 
comprise of 15 members, 8 from BT and 7 from MCI. Concert would be the first 
global telecommunication company with a multinational management team and 
dual transatlantic headquarters.
Regarding the division of marketing Concerts’ products and services, it was 
agreed that, for the time being, BT would continue to sell and service customers 
under its own brand in the UK and MCI would continue to do so in the US. An 
important and strategic element in the merger agreement was that MCI would
71 The challenges to form a merger between the two were posed by expected regulatory opposition. 
C&W’s Mercury, BT’s first competitor after liberalisation of the UK telecommunication market, would 
have to be sold off. Also, in Germany either company was involved in a separate alliance. Any solution 
BT and C&W would find could still have been sanctioned by the EC regulator. There were also 
conflicting assets in Hong Kong. Furthermore, for C&W to maintain what was essentially their biggest 
asset, this being the licenses it possessed overseas, a complicated take-over formula had to be worked 
out. The eventual and real deal buster was the price, however. The two companies could not agree upon 
a price.
72 This amount represented a 30% premium to the value of MCI before rumours surrounding the deal 
appeared (Whiterow, 1996).
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aggressively seek access to US local telecommunication markets (then estimated 
at a value of $100-150 billion).
At the announcement of the merger the new company was expected to generate 
revenues in excess of $42 billion, have 183,000 employees and serve 43 million 
business and residential customers in 72 countries. In their partnership BT and 
MCI had outperformed the other existing major telecommunication alliances. 
Concert was the only of the telecommunication SBAs to approach its financial 
break-even point, which would be one year ahead of the expected date announced 
at the alliance’s inception. This relative success of Concert Communication 
Services (the joint venture before the merger) provided the basis for the two 
companies to excel their co-operation from a joint venture into a merger. 
Additionally, the merger was intended to reduce costs through cumulative synergy 
benefits from full integration (instead of forming an alliance), which were 
estimated at $2.5 billion within five years following the closing of the merger. 
Continuing from their joint venture, the merged company would address the 
European and US markets and provide global services and solutions in wireless, 
global system integration, internet and intranet and specific international corporate 
services (for instance virtual private networks, conferencing, calling centres, and 
network security). Compared to 1993 when the two companies started their joint 
venture, BT had gained in experience in operating in foreign markets through a 
broad range of international relationships in Europe and other parts of the world.
In turn, MCI had been successful in its own market through capturing over 40% of 
the total growth in US’ long distance market over the last five years.
BT’s biggest international rival, AT&T, objected to the merger at US regulatory 
authorities on grounds of a lack of openness of the European market for US 
telecommunication companies (Bonardi, 1999). Nevertheless, the merger gained 
necessary approval from the US Department of Justice (on 8 July 1997 with the 
proviso that the Department would be supplied with more information on Concert) 
and the Federal Communications Commission (21 August 1997 but with the 
concession that foreign operators would be granted easier access to the UK 
market). The third regulatory body involved, the European Commission, granted
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permission to the deal on 14 May 1997 with some minor preconditions.73 More 
troublesome was obtaining permission from the owners of the companies, the 
shareholders. Those of MCI were not a threat to the deal: its shareholders 
welcomed the deal with a 77% in favour of it (European Telecommunications, 
1997a). More hesitant were BT’s shareholders. There was a general feeling that 
the price BT intended to pay was too high. Also, particularly institutional 
shareholders questioned the projected figures Concert was expected to produce as 
over-optimistic. Nevertheless on 16 April BT shareholders did approve the merger 
with a 99% vote in favour as well as a £280 million strategic alliance with 
Telefonica and a smaller partnership with Portuguese Telecom (European 
Telecommunications, 1997b).
The demise o f the B T -M C I partnership
On 10 July 1997 MCI issued a profit warning. It announced that its expected 
losses over 1997 suffered from failing to make substantial inroads into the US 
local telephone markets were not valued at the earlier indicated $400 million but 
would more likely be $800 million. As pointed out above, BT shareholders had 
almost unanimously approved the merger plans with MCI but concerns had been 
raised with regard to the price and the projected successes. MCI’s profit warning 
not only caused a resurface of those doubts that culminated in demands to 
renegotiate MCI’s price (Chan-Olmsted and Jamison, 2001). This confronted BT 
management with a dilemma. On the one hand, attempting to lower the price could 
result in MCI abandoning the deal (in which case BT’s long term plans would be 
upset) or, alternatively, MCI could resort to legal action, in addition to a £89 
million break-up fee which BT would have to pay MCI.74 On the other hand, 
failing to negotiate a substantial reduction would seriously alienate it from its 
shareholders, particularly its largest institutional investors Mercury Asset 
Management and Prudential (Reguly, 1997). With this dilemma BT’s management 
found itself in a difficult position. It stressed that the merger still made strategic
73 The Commission voiced its concern over BT’s dominance in the UK audio and videoconferencing 
market; access of competitors to Concerts transatlantic submarine cable; and fear for a monopoly 
position on the UK - US route.
4 In its home market, MCI had built up strong reputation as a litigious company. AT&T, in the 1970s 
often the recipient of such legal action had called MCI -  which stands for Microwave Communications 
Inc. -  “a law firm with a microwave antenna on its roof’ (Latour and Berman, 2005).
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sense and that the need for BT to have access to the US market was too strong to 
allow the deal to turn sour. Long term, access to the world largest telephone 
market would be in shareholders’ benefit in spite of the short term setback. MCI 
also would not want to see the deal collapse but faced similar pressure from its 
shareholder not to accept a lower price. A collapse of the deal, regardless of which 
of the sides would turn out to be most stubborn, would almost certainly send MCI 
shares in a tale spin (Jensen, 2004).75 Although BT’s management clearly still 
supported the merger plans, its CEO, Sir Peter Bonfield, was ostensibly 
disgruntled by the fact that he was only informed on the contents two days before 
the profit warning (Reguly, 1997). Whilst never voiced publicly (nor at the 
shareholders’ meeting on 16 July), rumours that BT would demand the resignation 
of MCI’s senior managers Doug Maine (CFO) and Tim Price (COO) were never 
denied. True or not, the important matter is that mutual trust between the two 
prospected partners had been violated tremendously (Whiterow, 1997).
Under pressure from its own shareholders, MCI was reluctant to accept the 
lowering of the original deal. But BT’s management did succeed in pleasing its 
owners and reduce the offer with a little over $5 billion to approximately $19 
billion. In turn, BT pledged to pay a sizeable penalty, $750 million, to MCI in case 
it would not be able to convince its shareholders to approve the new price. This 
amount was much higher than the respective original amount in the merger 
contract. That amount was $150 million and could only rise to $450 million in 
exceptional circumstances (Moss, 1997). That BT raised the standard penalty it 
had to pay with $600 million may appear odd but should be considered as a 
measure to increase the likelihood of shareholders approving the deal. However, to 
cover itself against possible dissenting shareholders in spite of the lower price, BT 
reduced the level of voting majority from 75% to 50%. It can be argued that this 
victory of BT’s shareholders can only be seen as a Pyrrhic one. MCI’s 
shareholders were dissatisfied with the write-down and the company’s 
management had had a major clash over the profit warning with its peers from the
75 The effect of a collapse on BT’s shares was less obvious and more open to interpretation.
76 There is, however, a curious side to this. Sir Peter, deputy chairman Sir Colin Marshall and non­
executive Keith Oates were all BT Board members sitting at MCI’s Board. Their presence should have
guaranteed them of knowing how MCI’s business developed and they should, therefore, have been
warned in advance that losses were substantially larger than originally portrayed.
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company that was about to acquire them. Even if MCI’s management positions, 
particularly those of the CFO and the COO, would not be affected short and long 
term, it was obvious that the atmosphere between the two management teams had 
been smudged, at the very least.
Notwithstanding recent clearing of the final regulatory hurdle (21 August 1997), 
the troubled nature of the relationship between the two companies prompted an 
opportunistic move from US’ most successful long distance telephone operator. 
WorldCom, a Clinton, Mississippi start-up delivered a $30 billion all-stock bid for 
MCI ($41.50 per share) on 1 October 1997.77 WorldCom was not the only 
company attracted by the potential opportunity to nestle between the Concert 
partners in order to acquire MCI. GTE, a non Baby Bell US local telephone 
company placed a $28 billion cash bid ($40 per share) for MCI, making this the 
biggest cash-based acquisition bid in US history (European Telecommunications, 
1997c). In the weeks that followed MCI held talks with the individual companies. 
But because the entire situation was a consequence of BT lowering its bid for 
MCI, it was not likely that BT would increase its bid again, in spite of the arrival 
of competitors. Therefore, talks were also held between MCI, BT and GTE jointly 
because BT and GTE considered a three-way merger through a joint bid in order 
to fend off WorldCom’s bid. But when WorldCom raised its bid from $41.50 per 
share to $51 per share for MCI shareholders and the total bid thereby increased to 
$37 billion in stock and cash, BT nor GTE (although it did raise its offer to $45 
per share) could follow and stop the largest corporate merger in history from 
taking place (Moss, 1997). On 10 November MCI agreed WorldCom’s 45/55 bid, 
leaving BT and Concert behind.78 BT received $7.4 billion in cash for its 20% 
stake in MCI. This was a profit on those shares of approximately $3 billion 
(Reeve, 1998). Additionally, BT received a $465 million break-up fee as a 
compensation for MCI’s negation of the merger deal (the Economist, 1998).
77 In 1985 Bernard Ebbers started Long Distance Discount Service (LDDS) in Clinton. After in 1995 
LDDS had acquired telecom provider Williams Telecom Group (WilTel) it changed its name to 
WorldCom From then on the company continued to grow using an acquisition strategy which enabled 
it to build a $7 billion corporation through over 40 acquisitions at the time of its offer for MCI.
78 In fact, this marked the second time that BT’s intended partner was snapped away from it just before 
BT intended to acquire it. In 1994, AT&T bought the US mobile company McCaw Communications 
just before BT set out to acquire the remaining shares it did not own already. Like in MCI’s case, BT 
possessed a 20% stake in McCaw.
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Whilst the settlement deal brought immediate and excellent value for BT’s 
shareholders, the company’s international strategy, based on Concert, had 
collapsed.
Concert’s third stage
With the formal completion of WorldCom’s acquisition of MCI on 14 September 
1998, BT acquired the 24.9% stake in the joint venture Concert Communications 
Services for £607 million. Concert became thereby a wholly-owned BT business. 
In order to establish Concert’s independence from MCI, it had to undergo 
alterations (estimated cost at £150 million) which were expected to take till March 
2000. Concert did not remain a wholly-owned BT business for that long, however. 
Whilst still on the rebound from MCI, BT found a new partner to fulfil its global 
ambitions. This was essential because BT’s European alliances did not provide an 
adequate backup with its main alliance off the global telecommunication map. 
These smaller European partnerships would only be able to come near any attempt 
to offset reverse conditions as a consequence of breakdown of Concert if 
cumulatively -  if  not all individually - they had been prospering at the time. But 
most of the individual alliances were suffering from adverse conditions 
themselves. In Spain, BT had intended to merge its wholly-owned BT 
Telecomunicaciones with Telefonica, which would join BT and MCI. However, 
the split between BT and MCI caused by WorldCom’s successful bid resulted in 
uncertainty regarding Telefonica’s status vis-a-vis the former Concert partners. 
Ultimately, Telefonica chose to partner MCI and WorldCom.79 BT could, 
therefore, not continue with unwinding its Spanish operations and had to restore 
them instead. However, neither BT Telecomunicaciones nor BT’s 15.8% stake in 
Airtel were very successful at the time (Telecom Markets, 1998). In Italy, BT 
expected the bidding alliance Picienne Italia which it was part of, to obtain the
O A
third cellular alliance but the consortium failed to secure one. BT had similar 
problems in Switzerland where it failed to win one of the two mobile licenses on
79 Telefonica had conducted extensive negotiations with both BT and MCI but MCI’s contacts with 
Telefonica’s international division TISA possibly could have provided the additional and determining 
leverage in the Spanish Group’s choice to follow BT or MCI (see case on Telefonica).
80 Later in 2000, BT attempted to enter the Italian mobile market once again through a different 
consortium, Blu (Cairo, 2000a). However this bid failed because the consortium collapsed over 
disagreement with regard to how to proceed during the bidding phase.
127
offer. BT’s operations in major market Germany where under strain, too. The 
company had more success in the Netherlands but the scale of this market was not 
substantial enough to compensate for less favourable conditions at other European 
ventures (Telecom Markets, 1998).
US regulatory rules prohibited BT from forming an alliance with another partner 
in the United States until WorldCom’s acquisition of MCI had been completed. As 
indicated, this formal completion took place on 14 September 1998. By that time 
the official announcement of BT’s new alliance partner had been made already. 
After some months of speculation, on 26 July AT&T and BT made public their 
intentions to form a global telecommunication alliance, through a 50/50 joint 
venture. The joint venture’s objective would be the provision of services to TNCs 
worldwide as well as to international calling needs of both businesses and 
individuals. Within this definition of these services the main focus would be on 
corporate services and network services, particularly the following three areas: 
Voice and data services including private line, frame relay and value added IP 
network services to corporations; tailor-made network services to corporations in 
specific industries (including financial, information technology and petroleum); 
carriers’ carrier service, i.e. supplying wholesale international pipelines to other 
carriers.
Under the joint venture agreement no swapping of equity between the parents was 
included. The companies' first five year plan was to combine and integrate their 
international networks and upgrade it to internet protocol (IP) networks as soon as 
possible. In order to achieve this, both companies were to invest $1 billion in US- 
based high-tech start-up companies to develop their own expertise in IP networks. 
Constructing a global IP network that would connect 100 of the world’s major 
cities via an 200 gigabits per second infrastructure would enable the joint venture 
to compete with new entrants as Equant, Global Crossing and MCI WorldCom 
that included BT’s previous Concert partner (Computer Business Review, 1998). 
Additionally, the two companies would realise some costs savings due to 
economies of scale and by-passing call settlement charges. The new joint venture, 
initially valued at $10 billion (later adjusted to $7 billion), adopted the name of 
BT’s previous SBA, Concert (but dropped the Communications Services part of
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the old brand name), which, in order to avoid confusion, we will refer to as 
Concert II in this thesis.
Geographically, BT would bolster the joint venture’s European operations and 
provide AT&T access through its European alliances. Similarly, BT would gain its 
much-desired access to the US market with AT&T, that country’s largest long­
distance operator as partner and not a competitor. AT&T’s new CEO had made 
two important US acquisitions (TCI and TCG, see below) that gave the company a 
stronger foothold in US local telephone markets. Those recent acquisitions were 
considered extra added value to BT because -  unlike the case of their intended 
merger with MCI -  on this occasion BT’s partner possessed tested and successful 
local telephony assets and thereby access to the local loop. Outside the two 
partners’ home markets, Japan, the world second largest market, would be an 
important target area. Since May 1998, following liberalisation of the Japanese 
telecommunication market, BT had established a joint venture, BT 
Communications Services, with local conglomerate Marubeni’s Telecom and 
Information division. Furthermore, following BT’s successful joint venture with 
NTT in Singapore it had a loose agreement with its Singapore partner to co­
operate on a project-by-project basis in Japan whilst maintaining (fierce) 
competitors (Sasamoto, 1998). However, on 25 April 1999 BT and AT&T 
announced their intentions to purchase each a 15% stake in Japan’s 
telecommunication company Japan Telecom for ¥220 billion (Asia Times, 1999). 
Japan Telecom was the country’s 2nd largest telecommunication carrier by revenue
tVibut 4 largest by customer base. BT and AT&T linked hereby their Japanese 
future to one of NTT’s main competitors. An alteration of the planned 15-15 per 
cent stakes in which BT bought 20% and AT&T 10% into Japan Telecom was 
completed on 2 September, two months ahead of schedule. Operations of both 
foreign companies on the Japanese market date back to the mid-1980. In 1984 
AT&T had set up a venture named Jens with 25 other Japanese companies and BT 
had first entered the Japanese market in 1985. The two Concert partners would 
fold all their existing ventures into their Japanese partnership.
In spite of strong opposition from competitors - most notably from Cable and 
Wireless and BT’s erstwhile partner MCI WorldCom (Craig, 1998) - BT and 
AT&T obtained EC regulatory approval for their joint venture on 29 March
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1999.81 The EC regulatory authorities did attach conditions to their approval, 
albeit relatively minor ones considering the magnitude of both companies. EC 
wanted to prevent a possible future merging of BT’s operations with those of 
ACC, a UK operator owned by AT&T and Telewest, one of UK’s top three cable 
operators in which AT&T held a 22% stake as a consequence of its acquisition of 
Telecommunications Inc. (TCI).82 Therefore, AT&T had to agree to sell ACC and 
create a structural and management separation between the company’s operations 
and Telewest (a so-called firewall). Included in this measure would be the 
prohibition of Telewest board membership by AT&T officials. AT&T was also 
obliged to withdraw from its unsuccessful partnership with the European alliance 
Unisource named AT&T Unisource Communications Services or AUCS (see case 
o f Telefonica, below). The EC gave permission to AT&T and BT to realise their 
plans to form an SB A in spite of the fact that on the US to UK route the parties 
had half of the traffic flow in either direction. It did so because the two companies 
had less than 20% of the capacity on this route and the EC foresaw the imminent 
availability of a vast amount of additional cheap capacity through other providers 
(European Telecommunications, 1999).
On 16 September of that same year it appeared as if  the co-operation frenzy 
between AT&T and BT was still on a high because the Concert II partners 
announced another alliance between the two of them. Marketed under the name 
Advance, BT and AT&T were to jointly offer mobile services in an attempt to 
develop a seamless global mobile telecommunication footprint. The 
announcement came at a time when in its home market the performance of BT’s 
mobile business, Cellnet, underwent a strong challenge from the number three 
Orange. The expansion of the existing partnerships in Concert II, Japan Telecom 
and a $1.3 billion joint venture in Canada with Advance pointed towards an 
increasing likelihood that the two companies would ultimately seek to merge their
81 The last regulatory hurdle, the FCC granted conditional permission on 25 October 1999.
82 Prior to the announcement of the Concert II SB A, AT&T was in search of new acquisitions in the 
European telecommunication market in order to create added value from its acquisition of US’ second 
largest cable company Telecommunications Inc. (TCI) for $45.8 billion. This acquisition was made 
under the new CEO Michael Armstrong who changed AT&T’s course and also oversaw the acquisition 
of a local US exchange carrier Teleport Communications Group (TCG). Armstrong is said to have 
called BT’s chairman Iain Vallance to suggest an alliance two days after the former’s appointment in 
October 1997. Eventually this contact led to the two companies’ SBA less than a year later (Computer 
Business Review, 1998).
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operations. However, Advance did not include any transfer of assets and soon it 
became apparent that the Advance partnership was a fairly loose one. Besides, the 
two mobile divisions were highly incompatible due to the adoption of different 
digital standards. Moreover, many of the foreign operations from either one of 
the two companies were partially owned and would complicate the structure of a 
more integrated mobile partnership (Mobile Communications Report, 1999). 
Nevertheless, the sheer size of the combination that would join AT&T’s 140 
TDMA networks in 50 countries with the 198 GSM networks in 100 countries of 
BT would make for a force the world’s number one mobile operator, 
Vodafone/AirTouch - then, itself the outcome of a very recent £34 billion merger 
deal - had to reckon with.
But Advance, nor Concert II or any of the other partnerships between BT and 
AT&T formed a threat for any competitor for more than one year. By July 2000, 
some 18 months after it started, it appeared that Concert II was already on the 
rebound. To be sure, the entire telecommunication sector was suffering from 
adverse conditions imposed by developments in the telecommunications and 
technology sector. The crash of these stocks in spring 2000 after two years of 
tremendous growth had its toll, first and foremost, on all companies involved in 
the IT sector. However, telecommunications had benefited from the inflated shares 
in IT by association and with the free fall of IT shares and companies, 
telecommunications was dragged down too. In telecommunications, this crash did 
not only affect the prime beneficiaries of the 1998 -  2000 irrational exuberance, 
the start-up telecommunication providers, but also established incumbents and 
telecommunication manufacturers. Incumbents BT and AT&T were no 
exceptions. AT&T under Armstrong had made a number of pricey acquisitions. In 
addition to the aforementioned takeovers of TCI and TCG it also purchased cable
83 Through a newly created joint venture called Wireless Corp, BT and AT&T acquired a 33% stake for 
C$ 1.4 billion (or US $934 million) in cash in Rogers Cantel Wireless Communications. This move 
aligned BT to the already existing partnership Rogers AT&T Wireless.
84 BT, like most European mobile operators, used Global System for Mobile telephones (or GSM) 
standard for its digital or 2nd generation mobile phones. This standard was developed in Europe and 
most used worldwide with a notable exception of the US. There the two dominant standards (among 
small pockets of other standards including GSM) for 2nd generation cell phones are Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA) and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), which AT&T used. With 
regard to 3rd generation, or 3G, mobile phones the incompatibility between the two companies was 
mainly with regard to the level of development. BT, as was the case with most European mobile 
operators, was well ahead of its US counterparts and Advance could not establish much more than an 
intention to bid jointly for upcoming 3G licences in targeted countries.
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television provider MediaOne for $62.5 billion, bringing the total price of these 
three acquisitions to nearly $110 billion (the Economist, 2005). The swift and 
sudden withdrawal o f liquidity from the telecommunication sector first forced 
AT&T to ration drastically and then to follow a massive expenditure slashing 
programme. Such priorities took AT&T away from the nascent Concert II SB A. 
BT found itself under similar pressures. Its expenditure had also been stepped up 
in the months before the stock market crash, albeit slightly less lavishly than 
AT&T’s. BT’s main money pit had been the 3G auctions held in a number of 
European countries, including its own. Just inside the stock market bubble the 
earlier auctions created a buzz in the telecommunication sector like never before. 
The unproven demand of customers for premium services as using the mobile 
phone to take pictures and send those over the internet, watching movies on 
mobile devices, record and listen to music and more was convincing enough for 
many telecommunication companies to engage in lengthy bidding sessions. The 
bidders included incumbents and start-up, telecommunication operators and 
conglomerates, local firms and foreign ones, European operators and operators
o r
from outside Europe, all got involved. BT acquired 3G licenses in the UK and in 
Ireland via its mobile division; and through its alliances in France (Cegetel’s 
SFR), Germany (Viag Interkom), and in the Netherlands (Telfort).86 
Early 2000 before the actual crash, BT’s performance (reflected in a sliding share 
price) was under pressure from competition in its UK home market. A number of 
other operators, including cable television companies had steadily been eating 
away market share from BT. Perhaps even more important, competition had 
driven prices down with plenty available options and capacity (the so-called 
bandwidth glut) for residential and, even more for corporate customers. Aided by 
the regulatory environment of low interconnection fees, the competitors had been 
able to squeeze BT’s margins (Cane, 2000). The occurrence of the crash enhanced 
BT’s problems: profits fell for the first time since privatisation, the share price 
continued to slide (in spite of a fundamental restructuring programme announced 
in April) and the company issued a profit warning on Concert II. The company’s
85 Particularly, the UK and the German auction generated enormous windfall revenues for their 
respective governments. In the UK, the Treasury windfall amounted to £22.4773 billion (or 214% of 
UK’s GNP) and took 150 rounds over 53 days; in Germany the auction took 14 days and 173 rounds 
and resulted in DM 98.8072 billion (or US$ 45.85 billion) extra revenue to the German federal 
government.
BT lost these licenses with the later spin-off of Cellnet.
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shareholders, after initial satisfaction with the restructuring programme, 
demanded, a mere three months later, more measures. Nationally, (institutional) 
shareholders pressed management to float BT’s yellow pages business, Yell, and 
list Cellnet. Regarding international activities they condemned the Concert II 
alliance and called for terminating it and seizing possible takeover opportunities of 
other companies.87
With both parents having troubles of their own, Concert II suffered from parental
go
neglect. The external conditions caused by the crash of the technology and 
telecommunication stocks were to a large extent to blame for that and thereby for 
the failure of the SBA. However, arguably, Concert II contributed to its own fall, 
too. Considering the type of assets it possessed, its geographical and operational 
reach and the strategy it was founded on the only way to reconcile all would be 
through the creation of an international wholesaler of network capacity. Concert II 
was a looser alliance than BT and AT&T announced it would be at its launch. 
Failure was further compounded by the fact that success in the European market 
was dependent on sales channels through subsidiaries of which BT was a partial, 
and often minority, owner. As a consequence at those European subsidiaries there 
was no full commitment to prioritise Concert II business with involvement of • 
(BT’s) partners that were no part of Concert II.
BT also suffered from its involvement in AT&T Canada where it had bought itself 
into through a 9% stake. Under the Concert II agreement BT would be obliged 
towards AT&T, which already owned 24% of the venture, to purchase another 
21% (for about $720 million) once the Canadian government would deregulate 
foreign ownership of its telecommunication companies. However AT&T Canada 
was performing poorly and BT had a serious cash-flow problem. It had just 
managed to cut its debt from $27.9 billion at the end of the third quarter of 2000 to 
$17.5 billion by the end of June so any new investments would be considered 
carefully (Lazaroff, 2001). Extra expenditure on a failing business as AT&T 
Canada would not constitute sound investment policy and would further enrage 
BT shareholders.
87 More specifically, the names of Sprint, which was denied by regulatory authorities to join MCI 
WorldCom, Telefonica and NTT were considered. But BT’s low share price had made the company a 
target for a takeover itself, more than a potential acquirer.
88 In fact, AT&T had turned inwards even more by 2001 after it self-imposed splitting into four 
separate businesses. With that important re-organisation in flow attention to Concert II was not just 
placed on ice but firm in the freezer.
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More tension between the Concert II partners emerged over operations in Japan.
As indicated earlier, Concert II considered the Japanese market pivotal. The 
explicit alliance with Japan Telecom within the Concert framework reflected that 
position. In an exclusive distribution arrangement, both BT and AT&T were to use 
Japan Telecom as the sole distributor of their services, jointly marketed through 
Concert II. However, when AT&T allowed NTT to purchase 15% of AT&T 
Japanese unit the arrangement regarding the Japanese market appeared to be under 
threat (Cairo, 2000). A similar trust-busting move surrounded AT&T’s acquisition 
of IBM’s global network business for $5 billion, which was announced on 8 
December 1998. Contrary to Concert II’s intention, AT&T never folded this 
acquisition in its alliance with BT but kept it -  and its customers - as an alternative 
plan in case Concert II would fail. Inspired by AT&T’s move or not, BT also 
hedged its bets and developed a corporate services business outside Concert II 
under the Ignite brand that competed with Concert II business.
On 16 October 2001 BT and AT&T announced the termination of Concert II 
citing market changes since the announcement of their alliance as the reason for 
the failure of their venture (Cooper, 2001). Whilst the influence of the biggest 
turn-around in telecommunication history ostensibly played its part, the 
fundamental flaws in the alliance we highlighted as well as a number of strategic 
mishaps are equally responsible for Concert’s failure. The implementation of the 
alliance had always been looser than initially portrayed it would be. Even before 
the liquidity drought in telecommunication finance as a consequence of the 
collapse of tech-stocks, Concert II showed traces of its eventual demise. The 
extensive IP network that was to link 100 major cities worldwide never came. Due 
to the proliferation of start-up companies and ample availability of funds to 
finance their roll-out, the number of providers of cheap and readily available fibre 
optic networks had driven prices down substantially. As the bandwidth glut 
increased, investing in a worldwide network made less and less sense. With this 
Concert’s most important function was undermined. Although this development 
can be attributed to general market transition, the failure of the realisation of 
Advance, the mobile venture, cannot. Geographically, the failure in the Japanese 
market includes parental neglect, as the Concert II venture does on the whole. In 
Europe, BT never managed to create much added value for Concert II which
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frustrated AT&T. Conversely, however, AT&T never was the catapult into the US 
market that BT had been seeking for over a decade. After the initial 12 months 
from its start in January 1999 (in which Concert II did manage to reach the -  
downwards adjusted -  $7 billion revenue target but failed to meet the profit 
projection), shareholders dissent grew as time went by. The final nail in the SBA’s 
coffin was the obligation to invest in AT&T Canada without prospects of 
receiving any return on that additional investment, let alone on the initial one. By 
that time, BT management, of the two parties clearly the one that attempted to 
keep the alliances afloat in their last months, then came under so much pressure 
that negotiations to unwind Concert II could not be avoided (Burkitt-Gray, 
2003).89
BT’s current international strategy: strategic change in BT’s conception of the 
European market after the demise of Concert
Initially BT’s strategy towards Europe concentrated on the EU and was developed 
because it considered that the imminent liberalisation of the EU markets would 
place it in a favourable position compared to most other member-states. Unlike 
those countries, by the time of the liberalisation date of 1 January 1998, BT 
already had been operating in a liberalised market for 14 years. Therefore the 
company had more experience in functioning in a competitive environment than 
those to whom liberalisation and competition would be a new phenomenon. To 
exploit such competitive advantage BT placed a number of partnerships in 
countries it deemed of tactical or strategic importance in order to gain from 
liberalisation. In general BT’s strategy was to use a variety of partnerships with at 
least one local partner. That partner should be an owner of infrastructure, 
possessor of a large national customer base or both but should not have a
89 In broad terms, the termination agreement, by and large, foresaw in the return of assets to the original 
contributor. In other words, BT acquired the service network infrastructure of Europe, Africa and the 
Middle East whilst AT&T obtained the Asia-Pacific network (even though BT contributed the frame 
relay assets to this region), the Americas and BT’s involvement in AT&T Canada. AT&T’s overall 
losses due to Concert II are estimated at $5.3 billion, those of BT at $2 billion (Financial Times 2001). 
Existing clients were served for another three years during which BT and AT&T would pay each other 
market prices for integrated services to legacy clients.
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telecommunication business. In order to attain its goals, BT considered partial 
ownership of the partnerships as sufficient.
When Concert II did not generate the success it was expected to generate and 
more so after the demise of both Concert alliances (which rid BT of a large 
international partner and, even more importantly, through it access to the US 
market), BT upgraded the European markets it was involved in. Since the early 
1990s Europe had been an important market for BT but only now did it truly 
become BT’s prime foreign area. However, the minority shareholdings it owned in 
most of those markets did not reflect the increased status upgrade of the European 
zone and had to be stepped up. As a consequence, in half of its previously 
partially-owned ventures BT has bought out its partners to fully own and control 
its operations in Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, and Spain.
More recently, 23 February 2005, BT acquired Infonet, a voice and data network 
service for corporate customers. Infonet, which at the time of the announcement of 
the acquisition (8 November 2004) was suffering losses, was acquired after a 
$2.06 per share offer which valued the business at $965 million. Significantly, 
rather than setting up an alliance with US-based Infonet, BT purchased the entire 
business (Total Telecom, 2004).
Before we turn to our other two cases and leave BT until we return to the company 
in the section in which we will review BT’s strategy in the light of our theories we 
would like to make two general observations. Firstly, returning to our section on 
the different ways of executing an international strategy in the first part of the 
thesis, we have witnessed BT moving from alliances to “building and buying 
overseas operations”.90 Secondly, BT did not appear to have any substantial first 
mover advantage regarding alliances. Its track record is not better than that of its 
European peers whose home markets were liberalised much later than BT’s (Das, 
Sen and Sengupta, 1998).
90 Although BT has not formally sworn off entering into SBAs it has become apparent that the 
company has left ambitions to become a global player. Instead it is geographically focusing on Europe 
which it now prefers to capture with wholly-owned subsidiaries wherever possible rather than trough 
an alliance-based strategy with minority shareholdings.
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Deutsche Telekom’s international strategy: the quest for stability and flexibility
Introduction
Deutsche Telekom international strategy has a number of similarities with that of 
BT but also a number of notable differences. It has made use of the formation of a 
number of smaller partnerships in a large number of countries with a slight 
geographical bias. During the 1990s, cornerstone of its international strategy was 
its global SBA that provided a relatively stable partnership for a substantial period.
Deutsche Telekom’s tactical partnerships
Like BT, Deutsche Telekom had already established a number of foreign 
operations before it engaged in a major SBA. In fact, compared to BT, Deutsche 
Telekom had a larger and more dispersed presence abroad (Sarkar, Cavusgil and 
Aulakh, 1999). Another difference between the two European operators is that BT, 
once it established its first Concert alliance, concentrated most of its international 
operations within the Concert framework and the number of such operations did, 
therefore, not proliferate outside the Concert SBA. Similarly, although Concert II 
had an even more explicit aim to expand international operations than its 
predecessor had had, since such expansion was to be through the Concert II 
vehicle BT did not expand its international footprint much outside the alliance. In 
Deutsche Telekom’s case this was a different matter. Due to the nature of the 
alliance agreement Deutsche Telekom had more leash to continue establishing 
international linkages than BT had and the German company made use of this 
contractual flexibility that its main SBA offered.91 In 1993 when SBAs started to 
become a major feature in Deutsche Telekom’s international strategy, the 
company already had a presence in multiple European and international markets 
including the UK, the US (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and Atlanta), France, 
Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, Ukraine, Singapore, Hungary and 
mainland China. In the following years this list of international operations was 
augmented with countries as Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, Poland, Czech
91 BT ultimately suffered when both Concert alliances had faltered: when Concert vanished most of its 
international presence went with it. The flexibility that Deutsche Telekom had, had the advantage that 
Deutsche Telekom had more individual control over its own international strategy than BT, but as we 
will see below there were disadvantages attached to it as well.
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Republic, Russia and Italy (although this was with its strategic partner but outside 
and separate of the alliance) within Europe and in Asia with countries as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Israel and Kazakhstan and 
Mozambique in Africa. From Deutsche Telekom’s involvement in those countries 
it is apparent that its international strategy since the 1990s has consisted of two 
components. One, which started first, is based on the screening of international 
opportunities. Such screening had a bias towards Central and Eastern European 
countries and non-English speaking countries outside Europe. The other 
component is the company’s engagement in SB As.
Deutsche Telekom and its SBAs
Similarly to BT, Deutsche Telekom’s support for using SBAs seems to have 
reached its peak during the 1990s when the global telecommunication sector was 
most buoyant and SBAs appeared to be the preferred option for most 
telecommunication carriers to execute their international strategy. Again much 
like BT, Deutsche Telekom’s enthusiasm for alliances seems to have tailed off by 
the end of the 1990 decade, consistent with developments in the rest of the 
telecommunication sector. As will become evident from a comparison of the case 
of BT with the following paragraphs on Deutsche Telekom’s alliances there are 
some differences between BT’s design (and subsequent developments) of its 
alliances and that of Deutsche Telekom.
Deutsche Telekom started using SBAs slightly ahead of BT. Deutsche Telekom 
first discussed the possibility of a joint venture with France Telecom in 199294. 
The type of developments we assessed in the first chapter of this thesis that have 
shaped the environment in which SBAs have emerged, played an important role in 
the initiation of these discussions. The German and French state-owned monopoly 
telecommunication providers anticipated that the accelerated forces of 
globalisation of business could provide benefits to their companies. Following the
92 See below for the relevance of this.
93 This can be concluded from adding the list of countries that Deutsche Telekom attempted to gain a 
presence in but failed to do so. This list includes Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Rumania, Slovak Republic, 
Spain, South Africa, Swaziland, India, Brazil and Colombia (from Deutsche Telekom’s strategy 
material obtained from Mr Stephane Deutscher).
94 Strictly speaking, this was under Deutsche Telekom’s predecessor because Deutsche Telekom AG 
was officially established on 1 January 1995.
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American companies French and German TNCs had expanded beyond their region 
too, in the following decades. The worldwide presence of these TNCs required a 
similar global provision of telecommunication services for those companies to run 
their operations. The infrastructural, technological, financial and personnel 
challenges that such stepped up provision of services accompanied were 
considered too extensive for one single company to satisfy even with the 
magnitude of Europe’s bigger telecommunication companies. Additionally, whilst 
the earlier described waves of privatisation and liberalisation had still left 
unaffected much of the telecommunication markets, including those of Germany 
and France, at the very least liberalisation of these companies’ home markets was 
in the long run unavoidable. The Single European Act in combination with an 
important 1987 EC Green Paper on telecommunications95 indicated the direction 
which by 1992 was clear: the cosiness of Europe’s protected telecommunication 
markets would soon come to an end. With the imminent entrance of competition 
in their lucrative home markets both Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom 
needed to develop alternative revenue-generating markets to compensate expected 
losses as a consequence of liberalisation. Much like BT, both companies 
considered the provision of services to TNCs on a global basis as the primary way 
to achieve this.
Soon after their initial contact the two companies set up a joint venture under the 
name of eunetcom in 1992. The novelty of such a partnership and the involvement 
of two of the European Union’s largest telecommunication operators led to a 
relatively (considering the limited scope of the partnership) detailed assessment of 
the range of services and the impact of the partnership on competition in the 
companies’ home markets. The European Commission gave its approval in 
February 1993 and services started at the beginning of 1994. Eunetcom’s focus 
was operating and maintaining large corporate networks including the provision of 
network solutions as well as facilitating data transmission networks on a 
worldwide basis. The joint venture had two main offices, one in Paris, where its 
headquarters were and one in Amsterdam, which was home to its financial holding
95 The Single European Act had come into force in July 1987. The full title o f the Green Paper is:
European Commission Green Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunication
services and equipment COM (87) 290, June 1987.
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company. Additionally, eunetcom’s technical and operational centre was based in 
Frankfurt, in other words, its main seats were dispersed across three cities in three 
countries.
Even before the official start of eunetcom early 1994, the two companies 
proceeded in their partnership relation by deepening their ties. In December 1993 
the two eunetcom partners signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to 
advance into a new phase of their alliance. In the MoU the parties announced the 
creation of a $1 billion SBA under the name Atlas. In addition to the tasks 
articulated in the eunetcom partnership, Atlas would expand the co-operation in a 
number of ways. More use would be made of the facilities of the individual 
parties. Operationally, this meant the use of Deutsche Telekom’s Datex-P 
subsidiary and France Telecom’s Transpac as well as its France Cables et Radio. 
The structure of the alliance was altered too. Eunetcom became a wholly-owned 
subsidiary within a newly-formed holding company called Atlas Telecom SA 
which was jointly owned by Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom on a 50-50 
basis. Atlas consisted of two wholly-owned major operating subsidiaries: Atlas 
France and Atlas Germany. With these subsidiaries came a substantial amount of 
flexibility for the individual telecommunication incumbents. Either would be free 
to supply services to corporate clients in their home market. Although by the time 
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom filed for regulatory approval of their Atlas 
alliance other European SBAs had been established, regulatory permission granted 
to the Franco-German partnership was delayed once again. In December 1994 the 
parties finished negotiations on Atlas, signed the agreement and notified the EC. 
The Commission scrutinised the deal to its maximum authority because it was 
apprehensive with regard to impediments of competition in the EU. Permission 
was eventually granted in two steps. First a positive preliminary ruling was 
delivered in October 1995. The final ruling took till July 1996. Just like with the 
transition from eunetcom to Atlas, when regulatory approval was finally granted, 
the partners had moved onto a more encompassing alliance once again.
Beyond a European partnership: Global One
In this new SBA, the parties initially acted under the codename Phoenix until the 
alliance became operational. When that had taken place the new three-way
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partnership was changed to its marketing name Global One. This time Deutsche 
Telekom and France Telecom expanded their evolving partnership not only in 
depth but also broadened it through the inclusion of a third party. Similarly to 
BT’s motivations, the US market was considered to be of crucial importance for 
the execution of a global strategy largely aimed at capturing the largest possible 
market share through the provision of services to international corporations. With 
the largest number of TNCs coming from the US and many foreign TNCs having 
affiliations in the US it was apparent that presence in the US market was not 
merely optional but of crucial importance. To catapult their presence into the US 
market the Atlas partners identified Sprint Corporation, US third long-distance 
carrier. The initiative to set up Global One (or then, Phoenix) was launched in 
1994 and the three parties signed the MoU to form the SBA in June. Deutsche 
Telekom and France Telecom were to invest approximately $4.2 billion in Sprint 
and receive a 20% equity share in return, divided up in 10% each (Bonardi, 2004). 
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom also swapped 2% of their own shares and 
attached some obligations to this cross-share holding. The services that Global 
One would offer included those of Atlas but had some significant extensions. 
Compared to Atlas, more attention would be paid to medium-size companies with 
international communication needs. Also travelling individual customers were 
included in the new alliance. Global One would also profile itself more as a 
carriers’ carrier.
With the inclusion of a US company to the alliance and a more explicit intention 
to target the US market, essential approval from regulatory powers was augmented 
with two US bodies. The Department of Justice as well as the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) would now also have to grant fiat for Global 
One to become legitimate. Since the rumours on talks about a possible three-way 
tie-up had surfaced the North American regulatory bodies expressed concern 
about the fact that the German and France markets had not been liberalised yet and 
about the fact that both Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom were state- 
controlled companies (Bonardi, 2004). The first concern related to competition 
worries. Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom would be able to compete in US 
markets through Global One and their stake in Sprint, yet US companies would 
not have to same freedom to serve the German and French markets. The concern
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about the not fully-privatised status of the companies related to the fact that 
through ownership of Sprint shares, the two respective European governments 
would obtain stocks of the third largest US long distance telecommunication 
operator. As we indicated in our section on liberalisation, certain sectors, which 
includes telecommunications, have for long been considered important to national 
interest and foreign governments obtaining ownership within such sectors was 
bound to meet regulatory suspicion.
Compared to its peer alliance Concert, Global One (as indeed was the case with 
Atlas) seemed to be delayed more by the regulatory process. Such delays impacted 
on the alliance’s success. Although Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom 
proceeded as much as they could during the consultation phase ahead of the 
preliminary or final decision, they were still hampered by restricting rules.96 Also, 
without the seal of approval of regulators, customers would not be fully assured of 
the continued provision of the services and this lack of certainty influenced 
customer numbers while competitors could lure potential clients away. It is likely 
that these factors have had adverse consequences for Global One. But the main 
difference with BT is that neither Deutsche Telekom nor France Telecom operated 
in a liberalised home market and that neither of them was fully privatised. As a 
consequence, both, competitors (particularly those from the US) and regulatory 
authorities were provided with ample ammunition to raise legitimate concerns and 
scrutinise the alliance plans, respectively. Whilst we concluded the section on BT 
that there had been no obvious first mover advantage for the British operator, this 
provides an example how BT may have had an advantage, albeit regulatory rather 
than operational. Eventually Global One obtained regulatory approval in 1996 for 
a restricted period of seven years and with a number of strict conditions. Due to a 
changed market structure, the EC relaxed some of those conditions by the end of 
July 1999. By then it had already granted approval to BT’s Concert II alliance 
with AT&T without imposing similar tough conditions. Also, since Global One 
had first applied for regulatory approval, a host of new entrants had appeared
96 In fact, in April 1997 the EC found Global One in breach of European competition rules. It stated 
that Global One had commenced trading ahead of meeting all conditions and criteria imposed by the 
EC. This ruling by the Commission was made after a court action evoked by BT and its German 
partner VIAG (see case o f BT) and referred to Deutsche Telekom acting in the capacity as a distributor 
of Global One services in Germany.
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which eliminated some of the Commission’s fear of monopolistic tendencies. 
However, by the time the Commission made the final ruling public once again 
changes had occurred in the Franco-German partnership but this time changes 
were of a less amicable nature.
Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom and the Italian job
Deutsche Telekom’s first controversial move vis-a-vis its alliance partner France 
Telecom came as early as June 1997. It was then that Deutsche Telekom’s mobile 
division, T-Mobile, set up a joint venture with the Italian state-owned national 
electricity company l’Energia Elettrica SpA (Enel). The immediate aim was to bid 
for the upcoming DCS-1800 mobile license (2nd generation) through this joint 
venture in which T-mobile owned 49% and Enel the other 51%, thereby 
competing with BT’s Albacom consortium (see case on BT). A likely longer term 
intention of the joint venture was the creation of a fixed line business. Besides the 
confusion regarding the mobile license due to a conflict of interests at the Italian
07Treasury , Deutsche Telekom’s position in the joint venture could make it a direct 
competitor to its SBA partner France Telecom in the Italian fixed-line market.
This was because France Telecom was at the time already in an advanced stage of 
obtaining a fixed license through its stake in Infostrada, which it had formed 
jointly with Olivetti and US RBOC Bell Atlantic. However, Infostrada’s 
performance slid while the Italian government opposed liberalisation of its market 
ahead of the EC deadline. As a consequence its members reconsidered their 
involvement. Bell Atlantic withdrew from Infostrada in 1997 after it was 
reorganised to include Germany’s Mannesmann. France Telecom withdrew soon 
afterwards to join Deutsche Telekom and Enel in what would become the Wind 
Telecomunicazioni SpA joint venture with 24.5% of the shares for Deutsche 
Telekom and an equal number of shares for France Telecom (Monlouis, 1998). 
Enel held the remaining 51% of the shares. Wind obtained a fixed-line license and 
a 2nd generation mobile phone license both in 1998 and a 3rd generation licence in 
January 2001.
97 Stet owned a 62.9% stake in TIM, the mobile division of Italy’s incumbent telephone operator
Telecom Italia. Deutsche Telekom’s partner Enel was for 100% controlled by the Treasury. But the
same Treasury also had a 64.3% stake in Enel’s competitor Stet (Mobile Communications, 1997).
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Whilst the 1997 possible stand-off sizzled out without denting relations between 
the two European partners two years later another, and fatal, clash occurred. Like 
before the set was the Italian market. But on this occasion Deutsche Telekom’s 
scoffing was much more openly as we will discuss shortly.
In 1999, seven years since their initial contact in 1992, the evolved partnership 
between Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom appeared to be remarkably 
stable. Certainly compared to its peer SBAs the two European partners, later 
joined by US firm Sprint seemed to be able to steer their alliance in the turbulent 
field of global telecommunications without clashing. BT and MCI’s Concert had 
come and gone and BT was into its second version of Concert. Other alliances 
such as Unisource and WorldPartners had undergone similar turbulence as the 
original Concert. From the inception of their partnering Deutsche Telekom and 
France Telecom maintained individual flexibility through relative independence. 
The SBA was structured in a complicated manner. Atlas Telecom, the holding 
company of which Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom both owned 50% 
controlled the three separate businesses: eunetcom, Atlas data communications 
and Global One, which included Sprint and in most areas superseded the previous 
alliances. Behind this structure was, however, the possibility, especially for the 
European members to follow their own strategy besides Global One. Regarding 
Deutsche Telekom we already mentioned that they continued to increase their 
foreign presence outside the Global One framework. Another example of the 
relative independence of the members was Deutsche Telekom’s partnership with 
Enel which almost brought it head-to-head with France Telecom. It appeared that 
the flexibility in this partnership could be the decisive ingredient responsible for 
its stability within Global One compared to similar alliances.
Mid-1999 the limits to flexibility became apparent, however. In the preceding 
months, the three partners had been negotiating with the aim of deepening their 
relationship. Particularly Sprint was in favour of replacing the SBA agreement 
with a merger and had taken the initiative to facilitate the talks. But negotiations
98 See the case of Telefonica for a discussion of these SBAs.
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went slow and there was no sign of a swift transition to a merger. At that time 
dramatic developments in the Italian telecommunication market would influence 
the Global One partnership more drastically than the merger talks had been able to 
do so far. Olivetti, a company one-seventh the size of Telecom Italia, launched a 
hostile takeover bid for the Italian incumbent telecommunication operator on 20 
February 1999. The offer of approximately $12 per share in cash and shares and 
culminating to a total of €53 billion would, if successful, place a 51% majority of 
Telecom Italia, including a lucrative and highly successful mobile division TIM, 
in the hands of Olivetti. Earlier, caught by the global waves of privatisation, 
Telecom Italia had been privatised in 1997, making it the largest state assets sell- 
off in Italy. But the intended efficiency benefits of this privatisation loomed large. 
Furthermore, Telecom Italia’s international strategy was characterised by a 
number of moves in Austria, Spain and Latin America that had destroyed 
shareholders’ value. Attempted plans to enter into alliances with AT&T and later 
with C&W both failed leaving the group without an effective international strategy 
while pressure from competitors in its home market grew. Olivetti’s promise to cut 
costs, reduce personnel and dispose the company of unprofitable businesses was 
expected to find approval with a majority of the shareholders. Telecom Italia first 
attempted to fight off the bid by suggesting merging Telecom Italia with the 
highly successful TIM but this plan was rejected. Olivetti raised its bid with 15% 
to €60 billion. On 16 April 1999 in a desperate attempt to fend off Olivetti’s 
attack, Telecom Italia turned to Deutsche Telekom, with whom it had been in 
merger talks before. Deutsche Telekom agreed to play the role of white knight. 
Announced on 22 April as an $81.4 billion (the world’s largest at the time) merger 
but which in actual fact was an acquisition by Deutsche Telekom the plan was 
presented to Telecom Italia’s shareholders (Privatisation International, 1999). The 
merger agreement included board members swaps: five Deutsche Telekom 
members would be seated on the Telecom Italia board and vice versa. However, 
they were not the only entity to rule on the plans. Deutsche Telekom was still -  
direct and indirect - for 65% owned by the government (Newsweek International, 
1999; Creswell, 2000). The Italian government did not condone the prospects of 
German authorities ending up with ownership of its former telecommunication 
crown jewels and blocked the merger plans. Telecom Italia shareholders were also 
not convinced that a fellow incumbent would present the company with the best
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scenario for survival and sided with Olivetti on 21 May 1999 with a 52% majority 
(Parkes, 2000)." The upshot of the Deutsche Telekom’s Italian sidestep was that 
the company remained empty handed and with egg on its face.
In fact that is not all that was lost to Deutsche Telekom. As indicated, Global One 
can be characterised by a high degree of flexibility for the individual members to 
take their own course with regard to its international strategy. However, such 
flexibility is subjected to boundaries and need to be in compliance with the 
alliance’s articles of agreement. We also indicated that relations between Global 
One’s members appeared to be harmonious and that this was reflected in the 
alliance’s relative longevity. A final observation we made before describing the 
Telecom Italia sidestep was that negotiations to transcend the partnership into a 
full merger had been stalled at best and possibly broken down altogether.
Consequences o f the Telecom Italia merger failure
To begin with the issue of harmony within the alliance, over time frustration had 
been building with Deutsche Telekom in particular. In its view, French 
management referred too much of the decision-making process to the 
governmental authorities. Whilst both companies still had sizeable government 
ownership, Deutsche Telekom considered that the French interpretation of the role 
of the government in the alliance was too prominent and that it had a paralysing 
influence on Global One’s progress. Global One had been under fire because the 
alliance was still solidly losing money with no imminent prospects of breaking 
even (Cane 1999). Whilst this appeared to be a feature of all major 
telecommunication alliances at the time, bar Concert I which, ironically, was at the 
brink of breaking even before it broke down, Global One’s extended running 
displayed little progress in this respect. Furthermore, from the operational side, 
projects consistently overran their deadlines thereby contributing to the SBA’s 
financial burden. The cited flexibility compounded Global One’s poor 
performance. Global One had its own management and staff that were supposed to 
bring added value to the parents of the joint venture. But the joint venture did not
99 The deal’s organiser, Roberto Colaniimo lost control of its acquisition when Italian tyre and cable
maker Pirelli and the Benetton family took control of Olivetti in July 2001 (Kapner and Ratner, 2001).
In 2003 Telecom Italia counter-acquired Olivetti thereby eradicating the controversial move of 1999
(Hawkins, 2003).
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get its parents unequivocal support with them having the possibility to set out a 
deviating or at least an additional international course. More importantly, the built- 
in flexibility resulted in Global One being largely based on network-to-network 
interconnections between Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom and, to a lesser 
extent, Sprint. What the alliance really needed was a more unified switching 
network. Providing Global One with a separate joint venture status and separately 
dedicated staff was beneficial in principal and could have facilitated the 
construction of such a network but the primacy of flexibility trough relative 
independence hampered its creation.
Sprint was already frustrated about the lack of headway on the merger initiative. 
The Italian affaire did not affect it as directly as in the case of France Telecom 
(see below). But the result of Deutsche Telekom’s move would unlikely improve 
the chances for a merger. Whilst in the immediate aftermath both other partners 
pledged their continued support for Global One, they also indicated that a 
resumption of the merger negotiations was out of the question. Meanwhile, MCI 
WorldCom, which had barely digested its massive merger (see case of BT) was
holding talks with Nextel Communications in the US on the purchase of the
"\
mobile company. With little hope of reviving the Global One alliance, Sprint’s 
CEO contacted his counterpart at MCI WorldCom to offer his company. Arguably 
superior to its long distance network was Sprint’s PCS mobile business. When 
talks with Nextel soon afterwards collapsed, MCI WorldCom bid for Sprint. This 
bid came at a time when Deutsche Telekom had shown interest in merging with 
Sprint without displaying too much determination, though. US RBOC BellSouth 
also entered the bidding fray and was backed by Deutsche Telekom but to no 
avail. On 6 October 1999 Sprint accepted MCI WorldCom’s $129 billion bid of 
which $115 billion would have been in common stock and $14 billion in debt and 
preferred shares. At the time this was the highest offered takeover price ever in 
corporate history.100 Sprint sold its Global One share to its former European 
partners (for $1.13 billion in cash and a repayment of $276 million in debt). With
100 The takeover never took place, though. It was blocked by authorities on both sides o f the Atlantic. A 
later revision by the European Court of First Instance in Luxembourg concluded on 29 September 
2004, however, that the European Commission’s grounds to block the merger had been illegal and that 
it should have approved the merger. By the time of this ruling WorldCom had already come under 
criminal investigation making the outcome largely academic.
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Sprint leaving Global One, the European partners were offered compensatory 
payments for their 20% combined shareholding in the US firm. At the purchase 
they had spent $2.1 billion each on the aggregate stock and therefore, when they 
each received approximately $11.5 billion for the sale of their Sprint shares they 
created almost $9.5 billion of profits to the shareholders in one sweep (Mobile 
Communications, 1999). As in the case of BT after MCI was acquired away by 
WorldCom, in Deutsche Telekom’s (and France Telecom’s) case the loss of their 
US partner brought immediate shareholders’ wealth. Difference is that in the case 
of BT the shareholders played a more direct role in the departure of the partner 
and the breakdown of the alliance.
Whatever France Telecom’s perception on the progress of its partnership was prior 
to the Telecom Italia case, after Deutsche Telekom’s surprise move the alliance 
was on the rocks. Deutsche Telekom maintained that it had not acted in breach of 
contract by not informing France Telecom about launching a plan to merge with 
Telecom Italia. France Telecom disagreed and took Deutsche Telekom to court. It 
based its argumentation on the fact that the cross-share holding the two parties had 
agreed upon with the formation of Global One included the condition of provision 
of information on matters as an acquisition. On 12 July a court in Rome agreed 
with this vision when it ruled that Deutsche Telekom had violated its agreements 
with Wind partners France Telecom and Enel when it tried to align itself with 
Telecom Italia. Wind as well as France Telecom and Enel had brought the case to 
the court (Financial Times, 1999). That was not the only court case. France 
Telecom also filed a case in Belgian courts and a €19 billion arbitration claim 
(which Deutsche Telekom answered with a €12 billion counter claim). 
Furthermore, three side disputes were raised in Geneva courts. Those two 
locations were specified in the alliance contracts and elected for their 
independence from the parties involved (Goldhaber, 2001).
After the ruling of the court in Rome, France Telecom together with Wind partner 
Enel, succeeded in ousting Deutsche Telekom from Wind in a particularly bad- 
tempered confrontation. Curiously, the eventual separation within the Wind 
partnership was more hostile than the settling of the future of the partners’ largest 
asset, the Global One SB A. To be sure, due to a number of developments in the
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Italian market, Wind had an enormous importance to both European parties since 
they both intended to remain on the Italian market (Cairo, 2000a). Nevertheless, 
Global One, for all its misfortune was still a much larger asset. But comparably, 
deciding the split for Global One was less hostile, which is not to say that 
proceedings occurred in an amicable fashion.
As stated, the initial reactions of both parties were statements that Global One was 
separate and that the dispute referred to the parents and not to their child. But with 
the atmosphere between Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom turning more and 
more sour over Wind it was difficult to see how this would not end Global One. 
The eventual loss of Sprint to MCI WorldCom only speeded up the termination of 
the longest running SBA in international telecommunications.
With both partners owning half of the holding company Atlas Telecom that 
controlled the Global One business, the question was which of the two owners 
would end up with the Global One network. In spite of Global One’s overall poor 
performance and its unsuitability in exploiting ever-increasingly important IP 
services both parties appeared to be interested in obtaining the Global One 
business and network. This is consistent with one of our earlier observations. An 
important reason for the failure of the Global One business was the absence of 
integrated network architecture. This absence could be overcome by placing the 
network under one single owner. Also, and this was a legacy of Atlas where there 
had been three main quarters spread over three cities and three countries (see 
above), Global One had essentially three headquarters. One in Brussels, another 
one in Reston, Virginia and a third in Hong Kong. This bred inefficiencies and 
hampered synergies. Bringing Global One under single ownership would 
eliminate the inefficiencies and promote synergetic outcomes. Initially, Deutsche 
Telekom manifested itself as the clear favourite to obtain Global One through 
buying out its partner France Telecom which indicated to be willing to sell but for 
the “right” price. Determining this right price proved to be a challenge, though. 
After negotiations about the settlement price appeared to stall, likely ownership 
turned around and in favour of France Telecom. Eventually the two parent 
companies agreed and France Telecom obtained Global One after buying out its
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erstwhile partner for approximately $3.88 billion, which consisted of $2.76 billion 
in cash and $1.88 million in debt (Cambridge Telecom Report, 2000).
Deutsche Telekom’s international strategy after Global One 
Deutsche Telekom did not ponder on the changed situation for long. In fact, it did 
not wait till the Global One issue was settled before it made its first move in the 
European telecommunication markets. Seeing off its short listed competitors 
(which included Germany’s Mannesmann, TIM and Vivendi) and ending with a 
victory in a final stand-off with France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom obtained the 
UK’s fourth and smallest mobile phone business called 0ne20ne. In August 1999 
it purchased this mobile operator for £8.4 billion. 0ne20ne, originally marketed 
as Mercury Personal Communications and launched in 1993 by C&W and RBOC 
US West, was sold off by C&W, its remaining original owner after US West had 
sold its share to MediaOne.101 C&W sold 0ne20ne because it re-organised its 
business and shed its cable and mobile interests as a consequence (Shearlock,
1999). With the $11 billion proceeds from the sale of cable television networks 
and the sale of its Sprint shares, Deutsche Telekom had the financial means to 
fund acquisitions that would build up foreign assets again after the sudden loss of 
two important international projects. With the global telecommunication markets 
still in full transition and Deutsche Telekom having access to a large cash fund, 
shareholders pressured management to make purchases in order to bring them 
wealth. Although Deutsche Telekom’s management stated it would continue to 
increase its international footprint with major purchases -  particularly in the 
mobile sector -  in the short term, it was not until after the telecommunication 
stock crash that it had any success following up on the 0ne20ne purchase. By that 
time, however, the perception on paying high sums for telecommunication 
businesses had changed dramatically.
Meanwhile erstwhile partner France Telecom did not waste much time either. 
Mid-October 1999, before the Global One sale had been settled, France Telecom 
aggressively bid and won the share in Germany’s number three mobile operator E- 
Plus, which was one of the European mobile stakes that had become available
101 MediaOne’s sold 0ne20ne because it had just been acquired itself by AT&T Corp for $62.5 billion.
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after the Vodafone -  Mannesmann hostile takeover. With this move France 
Telecom had turned quickly from ally to competitor of Deutsche Telekom.
As indicated above, Deutsche Telekom chose once more, successfully, against 
forming an alliance and opting for an acquisition instead after it had secured the 
One-2-One business. Before this success it hit another failure, though. In spring 
2000 it was in extended talks with Telefonica for a possible merger with the 
Spanish incumbent. Although most of the business-related maters were agreed, the 
companies could not agree on the site of the merged company’s headquarters. 
Neither party would consider the other’s capital and Deutsche Telekom’s 
compromise city Amsterdam was also rejected by Telefonica (Denis Staunton,
2000). Shortly after this attempt, Deutsche Telekom did manage to make a big 
deal in the telecommunication market. In July 2000, VoiceStream, a US mobile 
phone operator, officially announced it had entered into a definitive merger 
agreement with Deutsche Telekom. In effect it concerned an acquisition by 
Deutsche Telekom and its value was approximately $50.7 billion. In the post­
telecommunication boom that amount was generally considered to be on the high 
side. Reason why Deutsche Telekom was willing to pay a premium for its 
acquisition was primarily because of the US mobile phone operators VoiceStream 
was the only one with a sizeable GSM network. The bigger mobile phone 
operators in the US typically used TDMA or CDMA technology (see case on BT). 
It was, in fact, a double deal because Deutsche Telekom also took over Powertel at 
the same time. Both mobile operators have since become wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of Deutsche Telekom’s T-Mobile division.
Besides the high price, this acquisition raised controversy for another reason.
Since the concerns of the US regulators with regard Deutsche Telekom’s share 
purchase in Sprint the German government’s hold on the former monopolist had 
hardly decreased. By the time of the VoiceStream acquisition, the government still 
owned a total of 60% of Deutsche Telekom: 43% directly and indirectly 17% 
through Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW). But by the time of its bid the 
international telecommunication landscape had changed drastically due to its stock 
market crash. As a consequence, Deutsche Telekom’s attempt to fully purchase 
VoiceStream raised less concern than the purchase of 20% of Sprint together with
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France Telecom had some years before. In the aftermath of big financial deals in 
the telecommunication industry it was considered an opportunity to have one of 
the biggest telecommunication companies in the world making a substantial 
investment in what was only the sixth or seventh largest mobile operator in the 
market. This does not mean that there was no opposition, however, quite the 
opposite. But in the period before the cash crunch in the telecommunication sector 
it would have been unthinkable for the US regulators to have the deal passed 
without the German government decreasing its stake in Deutsche Telekom. The 
FCC, which cleared the deal on 24 April 2001, did secure a commitment that the 
government’s share would be reduced. But due to the adverse market conditions 
the sale was postponed and currently appears to be off the agenda.
Deutsche Telekom’s current international strategy 
More explicitly than BT, Deutsche Telekom considers the likelihood of re­
entering into an international strategy that is primarily based on one big alliance as 
unrealistic. The company’s CEO during the most volatile period of in the history 
of telecommunications was changed for the company’s former CFO which has 
adopted a more cautious approach. That is, however, a feature across the board 
and may not necessarily be a reflection of the individual case. Similarly to BT, 
Deutsche Telekom’s international strategy is otherwise unclear. Geographically, 
although having scaled back some of its international operations, it still has a 
presence in Central and Easter Europe and in Western Europe, in addition to the 
US. Furthermore, it is still committed to becoming one of the world’s dominant 
telecommunication operators and targets most specifically world leadership in 
mobile communication (which is wider than mobile telephony). Contrary to BT, 
Deutsche Telekom has not completely surrendered aspirations to operate on a 
largest global scale as possible. However, in actuality such grandeur plans are far 
from being materialised.
Since summer 2004 it is a member of a mobile phone “alliance” called Freemove. 
Although marketed as an alliance it is not substantially more than a roaming 
agreement between the operators for travellers, be those business or otherwise. As 
an alliance it is closer to contractual arrangements than any hierarchy and not
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likely to move from contract to status. Besides Deutsche Telekom’s international 
mobile business, T-Mobile, this partnership includes the international mobile 
businesses of operators TIM, Telefonica Moviles (from Spain) and, interestingly, 
Orange of former long term partner France Telecom.
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Telefonica de Espana and its SB As
Introduction
Within the purpose of our current research we distinguish three of the partnerships 
Telefonica engaged itself in as SB As. However, as we will show, in none of
cases did the alliance pass the stage of starting blocs fully, let alone contribute in 
any relevant way to Telefonica’s operations. Of the three companies that form the 
cases in our research, Telefonica is arguably the one company that has had the 
least practical experience with functioning alliances. As we saw earlier both, BT 
and Deutsche Telekom were involved in SB As with their respective partners MCI 
and France Telecom for a considerate number of years. In contrast, Telefonica has 
been linked to more alliances than its British and German counterpart, both in 
actuality and in preliminary negotiation talks with the intention of joining 
alliances. Telefonica has officially been a partner in three separate SBAs, BT in 
two and Deutsche Telekom in one.103
Telefonica's international strategy
Telefonica’s international strategy differs from the ones of BT and Deutsche 
Telekom with regard to its entry level. Certainly Deutsche Telekom, before 
entering into its eunetcom / Atlas alliance with France Telecom, had marginal 
international operations. Atlas was Deutsche Telekom’s main vehicle to establish 
footholds in foreign markets through, first a pan-European alliance, later followed 
by a global one. Similarly, BT’s foreign operations were modest too before it 
entered in partnership with MCI. BT’s international strategy differed from 
Deutsche Telekom’s with regard to approaching the European market. Where 
Deutsche Telekom allocated a substantial role to the partnership to conquer the 
European market, BT largely established its European footprint without the 
primary use of the Concert alliance. As we indicated in part on BT’s case, its
102 Telefonica has many other types of inter-corporate linkages such as buyer -  supplier relationships, 
licensing agreements etc. The partnerships we include here are truly SBAs in the way we considered 
them in previous sections.
103 The fact that Deutsche Telekom’s original alliance with France Telecom, Atlas, led to Global One 
after the inclusion of Sprint should in this context be considered as an extension of a existing alliance 
rather than a formation of an entirely new one. Similarly, in BT’s case, the inclusion of Telefonica in 
its Concert alliance with MCI should also be seen as an extension and not as setting up an entirely new 
alliance.
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dominant strategy was forging partnerships with local companies, which were 
often the first or second challenger to the incumbent European operator. This way 
BT, itself an incumbent in the UK market (albeit one already privatised) became a 
challenger of a number of European incumbent operators. Liberalisation, which 
we described in our first chapter, played an important role as a facilitator of this 
strategy chosen by BT.
Telefonica’s international strategies also drew heavily upon one of the forces we 
described in chapter 1. However in this case it was the worldwide wave of 
privatisation that most enabled it to execute its international strategy. Particularly, 
privatisation programs in Latin America were to the company’s interest. As we 
saw, BT’s international strategy was primarily through its Concert alliance and 
included a second and regional tier in its investments in European firms that often 
owned substantial infrastructure in the targeted country. Telefonica’s strategy has 
one similarity with BT but two important differences. It is similar in not leaving 
the development of its anchor region to a partnership (unlike Deutsche Telekom). 
But, as we just indicated, one difference is that Telefonica’s main facilitators were 
the privatisation opportunities that arose worldwide. Unlike BT’s strategy of 
establishing partnerships with domestic companies to challenge an incumbent, 
Telefonica’s dominant strategy was to acquire assets from privatised incumbent 
operators. In the countries where the company was successful in executing this 
strategy it became the incumbent operator, rather than challenging the incumbent 
operator: Perhaps an even more important difference between BT’s strategy and 
the one of Telefonica is the region targeted to develop its extra-alliance 
international strategy. As we indicated, Deutsche Telekom did not adopt a dual 
strategy of establishing a regional anchor when it embarked upon international 
expansion. In contrast, BT did and targeted those European Union markets it 
considered of strategic importance to prepare itself for competition across a 
liberalised European Union. Telefonica also adopted a dual strategy but its target 
was not its home region like in the case of BT. Telefonica focused on Latin 
America. It can be argued that amongst the three companies that form our cases 
Telefonica benefited most from the opportunities provided by the privatisation 
wave we described above. Deutsche Telekom also developed an extensive 
program to acquire assets, mainly from Central and Eastern European countries.
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However, that program did not exceed Telefonica’s levels and Deutsche 
Telekom’s program stagnated when the technology and telecommunications 
markets crashed. Even more salient is that Telefonica’s exploitation of 
privatisation opportunities started before the Spanish company integrated SBAs as 
a strategic tool into its international strategy. The importance of this difference 
will be explained below when we analyse Telefonica’s attractiveness to potential 
partners.
Telefonica’s first stage: Building a Latin American presence 
Throughout the 1990s Telefonica transformed itself from a stale and inefficient 
incumbent operator in Spain to the dominant and successful telecommunication 
company in both Spain and Latin America, operating in competitive, liberalised 
markets. It is widely believed that compared with many of its European peers the 
company’s current position is substantially better (Datamonitor, 2004). This 
favourable position today is largely due to its strong position in Latin America, 
which in turn was achieved by the successful execution of the first stage of its 
international strategy and the subsequent continuation of that trajectory during and 
after it operated in its second -  and less successful -  stage of executing its 
international strategy.
Telefonica was the first European company to internationalise and it did so by 
committing almost $800 million to that end in 1988 (Sarkar, Cavusgil and Aulakh, 
1999). In the first stage Telefonica entered a number of Latin American markets 
with the initial aim of providing traditional communication services (Noam,
1998). In order to provide such services, Telefonica constructed 
telecommunication networks that would be of its benefit beyond the aim of this 
first stage. Whilst both, Telefonica’s first and second phase were performed by 
making use of partnerships, only the type of partnerships to attain its goals in the 
second phase are considered SBAs within the definition of this thesis. The 
partnerships of the first phase resemble more the traditional joint ventures between 
foreign parent company and local subsidiary, we described earlier in this thesis.
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As indicated then, that type of partnerships is not the focus of our research.104 
Through these partnerships Telefonica -  via its international division TISA - set 
up an asset portfolio by purchasing privatised state-owned firms or by entering 
public auctions for telecommunication concessions (i.e. licenses to provide 
telecommunication services). For this type of partnerships with local actors 
Telefonica usually chose one of the following three actors:
a) local firms that through their contribution could provide Telefonica with 
essential expertise on local customs and that could generate political support;
b) foreign (i.e. non-local) firms that often were telecommunication companies 
too (particularly US-based ones like AT&T and GTE);105
c) financial allies that assisted Telefonica in the financing of constructing its 
foreign operations in Latin America, which decreased Telefonica exposure to 
financial risk in its expansion strategy (Garcia-Canal et. al, 2002).
Telefonica’s second stage: Adopting an SBA-strategy
Telefonica and Unisource
The first stage served to build up Telefonica’s Latin American portfolio (see 
footnote 104) that provided Telefonica with useful bargaining power vis-a-vis
104 The first of these partnerships, thereby starting off Telefonica’s international expansion strategy, 
appeared in 1989 when Telefonica, through TISA, entered the bidding contest for Entel Chile, in one of 
the first countries outside the developed world to have a privatisation program. In April 1990 it 
acquired a 43.6% share in Compania de Telecomunicaciones de Chile (CTC) for approximately US$ 
308.8 million. Subsequently, Telefonica/TISA made use of similar partnerships to enter other Latin 
American countries as Argentina (Telefonica de Argentina, SA or TASA) in November 1990, which 
later became a vehicle for the development of a wide range of assets in the Argentine market including 
long distance telephony, mobile telephony and paging services, yellow pages, and cable television; 
Colombia, where TISA owned a 31% share in the Cocelco partnership that bid and obtained the 
country’s second mobile telephone license in January 1994; later in 1994 TISA bought 31.5% share in 
the result of a merger between telecommunication operators CPT and ENTEL Peru, Telefonica del 
Peru. TISA paid approximately US$ 1,801.7 million for this share in Peru’s national 
telecommunication operator. Like in the case of Argentine’s TASA, Telefonica del Pern became 
TISA’s vehicle for the same range of assets as it acquired in Argentina. In the remaining years of the 
1990s, after Telefonica had evolved from stage 1 to stage 2 in its international strategy TISA entered a 
further number of countries Puerto Rico (TLD); Venezuela (CANTV); Mexico and Brazil. (Telefonica, 
SA Annual Reports).
105 The partnerships with other telecommunication operators referred to here differ from SBAs in their 
scale and scope. These partnerships were established for a very specific single purpose and did not 
require much fine-tuning o f operations between the Telefonica and its partners. Typically the 
partnerships were to bid jointly for a license made available at an auction and should not be considered 
of similar impact as further-reaching and deeper-seeded alliances in which Telefonica got involved in 
phase two of its international strategy.
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interested alliance partners in the company’s second stage of their international 
strategy. In that second stage, when Telefonica intended to use SBAs for the 
execution of its international strategy, the central aim was extended with providing 
global services as well as integrated solutions to corporate clients, reflecting a 
process already set in motion in the first stage. While Telefonica constructed its 
portfolio the globalisation of the telecommunication industry accelerated. Most 
notably, this led to the formation of three SBAs wherein the partners to the 
alliance displayed their international aspirations. As we addressed in our section 
on the case of Deutsche Telekom, its first partnership with France Telecom, 
although only cleared by the regulators in 1994, started operations in 1993 and 
was in the making since 1992. This alliance, eunetcom, consisting of Deutsche 
Telekom and France Telecom was extended with a US partner, Sprint to form 
Global One. Our other case, BT, established its SBA, (the initial) Concert with a 
different US firm, MCI. Before this Concert alliance was formed another alliance 
was initiated in Europe. In 1992 the national telecommunication operators of 
Sweden (Telia, currently part of the merged entity TeliaSonera) and the 
Netherlands (Koninklijke PTT Nederland NV, currently KPN) joined forces to set 
up the Amsterdam-based alliance Unisource. Like in the cases of Concert and 
Global One, the Unisource members deemed it necessary to add a US-partner to 
their alliance. AT&T, the US number one long distance operator, became an ally 
to the Unisource alliance (see below). As a consequence, when Concert was 
established, US’ number one to three long distance telecommunication operators 
were all involved in SBAs initiated by European incumbent operators. That the 
European companies took such a leading role in the introduction of alliances in the 
global telecommunication industry can be explained by referring to the pro-active 
role Jacques Delors and his team took in European Union policies with reference 
to a number of industries including telecommunications. Particularly, the 
imminent liberalisation of European telecommunication markets, as a consequence 
of the European Commission’s Competition Policy, prompted a search for partners 
to form such SBAs. Besides liberalisation, the technological forces (push and 
pull), played an important role as well (see chapter 1). The European Union’s 
incumbent operators realised that co-operation with other firms, be those 
telecommunication operators or providers of networks, provided the optimal
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strategy to deal with expected consequences of the dynamics that were about to 
shake up their industry.
Like its European counterparts, Telefonica decided to align itself with strategic 
partners. After Switzerland’s Swiss Telecom PTT had joined Telia and KPN’s 
Unisource in 1993, Telefonica did the same. Besides contributing a number of 
assets to the Amsterdam-based alliance (of which its data transmission division 
TTD was the most notable), Telefonica was required to pay a $25 million cash 
joining fee for obtaining a 25% stake in the alliances which was equally divided 
amongst its members (European Telecommunications, 1997b). The aim of 
Unisource was the creation of a pan-European telecommunication network that 
would be able to provide a range of services to large corporate clients (i.e. TNCs). 
In order to satisfy demand for Unisource services beyond Europe, the 
geographical scope of Unisource was expanded with the conclusion of a 
partnership with AT&T in 1994. It is important to stress that AT&T did not 
become a member of the alliance but an associated partner. AT&T, by then, had 
already been setting up an alliance on its own. Through a multiple number of 
associations with telecommunication operators across the globe Kokusai Denshin 
Denwa or KDD (Japan), Singapore Telecommunications or Singtel (Singapore), 
Hong Kong Telecom, Telstra (Australia), Korea Telecom, Unitel (Canada), 
Philippines Long Distance Telephone or PLDT, Telekom South Africa and 
Telecom New Zealand it had created WorldPartners. The Unisource alliance 
became a WorldPartners associate and its AT&T-led network entered into a 
distribution agreement. This agreement regulated the offering of Worldsource 
services between AT&T and Unisource. In sum, by 1994, Telefonica, after having 
joined Unisource one year prior, was part of the world’s largest 
telecommunication alliance through Unisource’s association with AT&T 
WorldPartners.
However, the size of this partnership did not automatically guarantee its success. 
The four years from its inception and the three years from the linkage with 
WorldPartners did not bring the expected corporate successes. One reason for the 
alliance’s inability to make headway can be found in its slow development in 
policy focus and, consequently in operational development. The separate arrival of
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Unisource members Swisscom and Telefonica led twice to renegotiations and 
redefinitions of the alliance’s aims and policies. When Unisource was aligned with 
WorldPartners more negotiations and shifting of policy followed. The effect of 
these changes on Unisource’s operational inertia was negative and bears the 
responsibility for the lack of momentum at Unisource in the starting years.
In 1996, Telefonica changed its chief executive officer and Villalonga became in 
charge of the Groups106. With this change the company redefined the role of SBAs 
in its international strategy. It announced its intention to leave Unisource and 
started negotiations with rival alliance Concert (Monlouis, 1998). The installation 
of the new CEO and his team was important because with them Telefonica’s 
outlook and approach regarding its international aspirations shifted. The new team 
intended a bolder and more aggressive international strategy than its predecessor 
(European Telecommunications, 1997d). Moreover, with almost the entire top- 
management team being outsiders to Telefonica, no prior links or personal 
commitments to management of the other Unisource members were in place, 
which eased breaking away from the alliance (Garcia-Canal; Lopez Duarte; Rialp 
Criado, and Valdes Llaneza, 2002). In spite of its expansionary objectives, 
Unisource had developed more into a defensive alliance to protect the partners’ 
home turf than a partnership that continuously increased its scale and size in the 
global telecommunications market. Even the explicitly stated capturing of 
substantial market share in the European market did not materialise. For 
Telefonica, more than the other Unisource members, the failure to expand 
internationally was frustrating its goals to fortify its position in Latin America 
(Chan-Olmsted and Jamison, 2001). It had intentions to build up a strong presence 
in Mexico, construct a fiber-optic network across the whole of Latin America and
1 07serve the Spanish-speaking population in the United States . Membership of the 
Unisource alliance did not aid in the attainment of any of these goals.
106 On 7 June 1996 Candido Velazquez-Gaztelu had been replaced by Juan Villalonga Navarro. 
Villalonga was an outsider to Telefonica and its operations and childhood friend of the then newly 
elected Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, who installed Villalonga at the top seat of Spain’s largest 
company.
Soon after he had come in, he replaced much of Telefonica’s senior management with younger 
managers the majority of which, like him, had a background in the consulting industry.
107 The Hispanic population of the United States was considered an untapped and potentially lucrative 
market. Untapped because firstly, the English-speaking telecommunication operators were not as well 
placed to offer the Hispanics content services in Spanish -  hence its purchase in May 2000 of US-based
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Telefonica’s exit from Unisource came with a price. The three other partners could 
not count on the Spanish government to force Telefonica to remain within the 
partnership through exercising its golden share because the Spanish government 
chose not to interfere in Telefonica’s decision-making process. The three 
threatened Telefonica with litigation in case it would join another alliance. 
Eventually, the break-up was more amicable than originally appeared (Bums,
1997). Telefonica did have to indemnify the remaining Unisource members in 
cash payment of approximately US$120 million (but it regained its TTD 
operations). However the penalty payment freed Telefonica from its adverse 
involvement in the alliance. Unisource had not only failed to deliver strategic and 
operational benefit to Telefonica but it had also presented a loss to the company.
By illustration, 1996 was the first year Telefonica had consolidated its Unisource 
membership. That year its contribution to profits derived from its associations 
with foreign companies decreased with 10.8% compared to 1995. This decrease 
was the consequence of Telefonica’s involvement in Unisource. The losses it 
suffered from its Unisource membership were booked at 7 billion pesetas (then, 
approximately US$ 50 million). In contrast, Telefonica’s Latin American 
operations did contribute to the group’s profit. Compared to 1995 there was a 
43.1% rise to 15 billion pesetas in 1996 (European Telecommunications, 1997b).
We already highlighted a number of problems Unisource suffered from that 
prevented the alliance from turning into a success. Unisource never transcended its 
initial phase due to the constant resetting of its policy, which was due the 
admittance of two new partners at different times and the affiliation with AT&T 
afterwards. The association with AT&T’s WorldPartners was not solidified and, 
like with the other affiliations AT&T had, can be characterised better as a looser 
distribution agreement than as a strong SBA. But even within Unisource ties
internet portal Lycos for $12.5 billion in stock as well as the purchase of the Dutch company Endemol 
for €5.5 billion - as Telefonica or Latin American operators were and secondly, none of the Latin 
American operators had yet embarked upon offering such services widely in the US. Telefonica’s new 
management team saw a competitive advantage over the US operators and was further attractive by the 
size of this market segment, its nascent state and the population’s yearly growth. For instance in March 
1994 the number of Hispanics in the US was 26,646 million; by March 1997 when Villalonga was 
installed the population had grown to 29,703 million. Latest available figures for the number of 
Hispanics in the US (37,438 million in March 2002) indicate that the population continues to grow 
strongly (US Census Bureau, 1998 and 2003).
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amongst the members were not solid, certainly if compared to ties between the 
rival SBAs Concert and Global One. At that time, those alliances had more stable 
membership than Unisource and did not suffer from the necessary alterations of 
policy and operational fine-tuning due to new entrants and affiliations. Especially 
in the case of Atlas / Global One the core of the alliance, formed by the European 
partners, had been in place for many years and the admission of Sprint did not 
shake up the established practices as much as when Unisource first doubled its 
membership and then affiliated itself to AT&T, the US largest telecommunication 
company by a large margin, with a vast amount of resources but a different 
network. Similarly, compared to Concert, Unisource had an additional problem. 
Both Telia and Swisscom were state-owned telecommunication companies at the 
time and they were both in the process of being privatised. As a consequence, the 
companies were still in transition. This reflected on the approach of the alliance 
which ended up being more defensively (for example articulating a need to protect 
employment) than offensively oriented. In order to facilitate a smoother exit, 
Telefonica sought a replacement operator and found this in the Italian operator 
Stet (which also was in the process of preparing for privatisation), later re-branded 
as Telecom Italia.108
Telefonica’s search fo r  a better alliance: Concert
Telefonica had started negotiations with BT and MCI early 1997 when the new 
management team re-defined its international strategy. In March 1997 these three 
telecommunication operators signed a cooperative agreement. Within this 
agreement the short and long term operations of the alliance that Concert would be 
after the adjustment were articulated. In the short term, the companies would focus 
on the development of operations in Latin America. Particularly Telefonica 
pressed for the swift exploitation of the potential these markets could offer the 
alliance. Together with MCI, which already had Latin American operations, it 
convinced BT that time was of the essence because a number of US 
telecommunication companies as well as France Telecom and Telecom Italia were
108 Soon after Telefonica’s exit Unisource suffered another blow when AT&T severed its ties with the 
alliance. Telia, PTT Telecom and Swisscom then decided to unwind Unisource and sell off its assets; 
Stet / Telecom Italia never got the time and chance to settle into Unisource, it was over before another 
round of re-negotiations followed by re-adjustments and reconfiguring o f the network had taken place. 
In 1999, after the fulfilment of ongoing contractual obligations to its customers, Unisource officially 
ceased to exist.
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interested in expanding in Latin America, too. The cooperative agreement also 
contained a number of optional activities which mainly referred to the European 
market. Until then, Telefonica’s presence in the European market was restricted to 
Portugal and Rumania. A third set of accords between the partners-in-making, 
labeled complementary activities referred more to intensions than concrete 
policies. In this part of the cooperative agreement the three companies pledged to 
develop operations consistent with the materialisation of success on the immediate 
and optional activities and consistent with the desired direction of the partners in 
the future.
The three firms could reach a cooperative agreement relatively quick because all 
had much to gain from Telefonica’s additional membership:
a) BT would benefit from an instant link with an entire region (Latin America) 
through that region’s largest telecommunications operator. Also, folding its own 
operations in the Spanish market109 with that country’s main provider, Telefonica 
would boost its success in the Spanish market. It was not only the Spanish part of 
the Iberian Peninsula that would come into play from BT’s point of view. Whilst 
still within Unisource, Telefonica had started negotiations with Portugal Telecom 
about a partnership between these two Southern European former monopolist 
telecommunication companies. The upshot of this was that Portugal Telecom 
became included in the deal with Concert and signed a separate strategic alliance 
deal with Concert on 15 April 1997. At the same time, in fact one day later, 
Telefonica and Portugal Telecom agreed upon an equity swap deal: Telefonica 
took a 3.5% stake in Portugal Telecom whilst Portugal Telecom acquired 1% in 
the Spanish firm (European Telecommunications, 1997b). Therefore, in addition 
to gaining access to the Latin American telecommunication markets, BT co-opted 
competition in the Spanish market and gained access to the Portuguese market 
through an affiliated partner to its Concert alliance.
109 BT owned a data transmission company since 1993 and had a 15.8% stake in Spain’s mobile phone 
company Airtel. Under the agreement, BT would dispose of both assets that competed with companies 
within Telefonica’s Group (Bums, 1997).
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b) For MCI the extension of its alliance with BT was beneficial in more than 
one way, too. Firstly, it obtained a partner that would be valuable in the 
development of its Latin American interests. Secondly and moreover, with this 
partner being Telefonica it did away with its fiercest competitor in the Latin 
American parts of MCI’s business (co-opting its biggest competitor in the region). 
Thirdly, it obtained further access to European markets through Telefonica and 
Portugal Telecom.
c) The inclusion of Telefonica in the Concert alliance only became a realistic 
possibility after Telefonica’s management decided to change from its Unisource 
involvement. Additionally, Telefonica enjoyed attention from other (US-based) 
telecommunication operators for the exploration of possibilities to forge an 
alliance, most notably AT&T and WorldCom. Since Telefonica initiated the move 
for a chance and chose its partner it is hardly surprising that it too had much to 
gain from entering Concert. The most important benefit for Telefonica was that it 
would obtain the possibility to use the alliance as a vehicle to exploit its already 
established operations and ambitions in Latin America. Unisource was not an 
effective vehicle in that respect but Concert met Telefonica’s aspirations in that 
region (Rivera, 1997). Additionally, MCI, unlike Telefonica’s Unisource partners, 
already possessed assets and operations in that region, most notably in Mexico (a 
market Telefonica was eager to capture) and Brazil. Therefore, entering Concert 
would exchange one competitor for an ally in Telefonica’s most important foreign 
markets. A second benefit for Telefonica to join Concert was access to the US 
market through MCI’s network and customers. The connection with AT&T in 
Unisource had not provided Telefonica with the opportunity to include the 
Spanish-speaking population of the US in its customer base. The perceived 
prospects of exploiting the potential that this content-based part of the 
telecommunication business had, was enough for Telefonica to consider it a 
priority. But the nature of the partnership with AT&T and the Worldsource 
services were not particularly catered for the operations Telefonica sought in the 
US market. Concert would be better placed to exploit the possibilities and develop 
such services. A third and final benefit for Telefonica was the possibility to 
increase its European footprint. Whilst its membership in Unisource also provided 
it with access to European markets, the relative small size of the Dutch, Swedish
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and Swiss markets and the modest ambition of the Unisource-members beyond 
protecting their home countries made such access insignificant. Concert provided 
better prospects of capturing a large European market share.
In addition to the cooperative agreement, Telefonica and BT also agreed equity 
swaps estimated at 65 billion pesetas in April 1997. In this agreement Telefonica 
would acquire 1% of BT whilst BT would take a 2% interest in Telefonica.
Telefonica’s search fo r  a better alliance: MCI WorldCom
The good intensions of the companies involved in the extension of Concert with
Telefonica were not taken to a test. Above, in the section on BT we described the
collapse of BT’s alliance with MCI just before these two companies’ merger plans
were realised (El Pais, 1997). WorldCom’s intervention in November 1997 had
consequences for Telefonica because the SB A it had signed to join disintegrated. '
However, similar to when Telefonica made its intentions known to abandon
Unisource, the company’s Latin American assets made it an attractive prospective
partner. Both, BT and the merged entity in progress MCI WorldCom were vying
for Telefonica’s partnership110. The initial strategic intention of Telefonica’s
management was to split its international operations in two strategic partnerships:
one with BT for Telefonica’s operations in the European market and another one
with MCI WorldCom which would focus on operations in North America and
Latin America. That way all of Telefonica’s aspired markets would be served
through partnerships with relative expert companies. However, a split of the
company’s international operations (through TISA) to form two big alliances was
not considered a realistic option and Telefonica chose for one of the two intended
partners. A reference to the important strategic considerations that prompted
Telefonica to switch from Unisource reveals that - once concluded that a split to
form two alliances was not an option - this choice ultimately was straightforward.
Of those strategic considerations, Telefonica’s Latin American business was the
pinnacle. MCI WorldCom with Latin American legacy assets from MCI’s
business, the merger’s closer proximity to the Latin American markets and the
110 Telefonica was completely free to choose between the two break-up entities that had formed
Concert. In the contractual agreement Telefonica had been granted the right to detach itself from the
agreement in case a third party would acquire MCI’s business.
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larger size of the merged entity provided better prospects than BT to serve 
Telefonica’s needs in those markets. Telefonica’s intentions to capture the 
Spanish-speaking part of the US market clearly had better chance of succeeding in 
the event of a partnership with MCI WorldCom than with BT, too. However, for 
the third strategic intention, increasing Telefonica’s market share in Europe, BT 
seemed better placed than MCI WorldCom was, even though MCI did have a 
European presence, mainly in France, Germany and Britain. Also, severing ties 
with BT would almost certainly lead to a return of BT as a competitor in the 
Spanish market. But these disadvantages, in case of choosing MCI WorldCom, did 
not weight up to the advantages of doing so. Firstly, WorldCom had been building 
a European presence through the construction of a fiber-optics network with the 
long term aim of linking all major European cities. Whilst not as settled as BT, 
due to WorldCom’s nascent infrastructure MCI WorldCom was not completely 
absent from Europe and, as has just been indicated, MCI also had a modest 
presence in Europe. Furthermore, WorldCom had a strong objective to increase its 
European operations and could point to a successful expansionary track record in 
the US. With regard to the threat of having BT as a renewed competitor in its 
home market, Telefonica had three reasons not to fear too much. Firstly, BT had 
been a competitor before and Telefonica had survived attacks from the British 
operator over the years. Secondly, Telefonica would still dominate its own market 
for the foreseeable future, with or without the return of BT. Thirdly, the end of the 
Concert alliance would leave BT in a bad state, one from which it would need 
considerable time to recover. At least during this recovery period it would be 
unlikely for BT to appear as an organised and fearsome competitor to Telefonica 
in the Spanish market. With these strategic notions in consideration a choice for 
MCI WorldCom was consistent with Telefonica’s international strategy. In March 
1998 Telefonica and MCI WorldCom signed the final agreement to form an 
alliance. Importantly to Telefonica was that all intended commitments referring to 
Latin America that had been agreed in the April 1997 agreement between 
Telefonica, BT and MCI were left in place. These agreements were extended to 
include the European and the US telecommunication markets.
In spite of the ostensible advantages of an alliance with MCI WorldCom and 
notwithstanding the careful weighting of the variety of partnering options
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available to Telefonica, the choice has turned out to be a wrong one. This is not to 
say that had Telefonica opted for following BT instead of MCI a more favourable 
outcome would have been secured. Firstly, and foremost, it is not possible to 
determine with any certainty what the outcome would have been had Telefonica 
pursed the formation of an alliance with BT. Secondly, considering the 
development of BT following the loss of MCI as a partner (see BT’s case) it is 
questionable whether an alliance with Telefonica would have led to a substantially 
different outcome for BT. As we saw in the case, the British operator was forced 
to adopt a more “inward-looking” strategy which included decreasing its 
involvement in international operations. Thirdly, as we will indicate shortly, at 
that stage there was a structural component that prevented Telefonica from being a 
successful partner to any company. BT, itself not subjected to that structural 
component, could have compensated to some extent for Telefonica’s failure in this 
respect. However it would still mean that an alliance between BT and Telefonica 
would have met with some of the adverse conditions the Telefonica -  MCI 
WorldCom alliance suffered from.
It would have made for a straightforward explanation had not the bursting of the 
technology and telecommunication bubble in April 2000111 placed a damper on the 
Telefonica -  MCI WorldCom alliance. The bursting of this “Nasdaq Bubble” 
marked the disappearance of stock market financiers that had since 1998 played an 
important role in providing the telecommunication industry with liquidity to fund 
its expansion. Particularly in the case of WorldCom, the transition from excess 
stock market liquidity to a drought in liquidity and a substantially more cautious 
approach by investors would have been a determining factor. WorldCom, more 
than any major telecommunication player, had benefited from the rise in the 
telecommunication sector during the technology and telecommunication boom in 
the late 1990s. From a start-up WorldCom developed into US fourth largest long­
distance telecommunications operator at the time the company offered MCI 
shareholders the acquisition deal. WorldCom was able to grow rapidly through the 
financing of a number of acquisitions through the stock markets. Therefore, the 
collapse of the stock market growth could not but influence WorldCom’s
111 In April 2000 Wall Street investors saw as much as $2 trillion evaporate from their portfolios in one
single week’s time.
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operations112. However, in the two years prior to the Nasdaq Bubble burst the 
alliance between Telefonica and MCI WorldCom never got off the ground. In 
other words, this major external factor is not to be blamed for the failure of the 
alliance: internal factors have prevented the MCI WorldCom SB A from becoming 
a success. None of the strategic policy objectives of the agreement between MCI 
WorldCom and Telefonica was met, in fact, in actuality sparse attention was paid 
to the alliance. The most ambitious plan was the construction of a fiber-optic 
network all around the South American peninsula that, in turn, would be 
connected to fiber-optic networks in the United States and Europe. WorldCom, 
before its takeover of MCI had been building aggressively such networks in the 
US and Europe and obtained experience with the various facets of that business. 
Telefonica had considered the construction of such a network as a major feature of 
its Latin American operations but could not accomplish this within Unisource. The 
combination of WorldCom (extended with MCI with its Latin American presence) 
and Telefonica should have led to a synergic outcome and form a recipe for 
success. However, MCI WorldCom and Telefonica failed to agree on working out 
the actual building of the network across South America and each party went their 
separate way, initiating different projects113.
That was not the only area in which the two companies acted more as rivals and 
competitors than as allies in a major SB A. Fierce battles between the two allies 
were fought in the Brazilian long distance telephone market. Telefonica, leading a 
consortium that had paid $5 billion for a local operator Telesp in Sao Paulo, 
encountered MCI WorldCom controlled Embratel as its first competitor in the 
long distance market after the market was liberalised (Katz, 1999). In Brazilian 
courts Telefonica and MCI WorldCom fought out their dispute over what services 
the two competing operators could offer. Other areas where the two operators had 
pledged to cooperate did not materialise either. Telefonica never distributed MCI’s 
services in Spain as was agreed and did not exercise the option to buy the
112 Different from many other start-up companies in the dot.com era WorldCom did have an asset 
portfolio. The services it provided were backed-up by a fibre optics network the company had 
constructed. However, with the collapse of the technology and telecommunications boom die value of 
such assets declined rapidly. The presence of assets also marks a difference with a company as Enron 
with regard to the issues of fraud that hit both companies shortly after the tech stock crash.
113 Telefonica set up a partnership with US company Tyco and another one with IDT, also from the US, 
to attain its goal of creating a fibre-optic network around South America.
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available 10% share of MCI WorldCom’s European business. Nor did it acquire 
the 46% share of MCI WorldCom’s activities in Italy but set up its own unit to 
enter the Italian market114. Furthermore, the planned formation of a joint 
subsidiary targeting the Eastern and Southern European market did not come into 
existence either (Rocks, 1999).
MCI WorldCom attempted to continue the acquisition spree that had brought the 
company substantial growth in a short timeframe. After the successful acquisition 
of the US number two long distance operator MCI, it bid for the acquisition of the 
number three operator Sprint. Whilst the bid was barred by both European and US 
regulators, it provided a major distraction from nourishing its relations with 
alliance partner Telefonica115. Arguably even more distracting was a host of 
allegations of illegal practices, including accounting fraud, committed by the 
WorldCom unit of the merged entity that eventually culminated in actual 
prosecution of WorldCom executives. MCI WorldCom, by that time already re­
branded to WorldCom, was forced to file for the biggest bankruptcy in US history 
in July 2002 because the fraudulent practices displayed a substantial financial 
discrepancy on the company’s balance sheet which eventually grew to $11 billion 
and left the company with debts of $41 billion116. The alliance between Telefonica 
and MCI WorldCom was even before the fraud allegations and the distraction 
caused by the Sprint merger plans already an empty shell. It was terminated 
without having reached any of the intended aims.
Telefonica’s current international strategy
In the years succeeding Telefonica was involved in two concrete attempts to form 
a merger / alliance with another European telecommunication operator. End 1999, 
BT and Telefonica were in negotiations for a number of weeks to merge their
114 Telefonica prioritised the Italian market in order to prepare for the adoption o f retaliating practises 
against a consortium, Grupo Auna, led by Telecom Italia (and Spanish partners Endesa and Union 
Fenosa) that competed directly via operator Retevision with Telefonica in the Spanish market.
115 European regulators banned the planned takeover of Sprint by MCI WorldCom but on 28 September 
2004 the European Court ruled that the regulator’s decision had been unlawful and that the merger 
entity of WorldCom should have been allowed to merge with Sprint because fear for excess market 
power in the internet segment of the new entity’s business were deemed to be unfounded. However, the 
plans to merge had been dropped four years prior to the Court’s ruling.
16 The company filed for Chapter 11 protection under the US Bankruptcy Code. In April 2004 it 
emerged from bankruptcy after restructuring and re-re-branded itself to MCI in an attempt to sever 
associations with WorldCom’s negative association.
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companies and create a telecommunications group with a value of £140 billion 
(Lorenz, 1999). On the one hand this attempt indicates that Telefonica had chosen 
the wrong of the most persistent options when BT and MCI’s Concert was split by 
WorldCom’s merger bid. On the other hand, the fact that Telefonica and BT could 
not come to an agreement is an indication that, in spite of some synergy, not all 
elements for the two companies to align themselves were present.
The second attempt in the aftermath of the failure to develop its alliance with MCI 
WorldCom was with Dutch telecommunication operator KPN and followed the 
failed attempt with BT five months earlier. In this case the Dutch and the Spanish 
companies would have created a telecommunications operator with a market cap 
of $138 billion through a merger (L’Expansion, 2000a). But this attempt failed, 
too. The interesting aspect of this failure is the role the Spanish government 
played. As we indicated in our discussion of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
theory, governments are a special actor because they often adopt multiple and 
different roles in the Value Net. Often they are a regulating authority but they 
could be any of the four actors we identified. Relevant in this case is that the 
Spanish government had taken position as a shareholder. Since the full 
privatisation of Telefonica in 1997 had the Spanish government kept a golden 
share in the company. That enabled the government to block merger plans and it 
exercised that right early May when Telefonica’s management and KPN had 
agreed to merge their companies. The Spanish government took this unusual step 
because KPN was for approximately 43-44% still under control of the Dutch 
government (Parkes, 2000). Even though Spanish shareholder would control the 
merger entity with 62% ownership, the fact that the Dutch government would 
control 15% was not acceptable to Minister of Economic Affairs Rodrigo Rato 
and he instructed the Spanish government to block the merger plans (L’Expansion 
2000b).
After the failure of three complete attempts (i.e. that ended with the signing of 
partnership contracts and therefore, not including the 1999 BT and the KPN 
attempts) it appears that the SBA-route has been all but abandoned from 
Telefonica’s international strategy for the foreseeable future. Partly due to the lack 
of success this strategy has delivered to the Spanish operator, partly due to an
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overall meltdown by telecommunication operators in general towards SBAs. 
Telefonica’s current international strategy is to a large extent a return to its 
original position: a strong concentration on Latin America through a go-it-alone
117 ,approach . As evidence of its continued ambitions, in January 2005, with the 
purchase of the Argentine operator Movicom for $988 million Telefonica 
completed the purchase of all ten of BellSouth’s Latin American mobile operators 
for a total amount of $5.85 billion (ABC, 2005). This has made Telefonica the 
single largest mobile phone company in Latin America and the second largest 
mobile phone company in the world, after UK’s Vodafone. Some of the grand
1 1 Q
plans of Villalonga were abandoned after his departure but Latin America has 
remained the center of Telefonica’s international strategy, notwithstanding the fact 
that the company recently completed a major takeover outside that traditional 
heartland. On 16 June 2005 Telefonica purchased a 51.1% majority share in 
former state-controlled incumbent Cesky Telecom of the Czech Republic for €2.7 
billion (Sanchez, 2005). Furthermore, two weeks later it purchased 2.99% of 
China Netcom for €240 million (Polop, 2005).
117 Portugal Telecom has remained Telefonica partner and ties have even intensified over time but 
remain restricted in scope and are predominantly for activities in the Brazilian market.
118 After Villalonga’s forced departure due to insider trading allegations in July 2000, the more 
conservative Cesar Alierta took control of the company and brought Telefonica back to core 
telecommunication operations. As a consequence a stake in Internet portal Lycos was disposed of as 
well as interests in Spam’s TV station Antena 3 and satellite broadcaster Via Digital and Audiovisual 
Sport. More recently, Telefonica has made the long-awaited statement that part o f content division 
Endemol will be floated by early 2006 at the latest (El Mundo, 2005).
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Chapter 4 
Cases and theory
Introduction
In this section we will attempt to interpret our cases within the Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s Co-opetition framework. It is not our intention to provide an 
exhaustive analysis of all possible angles that display connections of the theory 
and our three cases. Rather we hope to present our interpretation of the cases 
within the theory in order to serve two purposes. Firstly, our interpretation will put 
us in a position to answer the question whether Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
framework has any relevance to SBAs. In case the first question is answered 
affirmatively, secondly, what lessons there can be learned from the Co-opetition 
framework for alliances as the ones we presented as our cases. These two purposes 
are derived from the hypotheses we presented earlier:
Schematically, the Value Net provides a clear overview of how a range of 
other Players relate to the featured company.
Although constructed for conducting business in general, Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s Co-opetition framework has both analytical theoretical and 
practical relevance for the more specific phenomenon of SBAs.
Our methodology for this section is as follows: for all three cases individually we 
will first provide an exhibit of the alliance’s Value Net. Because the alliances 
largely operate in the same market there will be a fair amount of overlap between 
them. Similar to Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Value Nets we do not attempt to 
display the entire Value Net but merely present an overview of one interpretation 
of the Value Net. Following this we will assess, case by case Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s PARTS framework. The analysis of that section will serve to 
provide the lessons that can be learned from these alliances by using the Co- 
opetition framework.
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PARTS’ contribution: an interpretation of PARTS applied to the 
telecommunication industry
Above we identified the potential contribution of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
Co-opetition theory to our thesis. What we articulated there concerns in fact, the 
central question whether Co-opetition can be shifted from a macro-focus to a 
micro-focus and still maintain its relevance as an analytical framework. An 
affirmative answer to that question will provide a justification to a contributory 
claim of this thesis. To summarise the rationale behind Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s theory (for a more elaborate account see chapter two), Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger present their Co-opetition theory and PARTS framework 
therein as a valuable tool that applies to business in general. Moreover, Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger arrive at their theory and the creation of their PARTS 
framework after they have signalled important features in the current structure of 
the economy and particularly in the state of international business. Such features 
resulted in their conclusion that firms that operate in contemporary business are 
subjected to conditions that have altered the traditional business environment (see 
our first chapter). Nalebuff and Brandenburger consider that the best way for firms 
to tackle the challenges that the changed outlook of business poses, is to adopt a 
mixture of co-operation and competition (or the peace and war mindset). Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger also provide the guideline on when to use which of those two 
approaches. This guideline is to co-operate when the pie is being created and 
compete when it comes to dividing the pie.
The important element to subtract from that account is -  and Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s rendition of their own theory underlines that -  the observation 
that their theory refers to the macro-level. The theory is about developments and 
changes in (international) business. It is our aim to test whether Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s theory also applies to the micro-level. In order to run such a test 
we link Co-opetition to SBAs. As we analysed in the first chapter of this thesis, 
SBAs are one of the alternative ways open to firms to execute an international 
business strategy. In other words, an SBA is a micro-level phenomenon. The
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specific appropriateness of SBAs as a case to test Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
framework for micro-level suitability lies in central characteristics of this 
phenomenon. In accordance with Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s analysis on the 
justification of their theory, SBAs aim to create value and are vehicles to divide up 
the value that has been created. Through SBAs companies attempt to enlarge their 
existing market share or, alternatively, try to enter in or create a new market for 
the partners’ benefit. When market shares have increased or revenue has been 
generated from entering or creating a new market, the SBA functions as a vehicle 
to distribute the proceeds of the alliance amongst its beneficiaries. Linking these 
central characteristics of SBAs to Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory shows that 
SBAs possess the duality of the peace and war mindset. It is this observation that 
has prompted us to consider whether Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory allows 
itself for micro-level analysis. Following a positive answer to that question we 
would then be in a position to consider whether Co-opetition could be a useful 
framework for analysts (for example in academia) and or companies engaged in 
SBAs. In this respect, usefulness will appear if it turns out that applying Co- 
opetition can be beneficial to either of those actors (or both). Using the empirical 
part presented in the previous chapter we will endeavour to address this while 
taking the telecommunication industry as the focus of our SBAs.
Two types o f  contribution
We distinguish two different types of contributions that the PARTS framework 
can make. The difference between these two types is not made in order to rank 
them one way or another: both have equal value for our purpose. But the two types 
refer to different orders and are, therefore, separable in terms of assessment.
Whilst it is not our aim to expand on the differences between these two types of 
contributions in this thesis, generally it can be argued that one of the types refers 
more to a theoretical contribution of PARTS and the other type, arguably, more to 
a practical contribution. However, the intertwined nature of the two types may 
limit a perfect and strict separation between the two types of contribution.
The first possible contribution of PARTS to our research is of a more analytical 
theoretical nature. This contribution manifests itself when PARTS serves a
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purpose as a provider of a useful tool in rightly analysing developments as we 
found in the empirical section. To be sure, it is unlikely that PARTS’ contribution 
in this respect will be exclusive. Conceivably, one could signal other theoretical 
frameworks that can provide equal or similar value in their analysis of the 
previous chapter’s developments. But at this occasion, a potential lack of 
exclusivity should not lead to a gagging order: if it appears that Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s theory can be stretched validly to include micro analyses its 
theoretical contribution has already been enlarged beyond its authors’ intended 
reach. Moreover, considering the relative novelty of SBAs and the hiatus in 
science’s understanding of the phenomenon, a further analytical tool with 
applicable value makes for a welcome addition.
We consider PARTS’ second potential contribution of a more practical nature. 
Central question in this respect is: would or could the outcome of events have 
been different had the actors taken PARTS into consideration? Compared to the 
first contribution, the suggestion of the presence of this second one is somewhat 
more speculative. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, we, obviously, can not know 
for certain whether the various actors (players) in our three cases have or have not 
consulted Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory. All that we can attempt to do is 
use logical argumentation to prove as much as possible whether it is likely that 
they have (not) considered Co-opetition’s PARTS.119 Secondly, in social science 
projecting a different scenario outcome due to occurrences that did not materialise 
in actuality is an easy target for those seeking to criticise. However, it is our 
conviction that - if supported by deductive logic - such scenario building could 
provide a valuable contribution to a “non-laboratory” science as this and enable 
for a wider academic analysis than the borders of the actual occurrence allow. In 
other words, we have included this second contributory role that PARTS can play 
in spite of its less grounded basis than is the case with the other potential 
contribution because we perceive it of great relevance and because adherence to 
the laws of logic should offer an acceptable level of justification to do this. In 
those cases where this second type of contribution can be distinguished, PARTS
119 Or at the very least, if they have considered PARTS than they did not apply it correctly in our 
opinion: for our assessment there is no relevant difference between a failure to consider PARTS and a 
failed consideration of it.
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provide -  albeit it retrospectively with regard to the cases -  direct advice to 
players of the game.
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Co-opetition and BT
Value Net (Concert I and II)
Customers: 
Shareholders 
Large Businesses 
MCI/ AT&T 
BT
Competitors:
Global One, Unisource, 
WorldPartner 
WorldCom / MCI WorldCom 
Qwest, Global Crossing, Level 3 
(and other star-ups)
Colt
Regulators
Concert I and II
Complementors:
Network producers 
Financial Markets 
Foreign governments attracting FDI 
Other alliances 
WTO (and other liberalisers)
Suppliers:
BT MCI /AT&T 
Cisco, Microsoft etc. 
BT’s European alliances 
Shareholders
BT and PARTS ’ contribution
With regard to BT we provide an interpretation of PARTS for the Players, Added 
Value, Tactics and Scope. As will be clear from comparing BT with the other two 
cases this application domain is wider than that of the other two cases. The reason 
why BT’s case has a wider coverage in this respect than the two other cases is
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because BT is the only one of the three to have been involved in two full SBAs
1 9 0and there is therefore more material to draw from. As Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger indicate there is some overlap between the different elements of 
PARTS and some of the important developments within the cases have 
implications that reach across PARTS elements.
Players
BT and MCI Concert alliance and the coming to a merger 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger describe the impact of new players entering a game. 
They use examples to indicate how a new entrant into an existing game can 
change the outcome of the game. We distinguish similar developments in the case 
of BT. The company’s shareholders overlooked the positive contribution new 
players entering the bidding game for MCI could bring to the attainment of their 
intentions.121 One could suggest that the shareholders did not overlook this 
possibility and that, conversely, the ultimately sought after outcome was a 
consequence of the shareholders’ successful introduction of a new player into the 
game. However, nothing suggest that the shareholders adopted such a strategy to 
cause this outcome - which would have had to be through prompting BT’s 
management to invite a new player into the game rather than the shareholders 
doing so independently. It would not have been a simple matter of opening up the 
purchase for MCI shares to random bidders. In order for the shareholders to be 
successful in their intentions it would have needed to be a player that BT 
management would find acceptable as an entrant in the game and one that would
120 Deutsche Telekom’s involvement was limited to one extended SBA with France Telecom and, 
although Telefonica was associated with three alliances it never reached the longitude BT achieved 
with its SBAs and, consequently, Telefonica offers less determining developments than BT due to the 
shorter operational periods.
121 We chose to analyse the Bringing in Players from the shareholders viewpoint but we can do it in a 
similar way centred on BT management. However, that will lead to much duplication of the arguments. 
Between the two, we chose the shareholders because they potentially had more to loose and also 
because their analysis is more complicated since they succeeded in their goal by creating wealth in the 
short term. From BT management’s point of view, the failure to adopt Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
bringing in other players in an earlier stage than when they brought in GTE has been more 
straightforward because it is clear that they only lost from failing to act on Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s normative concept on bringing in new players unlike the shareholders that in the strict 
sense of creating value on their investment were successful.
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cause a lowering of BT’s offer for MCI shares. Without BT management’s seal of 
approval for the new entrant the dispute between shareholders and management 
would only intensify. This is because we know from the case that in spite of the 
profit warning BT management did not intend to abandon plans to fully acquire 
MCI. Because BT management had major strategic - as well as a number of 
personal -  interests to safeguard to completion of the merger it intended to stick to 
the acquisition deal. The profit warning had confirmed the shareholders initial 
scepticism regarding the terms of the merger and strengthened their intensions to 
lower the price they were willing to pay MCI. Considering all of that, BT 
shareholders would have increased the likelihood of a successful outcome had 
they engaged in actions that would have led to the introduction of a player that BT 
management would consider an acceptable investor (for example a third 
telecommunication partner with an interest in an established US long-distance 
network or a private equity firm).122 A study of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
theory could have made them aware of the benefits of such an approach. As it 
happened, BT shareholders did find that developments went their way. But this 
was not due to their exertions and they were in fact fortunate that things developed 
the way they did because a couple of unique circumstances ultimately played out 
in their favour. Firstly, the fact that any company would attempt to disrupt a 
merger deal in such an advanced stage was unique in the telecommunication 
industry at that time.123 Secondly, BT’s shareholders were in luck that the 
challenger was WorldCom. Without a doubt, WorldCom has been the most 
aggressive acquirer in telecommunication history and at that time it had 
particularly and uniquely large (albeit paper) funds at its disposal due to the 
telecommunication bubble. As a consequence, it was in a position to make the 
attractive offer to MCI (although, retrospectively, it has emerged that their strong 
financial position at that time was rigged). Mainly due to those circumstances did
122 Although the latter group often demands managerial changes which might be met with resistance 
from BT management.
123 Since then it has occurred more often most notably once to Global Crossing in June 1999. Qwest 
Communications challenged Global Crossing’s double bid for US West and Frontier Communications. 
However, compared to the first big challenge in international telecommunications by WorldCom from 
our case, Qwest’s move was far less bold because Global Crossing’s relationship with either US West 
or Frontier was in a far less advanced and intertwined stage than that of Concert alliance partners BT 
and MCI. More recently, in Spring 2005, MCI was the object of another challenged bid -  the longest 
running since the June 1999 one - when for a three-month duration Qwest (which had merged with US 
West since the Global Crossing challenge), unsuccessfully, challenged Verizon’s bid for MCI.
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BT shareholders end up creating wealth through the sale of their shares. The 
failure to implement Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s strategic advice on the use of 
bringing in players deprived the shareholders of an opportunity to steer the process 
of the game to purchase MCI shares. This could have led to BT still purchasing 
the remaining MCI shares at the originally agreed price or even at a premium there 
over (due to a bidding contest with a new entrant less endowed than WorldCom 
appeared to be at the time) since in the situation as it happened there was no 
guarantee that the new bidder would secure a deal with MCI.124 The shareholders 
could, therefore, have ended up with a destruction of their value as a consequence 
of their insistence to cut price on BT’s offering because their insistence was not 
backed by a safety net which bringing in the right player would have provided.
The assessment of Players, in this respect to BT, provides advice to those in 
similar games as the BT shareholders found themselves. But in this case the lesson 
to be learned is not a simple and straightforward case in which an application of 
Co-opetition makes the difference between failure and success. That is because (in 
the short run) BT’s shareholders succeeded in attaining their goal of value creation 
in spite of their neglect of Co-opetition’s advice with regard to PARTS’ Players. 
However, this success came upon the shareholders mainly due to the unique 
circumstances in which they and their co-Players found themselves. The 
shareholders did not play the game by bringing in WorldCom but were played and 
ended up with a premium price for their shares. Instead of leaving such an 
outcome to the element of luck or good fortune, they could have increased the 
likelihood of such outcomes had they referred to and applied Co-opetition’s 
PARTS, thereby taking a more active approach towards safeguarding their wealth. 
In fact, we will carry the argument one step further. A correct application of 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s suggestions on bringing in Players could have led 
to early suggestions of bringing in a Player that could bridge the financial gap 
between the agreed share price for the merger and the price the shareholders were 
willing to pay after the profit warning. The advantage of such an introduction 
compared to the actual outcome should not be underestimated. Firstly, shareholder
124 That is exactly what happened May 2005 in the case of Verizon’s bid for MCI. Qwest’s challenging
bid was unsuccessful but Verizon ended up having to pay approximately 25% more for MCI’s shares
(US $8.54 billion) than what Verizon originally had agreed to pay for MCI.
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-  management relations would not have turned as sour as they did. Secondly, BT
and MCI would not have had to give up their merger intentions, which, to
reiterate, was generally considered to make strategic and operational sense even
after the profit warning. Years of co-operation and operational fine-tuning was
destroyed by an emphasis of the shareholders on the price of MCI’s additional
shares. Bringing in an appropriate Player that would work with the merger plans
and that could bridge the financial gap between the initially agreed price and
shareholders’ new value could have prevented the total annihilation of BT’s
international strategy. In fact, an initiative to bring in such a Player emerged late
in the process when GTE switched from BT’s challenger to co-operator but the
timing was off. WorldCom had already entered the game by that time and created
1enough momentum to see the deal through.
On this last point, when a new player was finally brought into the bidding game 
for MCI by BT’s management another contributory element of Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s theory emerged. Once BT got caught up in the bidding fray with 
WorldCom and realised that WorldCom’s offer was financially superior and its 
financial clout could not be matched it used a tactical move to reverse its trailing 
position. By combining with a company that, like WorldCom, initially had entered 
the bidding process for MCI thereby opposing BT, BT management acted 
according to Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s advice of bringing in complementors 
because this works to the introducer’s advantage. Joining its bid with GTE can be 
considered as such. Not only did this add some pure financial muscle to BT’s bid 
but it also added value to the operational value of the proposed merger because
125 Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s section on hidden costs of bidding are indicative in this respect. Once 
WorldCom had entered the BT / MCI game - and it only came into action with a bid almost three 
months after the profit warning, meaning BT and MCI had had sufficient time to mend the cracks in 
their relation -  a number of hidden costs had been made. Those included costs on financial and legal 
advisers to prepare the bid but also less tangible costs as its reputation as a company that had shot up 
the telecommunication ranks through a large number of successful acquisitions. Mainly due to the 
company’s founder Bernard Ebbers WorldCom’s image was that of a US maverick cowboy 
challenging incumbent telecommunication operators across the world. Once engaged in a highly 
profiled shoot-out with European incumbent BT more than the naked intrinsic value of MCI was at 
stake for WorldCom. In other words, the introduction of GTE as a player in a BT -  MCI merger deal 
made game theoretical sense but would have had more success had it occurred in an early phase before 
WorldCom had made (hidden) costs.
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that meant the inclusion of a US local loop network to the deal (see BT and 
Tactics).126
BT and AT&T Concert alliance
In our introduction of this chapter we distinguished two possible types of 
contributions: one of a more theoretical and one of a practical nature. The 
contribution of PARTS with regard to BT and Players so far has been of the 
practical nature: had the actors taken PARTS into consideration the outcome 
would have been more favourable to them than what happened in actuality. For a 
contribution that is of an analytical theoretical nature we assess the Concert II 
alliance. In this alliance an attempt was made by the partners to enlarge the pie by 
bringing in a new player. The two Concert II partners BT and AT&T brought 
Japan Telecom into their Concert alliance -  although with a more limited role than 
the two founding partners played. With the introduction of Japan Telecom as a 
Concert II member BT and AT&T would gain access to the lucrative Japanese 
market through an established Player with local knowledge, an infrastructure and 
an existing customer base. These factors would increase the probability of success 
in providing Concert II services to the world’s second largest telecommunications 
market. More success would mean to BT and AT&T more revenues from their 
operations in the Japanese market. The increase in revenue would mean an 
increase of the pie for Concert members BT and AT&T (as well as for new entrant 
Japan Telecom). In other words, the link-up with Japan Telecom is consistent with 
and can be understood through Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory.
Added value
BT and MCI Concert alliance and the coming to a merger (f)
After the profit warning, BT’s shareholders pressed BT management to lower the 
company’s bid for the remaining 80% of MCI’s shares. This pressure led to re­
126 Likewise to Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s observation, we note that the integrated character of 
PARTS leads to multi-applicability (dual or more) of certain elements. In this case, instead of treating 
the joint bid with GTE as evidence within the Players section, we could have analysed it from the 
Added Value perspective. There is even a third dimension of PARTS to this move as we will analyse in 
the Tactics section. Similar multi-applicability may appear in other issues from the cases.
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negotiations between BT management and its MCI counterpart over the originally 
agreed price for the takeover. The subsequent lowering of the price provided an 
opportunity for WorldCom to make a superior bid to MCI shareholders and this, 
eventually, culminated to BT losing out to WorldCom. In fact, BT not only lost its 
long term and destined merger partner, the course of events from then until the 
present so far warrant the conclusion that BT lost its, perhaps one-time, 
opportunity to align successfully with a US partner. The failure to achieve this 
focal element in BT’s international strategy until now is symptomatic for its failed 
international strategy. In other words, BT shareholders carry, at the very least, a 
substantial part of the blame attached to that failure: after all BT had centred its 
entire strategy and business plans on the imminent further integration of the two 
partners. To be sure, as indicated earlier, shareholders with stock that WorldCom 
purchased received excellent return on their investment.127 However, all 
shareholders (i.e. including those that had released the shares to WorldCom) that 
continued to hold BT stock after the severing of ties with MCI, experienced 
wealth destruction in the long run as a consequence of a decrease in BT valuation 
when the company was left without an international partner and strategy. A more 
precise financial analysis of BT’s share price development due to the occurrences 
surrounding the failed merger plans is outside the scope of this thesis. However, 
this is set out in a general manner because the single matter of the collapse of 
Concert due to the loss of MCI was responsible for some long term wealth 
destruction of shareholders. Therefore, BT’s shareholders, by pressing for a 
reduction of the price for MCI underestimated the true (long term) Added Value of 
MCI.
We consider that Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s treatment of Added Value makes 
a strong contribution in a practical sense on this issue. Not surprisingly (and 
perhaps very typically for shareholders in general) BT shareholders operated on a 
definition of MCI’s added value that is too limited for Nalebuff and
127 At this point it can be argued that the failure of BT’s shareholders to foresee WorldCom entering the 
bidding game has been at no detriment to them. WorldCom’s entrance and subsequent victory in the 
bidding fray was to their financial benefit. However, as was mentioned in the Players part and as will 
be shown below, by linking the Players part with other parts of the PART framework, their victory has 
been a Pyrrhic one. Had they fully interpreted Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s framework (or had had 
the benefit of hindsight) they may not have pressed BT management as ferociously for a price 
reduction on MCI’s shares in spite of the short-term gains it generated.
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Brandenburger’s definition of Added Value. The shareholders assessed MCI’s 
recent and expected short-term future performance - neither of which were 
considered positive pictures to them due to the increased losses MCI had suffered 
while attempting to break into local US telephone markets -  and equated this to 
the price of the remaining shares to be bought by their company. This led to their 
conclusion that MCI’s Added Value was lower than the US $24 billion value that 
MCI would represent had the acquisition of those remaining shares taken place 
according to the reached agreement. Retrospectively, many would agree that 
MCI’s $24 billion value was somewhat inflated.128 But those that do would do so 
for different reasons than BT’s shareholders did at the time. The then estimated 
value of MCI (as with that of all telecommunication companies at the time) was 
influenced by the initial signs of inflated prices for telecommunication assets, later 
culminating to the bubble and its subsequent demise. However, BT shareholders 
did not consider the price (and value) of MCI too high for such reasons. Their 
motivation for considering MCI over-priced was independent of any 
telecommunication “bubble developments” and such industry-wide downward 
corrections on value of telecommunication assets came much later. The 
shareholders considered MCI’s value too high because the profit warning 
indicated that the company’s attempts in attacking the RBOC would be less 
successful than portrayed earlier. Ultimately they were content with a $5 billion 
reduction of MCI’s price. In other words, they considered MCI’s Added Value $5 
billion less than the agreed value. It is here where the value of Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s analysis emerges. They prescribe a wider definition of Added 
Value than BT shareholders proved to have adopted based on their actions. In 
order to assess the true Added Value of MCI to BT and its shareholders one 
should have considered the full value purchasing the remaining shares represented. 
The total losses BT would suffer from not acquiring MCI were a better indicator 
in the Nalebuff and Brandenburger definition of Added Value than the estimations
128 We fully realise that a comparison of those telecommunication assets with those of 2005 is not a 
matter of straightforward arithmetic. However, there is some justification to compare prices in order to 
show the inflatedness of telecommunication assets in the late 1990s. Comparing the combined price of 
$24 billion BT bid for MCI (not to mention the $37 billion WorldCom eventually paid for the 
company) with the price two other competing bidders placed on the same company in 2005 is 
indicative against any measure. Early May, after their 3-month bidding battle for MCI, Verizon and 
Qwest topped their bids with $8.4 billion and $9.9 billion, respectively. Irrespective of any arguments 
that can be brought up against comparing MCI’s 1997 value with that of 2005 the differences are too 
great to ignore the influence of the emergence of the technology and telecommunication bubble.
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or calculations BT shareholders made. As subsequently has been proved, the value 
of losing MCI as a partner -  in alliance and acquisition -  should have been 
considered as many times the negotiated discount of $5 billion. As we indicated in 
the first chapter of this thesis, companies operating in globalised industries as 
telecommunications had been forced to develop a successful international strategy 
to offset losses suffered from globalisation’s dynamics and in order to seize 
opportunities globalisation posed to such companies. To this effect, BT had based 
its international strategy on the Concert alliance and made large investments in 
terms of finances, time, manpower, operational fine-tuning and reputation in that 
partnership. MCI, its only partner in the alliance played a pivotal role. Without 
MCI Concert’s Added Value would be reduced substantially. In other words, 
MCI’s Added Value to BT was enormous since it represented much of the 
company’s international strategic orientation and because it had a high level of 
asset specificity which would not be easy to regain from another company, 
particularly not at a short notice. It is difficult to quantify the total value of the loss 
of MCI, the collapse of Concert and subsequently the disappearance of BT’s entire 
international strategy but $5 billion certainly is too modest a price to reflect that 
loss. Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s definition of Added Value o f a player can be 
distilled from the equation:
the size of the pie when that player is in the game 
minus
the size of the pie when that player is out of the game
If BT’s shareholders had applied this definition of MCI’s Added Value, the 
requested reduction of MCI’s price, which snowballed into WorldCom’s entrance, 
the loss of MCI and BT’s failure to cement its international strategic plans would 
have made less sense. As such, Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s PARTS could have 
provided the shareholders with important advice.
BT and MCI Concert alliance and the coming to a merger (ID
Also in the BT’s alliance with MCI, a further indication of Nalebuff and
Brandenburger’s notion of Added Value appears in WorldCom’s position. In
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essence this contribution is of more analytical theoretical nature than practical 
advice. But Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s method in this respect can be made 
useful for practical purposes. Before WorldCom (and GTE) entered the bidding 
process for MCI the company was valued at approximately $24 billion by the 
intended purchaser, BT, who offered $19 billion for the remaining 80% MCI 
shares. When WorldCom eventually won the stand-off with its revised bid for 
MCI those shareholders had witnessed their company rise in price to $37 billion. 
In other words, at that time, to MCI shareholders WorldCom had an Added Value 
of approximately $15 per share because their size of the pie before WorldCom 
entered the game was approximately $36 per share (BT’s initial offer). After 
WorldCom had entered the game and won, MCI shareholders had seen their pie 
increase to $51 per share so WorldCom represented a substantial Added Value to 
them. In this case, the contribution of this assessment is theoretical: it casts light 
on how to analyse the position of WorldCom vis-a-vis MCI’s shareholders. 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger use that analysis to provide practical advice to 
Players in the game. Because it is outside the scope of our research, we will 
merely touch upon these points and not expand into greater detail.129 Building on 
the assessment of WorldCom’s potential Added Value to MCI shareholders, 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger would have advised those shareholders to bring in 
WorldCom at the time when they assessed that the company could provide it with 
higher Added Value than BT would. Such additional Added Value could have 
been brought to MCI shareholders by other companies as well and it would be up 
to the shareholders (ideally with MCI management on their side) to consider the 
best prospects to increase their value.130 An assessment of PARTS would, in turn, 
lead to WorldCom using the analytical assessment to demand a “Pay-me-to-play” 
contract from MCI to hedge itself against the hidden costs of bidding against BT.
129 It concerns two Players, MCI shareholders and WorldCom that feature in our thesis by association 
without being the subject o f one of our three cases BT, Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica.
130 To consider the full Added Value of a company brought into the game this way, the shareholders 
should include in their assessment the loss of BT as an international partner and receive compensation 
for this in either financial form (and then handsomely) or operationally (i.e. elect a company that can 
offset the strategic and operational loss of MCI’s withdrawal from what was the most promising 
alliance at that time).
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BT and AT&T Concert alliance
When the plans were presented it appeared that this alliance would dwarf all 
existing and past ones with its original figure of $10 billion (compared to $1 
billion for Global One). But as has turned out, this amount had little relation with 
the alliance’s Added Value. Still the combination of the two companies in an SBA 
would represent massive Added Value especially to large TNCs, it was thought. 
The Added Value would partly be due to the sheer size of the SBA but also to the 
fact that particularly these two companies were combined and the synergetic 
extras as a consequence. Although this alliance was between the second and fifth 
largest telecommunication company in the world, there was little overlap in their 
operations. Both parties had gained experience through previous involvement in 
large SBAs and they were linguistically, culturally and strategically close 
(Fransman, 2002). But a combination of factors destroyed all this potential (or 
virtual) value within two years, in spite of setting up further opportunities for 
Added Value creation (i.e. the mobile joint venture Advance, the partnership with 
Japan Telecom and AT&T Canada, see chapter three for a discussion on these 
three Added Value inducing partnerships). Firstly, it turned out that the Added 
Value had been overestimated and the $10 billion revenue figure was adjusted 
downwards to $7 billion. Then, and more importantly, the alliance suffered from 
parental neglect due to a number of problems the companies had and that 
distracted them from providing Concert II with the necessary input. AT&T was re­
organising itself and BT was re-constructing its rising debt levels. With the 
technology and telecommunication sectors crashing in 2000 due to the tumbling 
values of the associated shares, prominent companies like AT&T and BT did not 
remain unaffected. Neither did their nascent SBA: turmoil in the industry led to 
little remaining of Concert IPs projected Added Value. However, this is not to 
state that parties could have prevented the demise of their alliance had they studied 
Co-opetition’s Added Value section. The failure was not due to a lack of Added 
Value (although the initially expected levels turned out to be inflated) but to an 
unfortunate wrong timing of the alliance -  just when the market changed 
drastically -  in addition to the emergence of other priorities for the parent
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companies. As such here PARTS’ contribution should be considered as analytical 
theoretical and not so much from a practical contribution’s side.131
Finally, on this issue, a separate analytical theoretical point on Concert II is that its * 
network should have been an example of what Nalebuff and Brandenburger call a 
“trade on”. The creation of the IP network that the partners announced they would 
construct, would deliver superior quality compared to most existing networks. The 
initial cost of constructing the network would be high (and included a fund for US 
start-ups that could provide assistance to the two incumbents in the network’s 
creation) but once the network would be up and running it would be cheaper than 
the existing fibre-optic networks, yet of premium quality. An increase of customer 
uptake would lower the marginal cost and increase the average revenue per user 
(ARPU) which enables further investments to upgrade the network and attract 
more customers. In other words, the trade-on vicious cycle Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger mention would appear. But the network was never created, the 
trade-on never realised and this part of the Added Value did not end up sinking 
with the rest because it never materialised in the first place.
Tactics
BT and MCI Concert alliance and the coming to a merger
There are multiple manifestations of tactics and tactical moves in the discussion of 
our cases. An important one related to the BT - MCI affair is the attempt by BT to 
neutralise WorldCom’s superior bid for MCI (see also the section on Players 
above). However, this tactic failed. BT and GTE joined forces after WorldCom 
had made its first offer of $30 billion ($41.50 per share) and after GTE had placed 
a $28 billion ($40 per share) bid on its own. In other words, the decision by BT
131 For a possible practical contribution of PARTS to this alliance an assessment of Scope would 
probably be best suited. Such an analysis would focus on how interactions of the bigger game affected 
the (lack of) success of Concert II. It would pre-suppose a substantial amount of managerial foresight. 
The inflation of the bubble was accompanied with expectations that it would not last and that some 
form of correction within the industry would follow. However, the exact timing o f the correction and 
its actual size were unclear until their appearance. Therefore, attempts to use Co-opetition as a beacon 
to provide strategic advice to the Concert II partners should be approached with caution. Such is the 
magnitude and the complexity of industry-wide crashes that few theories may be able to make valuable 
anticipatory contributions.
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and GTE to align came late in the game. MCI’s profit warning was in July 1997. 
BT’s reaction can be split in two: one from its management and one from the 
company’s shareholders. As indicated in the discussion of the case, BT 
management’s reaction was one of infuriation, i.e. a negative response. BT’s 
shareholders also responded negatively by demanding the price discount on MCI’s 
outstanding shares. As we further mentioned in the Added Value section, those 
reactions of BT’s shareholders bear considerable blame for the subsequent adverse 
conditions of BT’s international strategy. However, the shareholders should not be 
singled out in passing the blame. For one, BT’s management was the responsible 
actor for the company’s international strategy. Understandably, it had placed its 
progress with MCI at the summit of its strategy. After a successful period as 
partners in an SBA, further integration would lead to cutting cost, more 
streamlined provision of services and speedier response to the constantly changing 
market conditions that had characterised the telecommunication industry since the 
early 1990s. It is, therefore, remarkable that BT’s management did not adopt a 
more appeasing stance at an earlier stage in the emerging dispute with MCI. After 
all, it would be its international strategy that was at threat of collapsing were the 
dispute to escalate and management, better than the shareholders, knew what the
119operational consequences of failing to maintain MCI as a partner would be. Yet,
from MCI’s profit warning in July it took until October when BT finally used
tactics in their joint bid with GTE to use a more positive approach to the adverse
situation. BT knew all along of dissatisfaction amongst its shareholders with
111regard to the originally agreed price for the outstanding MCI shares. So when 
the disappointing results of MCI’s achievements in the US’ local 
telecommunications markets were revealed a positive pro-active approach could 
have kept the atmosphere with MCI positive, pleased BT’s shareholders, 
strengthened the merger’s prospects in the local telephone markets and, most 
importantly, very likely pre-empt WorldCom’s involvement in the game. Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger would argue that had BT, through quiet diplomacy, introduced 
a Regional Bell Operating Company (RBOC, see section on the case of BT) as a
132 It is even no exaggeration to state that the BT’s top management had strongly identified its position 
with a successful course of the merger with MCI, which made for another reason for them to be more 
prudent in their handling o f the matter.
33 As we indicated in the discussion of the case, in spite of the eventual large support for the suggested 
deal, shareholders had displayed disquiet with the premium that was offered to MCI shareholders.
Also, institutional shareholders had been sceptic about the merged identity projected achievements.
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third party in the merger it would have been able to turn the adverse situation of 
the profit warning into an advantageous scenario. It tried to do this eventually but 
at that time the important negative consequences that an earlier introduction of a 
RBOC could have prevented had already taken place. We see here an important 
practical contribution of PARTS to BT’s strategy vis-a-vis MCI. Adopting 
PARTS recommendations could have contributed substantially to the saviour of 
BT’s intended merger with MCI.
MCI and the withholding of information on its performance 
In their section on Tactics Nalebuff and Brandenburger devote ample attention to 
what they refer to as “fog”. They discuss three types of fog. Particularly the one 
they call “preserving the fog” applies to MCI’s reaction vis-a-vis BT. In 
preserving the fog, a player that has managed to create a favourable impression 
with others (customers but also suppliers, complementers or even competitors) 
seeks to maintain that impression. That gives the player an incentive to hide 
information that may violate that impression: given the chance the player will hide 
such information. MCI had built up a favourable impression with BT over the 
period the two companies formed an SBA. MCI’s positive impression was to the 
extent that BT offered to merge (by acquisition) with the company through a 
purchase of the remaining shares at a premium. One important area of business in 
the alliance was the recently liberalised local telecommunications market in the 
US. BT, itself serving UK’s local market for almost a century, assumed great 
prospects to use its experience in tandem with a US partner. MCI’s, although not a 
local telephone operator, would have Added Value in its familiarity with the US 
telecommunication market (for example the regulatory framework including the 
issues relating to licensing, marketing strategy and the like). As a new entrant to 
the local market, it was expected and accepted that MCI would make a loss over 
1997, estimated at $400 million, maximum. However, when it appeared that the 
losses would more likely be double that estimate, MCI hid the information to 
preserve its reputation. There are, however, two curious points to this in our 
opinion. Firstly, as we stressed before, with three BT members on MCI’s board of 
governors, MCI should not have been able to hide such strategic information for 
such an extended period. A second point to raise on this strategy adopted by MCI 
relates to the conditions that Nalebuff and Brandenburger distinguish with respect
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to preserving the fog through hiding information. According to them this should 
only be done if the hidden information can be buried and prevented from ever 
seeing daylight. This is where MCI appears to have failed: eventually BT (and the 
financial markets) found out that MCI had hidden the information on the worse 
than expected performance of its local telephony operations. It is difficult to see 
how MCI could have kept this type of information hidden and how this would not 
have come out. Whatever motivations lie beneath this wrong application of 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s preserving the fog, as we have shown, they 
triggered a host of reactions by a number of Players and culminated in the 
cancellation of what until then appeared to be a certain merger-in-the-making. We 
consider Co-opetition’s contribution in two ways with regard to hiding 
information. The part relating to the reason why MCI chose to hide information 
from its partner is of analytical value. The second point, referring to Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s application to the reason why MCI’s approach failed, is a 
practical contribution. Had MCI taken to heart that preservation of fog necessitates 
the inability of such information to ever come out it would have understood that a 
different approach was needed than the chosen tactic. It can be considered a big 
mistake of MCI not to act accordingly since we assume that the completion of the 
merger was the company’s goal at that time.
Scope
BT and MCI Concert alliance and the coming to a merger 
BT’s shareholders underestimated MCI’s true value to BT and failed to see the 
wider consequences of their insistence on lowering the offer price. BT’s long term 
prospects, including financial, had a higher value than the price cuts negotiated 
with MCI. BT management underestimated the element of trust - after MCI had 
made the same mistake by hiding the true value of the losses suffered on local 
telephony operations. Whether it concerned an actual demanding o f resignations 
of two MCI executive officers, a threat to do so or the failure to publicly deny that 
either one of those (demanding or threatening to demand) was at stake, at that 
moment both parties had violated carefully built-up trust levels. Arguably, the icy 
crust that had developed after cold water had been poured over the relationship
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between two management teams that should have been on the brink of fully 
integrating and tightening their relatively long-established co-operation had made 
MCI’s management more susceptible to WorldCom’s offer than it otherwise may 
have been notwithstanding its higher value. In fact, whilst WorldCom’s offer was 
higher in value, since it concerned an all-share offer it carried some risk. 
Furthermore, MCI had an established and successful track record with BT whilst 
WorldCom was still an unknown factor. It can not be proven that a less belligerent 
reaction of BT would surely have led to a more favourable outcome for BT. But a 
better assessment of the Scope of the game and an assessment of the possible 
consequences of a clouded relationship between the two management teams might 
have been in BT’s advantage. Particularly since the outcome of lowering the offer- 
price ultimately placed MCI in a stronger position than any of the players: it could 
pick its partner. In fact, BT was forewarned. In 1993 it had experienced a 
comparable situation when it also intended to increase a 20% stake, then in 
McCaw mobile communications. At that occasion AT&T stepped in and thwarted 
BT’s plans. Furthermore, a careful analysis of WorldCom’s development would 
have revealed that the next target in its acquisition spree could very likely be 
another US long distance operator. WorldCom had just acquired local operator
MFS Communications and Internet access provider UUNET. Adding a long
>
distance operator to its already prolific portfolio of acquisitions made strategic 
sense because it would provide WorldCom with the opportunity to link it to its 
local network from MFS and use UUNET to create Added Value from providing 
Internet-based services. WorldCom, at the time the number four US long-distance 
operator would not be able to acquire AT&T due to its enormous market cap but 
MCI and Sprint, the numbers two and three, respectively, lay within it reach.
Both BT’s management and its shareholders did not place their “gut-reactions” to 
MCI’s profit warning in a wider context. A wider Scope included elements as the 
non-materialisation of the merger due to their actions, the Added Value of a 
proven partnership versus the need to build a new one and the creation of more 
favourable circumstances for WorldCom to enter the game. Those elements were 
not given the due weight that, retrospectively, both management and shareholders 
would have given to them considering the terrible state of BT’s international 
strategy after the loss of MCI. Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s warnings on failing
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to consider the wider game or Scope of the game are loud manifestations of 
practical advice but were not heard by these two actors of BT.
Co-opetition and Deutsche Telekom 
Value Net (Global One and predecessors)
Customers: 
TNCs 
Shareholders 
Deutsche Telekom 
France Telecom
Competitors:
Concert I and II, Unisource, 
WorldPartners, WorldCom, US 
start-ups (Global Crossing etc.) 
German regulator RegTP 
EC and US regulator 
Big Corporate accounts division of 
both Deutsche Telekom and France 
Telecom 
French government (to Deutsche 
Telekom)
Global One
(and predecessors)
Complementers: 
Network producers 
Other SBAs 
East Asian markets 
WTO
German and French government
Suppliers: 
Deutsche Telekom 
France Telecom 
Cisco, Microsoft etc. 
shareholders
Deutsche Telekom and PARTS’ contribution
When we placed BT in the context of PARTS’ contribution we explained the 
reasons why that case allowed for a wider application of PARTS than the 
applications of Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica. Whilst Deutsche Telekom’s 
case provides less room for application than the BT’s case (for one, Deutsche 
Telekom was only involved in one SBA, albeit an extended one) we nevertheless
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have been able to produce evidence of PARTS’ contribution to the case of 
Deutsche Telekom. For that purpose we present an application of the Players and 
the Tactics sections of the PARTS framework. Equal to the case of BT, Co- 
opetition’s contributions can be of analytical theoretical or of practical nature.
Players
Sprint’s position in the wake of the dispute within Global One 
Much to the detriment of Deutsche Telekom and its original partner France 
Telecom, an example of a successful introduction of a new player is provided by 
Global One’s third member, US long-distance operator Sprint. We classify this as 
an analytical theoretical contribution of Nalebuff and Brandenburger.134 By 1999 
Sprint had been trying to arrange the establishment of a three-way merger with its 
Global One partners Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom, however talks had 
stalled. Subsequently, Deutsche Telekom’s white knight attempt to merge with 
Telecom Italia failed and, as a consequence of that surprising move, its relation 
with France Telecom deteriorated substantially. This drastically reduced whatever 
small chance existed for the emergence of the three-way merger of Global One 
partners. Sprint’s CEO Esrey realised this. He was also aware of merger talks 
between the newly created MCI WorldCom and Nextel Communications, a US 
mobile phone company. Picking up the signal that MCI WorldCom must, 
therefore, be interested in wireless assets -  until then WorldCom did not have any
134 One could argue that it should be stretched to a practical issue. In such an extension one would take 
the position that Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom, by studying Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
PARTS, would have been alerted on the possibility of the entrance of a new player like MCI 
WorldCom that could snap up Sprint and, with Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s advice, could have 
prevented this from occurring. However, firstly, at that time France Telecom did not appear too 
interested in maintaining a partnership with Sprint (in nor outside Global One). Secondly, although 
Deutsche Telekom was more interested in continuing such links it too was not very adamant in its 
actions and it is doubtful whether either of those two felt a strong urge to do whatever it would take 
(including flipping through Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s manual) to keep Sprint as a partner. 
Deutsche Telekom marginally stepped up its efforts by siding with BellSouth but by then MCI 
WorldCom had already shown serious interest and the determination WorldCom had displayed in 
earlier takeover battles once it had entered those, including the one for MCI, was enough indication to 
expect that Deutsche Telekom had to show real commitment to keep an independent Sprint as a 
partner. As we pointed out Deutsche Telekom’s actions did not reflect such required commitment. In 
sum, we do not consider Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s contribution anything other than of an 
analytical theoretical nature on this issue because the relevant Players did not appear to be in need or in 
search of any practical advice, thereby making a practical dimension non-applicable.
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mobile telephone business assets and had indicated not to be interested in such 
assets -  Esrey brought in a Player. By personally contacted his counterpart, 
Bernhard Ebbers at MCI WorldCom and suggesting a mobile license deal between 
the two companies, a customer was brought into the game. After MCI 
WorldCom’s negotiations with Nextel collapsed, at least partly, due to a high level 
of debt the company would have had to assume, Sprint and WorldCom negotiated 
and reached an agreement on the largest acquisition offer in corporate history. 
Rather than taking a passive position and wait how developments between 
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom would affect his company, Esrey took an 
active approach instead. He reacted to the uncertainty that had befallen Global 
One and changed any possible direction the game of the alliance’s future could 
have taken had he not acted. By bringing in a customer for its business to compete 
with the existing two (Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom) Esrey sealed his 
company’s fate and took it into a direction he deemed preferable over potential 
scenarios that would have followed his inactivity. Nalebuff and Brandenburger 
describe potential benefits players can derive from bringing in other players. It 
provides an adequate analysis of Sprint’s position and its reaction thereto (as well 
as guidance to those that find themselves in similar situations).
Tactics
Determining ownership of the Global One business after its demise 
After it had become clear that Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom were to 
separate as partners the future of Global One needed to be determined. As 
indicated in the discourse of the case, first the German partner appeared to become 
the new owner but when no agreement could be reached, efforts were concentrated 
on transferring Global One to French ownership, which happened eventually. The 
settlement of this issue provided the perfect scenario for Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s Texas Shoot-Out (chapter two of this thesis, the section on 
Perceptions, provides an analysis of this aspect of the theory). All necessary 
elements were present. Firstly, in agreement with Nalebuff and Brandenburger the
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joint venture business was set up by the two partners.135 Secondly, although both 
parties wanted to discontinue the SB A, France Telecom had taken the more 
resolute role in terminating the partnership and was the initiator. This too is 
consistent with the conditions set in Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s treatment of 
the issue of ownership after the break-up of a joint business. Thirdly, even with 
Deutsche Telekom as the keenest partner to take Global One, it was to be expected 
that negotiations about the takeover conditions would make for a difficult process. 
That is because both partners valued the Global One business positively in spite of 
v its loss-making status. Also, an objective assessment of Global One’s value was 
not available: there was no separate share price to consider. Besides, it remains to 
be seen to what extent a share price would have provided an appropriate and 
helpful tool in the negotiations. Amongst other disadvantages, such as -  and this 
was particularly troublesome in Global One’s case which was characterised by 
operational inefficiencies - the total absence of a reliable measure to evaluate its 
true and potential value, the share price can, in such situations, conceal
1 ' Xfkinformation to outsiders (Fransman, 2002). In any case, it should also have been 
expected that the negotiation process would be a difficult one because relations 
between the two parties were not amicable in the aftermath of Deutsche 
Telekom’s moves in the Italian market and the court cases that had followed those 
moves (see previous chapter). In spite of the presence of these three elements that 
provided the perfect conditions for a classic Texas Shoot-Out, it does not appear to 
be the case that a Texas Shoot-Out was applied, in any case not from the inception 
of a need to find a way to solve the ownership issue after separation. Although we 
would have had to have been imbedded in the process to be hundred percent 
certain, there are two reasons why we are confident in arguing that it is extremely 
unlikely that the parties followed Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s advice. Firstly, 
the process would have been much swifter had France Telecom, who would have
1 7 7had to play the role of “shooter”, shot. Perhaps more convincingly, had the
135 Of course, Sprint had contributed to Global One, too but had already been bought out and made no 
claim on Global One or parts of the business after its departure.
136 A potential counter argument to the importance of the issue of share price in relation to Global One 
is that both potential buyers were insiders that would not lead their valuation of Global One on a share 
price if that had been available.
137 Notwithstanding our criticism towards Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s treatment of the potential 
dilemma with the Texas Shoot-Out, this case may not have been subjected to the difficulty of assessing 
how one’s partner values the business. Based on the individual strategic accents of their international 
units outside Global One, it could be derived what elements of Global One the counterpart would value
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partners opted for a settlement through a Texas Shoot-Out then there would not 
have been a reversal of front-runner position. After having established the 
rudiments of the bid, Deutsche Telekom would have either accepted or rejected 
France Telecom’s proposal and there would not have been negotiations anew. The 
essence, and merit, of the Texas Shoot-Out is exactly that: there is one shot 
followed by one decision. The fact that France Telecom became the focus of 
negotiations indicates that when Deutsche Telekom was the focus the Texas 
Shoot-Out strategy was not used. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that 
afterwards a role reversal took place in order to apply the Texas Shoot-Out only at 
that stage and the time the negotiations took in that second phase is consistent with 
that assumption. In conclusion, the aspect of Texas Shoot-Out from Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s theory -  where they link this Rule to perceptions or Tactics -  
provides a practical contribution. Not entirely in the sense that the outcome of the 
settlement of the ownership issue would have been different (an application of the 
Texas Shoot-Out could have led to France Telecom buying out Deutsche 
Telekom’s involvement in Global One and perhaps even for the same price). But it 
would have made for a swifter outcome of the settlement dispute to the full 
satisfaction of both parties.
more and, which ones, less (even if  expressing the exact value in money would remain to be a 
challenge).
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Co-opetition and Telefonica
Value Net (Telefonica and Unisource / Telefonica and MCI WorldCom)
Customers: 
Residential Latin American 
customers 
Corporate customer 
Shareholders 
Latin American business 
sector (basic infrastructure) 
Latin American 
governments
Competitors: 
WorldPartners 
Global One 
Qwest, Global Crossing and other 
US start-ups 
Local Latin American telephone 
operators 
National, regional and foreign 
operators in Spanish market
Complementers:
Telefonica & MCI WTO
WorldCom / w The “Chicago Boys”
Unisource ?? Latin American stock markets
Suppliers:
Cisco, Microsoft, etc. 
Endemol Entertainment
Telefonica and PARTS ’ contribution
In numbers, Telefonica pips BT and Deutsche Telekom when it comes to 
involvement in SB As. But in terms of longevity it trails the other two rather 
hopelessly. There are, nevertheless, some instances where we can link PARTS to 
Telefonica’s involvement in alliances and determine the framework’s contribution. 
We, thereto, start with presenting an analysis of PARTS’ contribution through 
Players in relation to Unisource. Furthermore, we draw attention to Added Value 
in two ways to indicate PARTS’ usefulness: one in relation to Telefonica’s 
decision to leave Unisource, the other one regarding Telefonica and its
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involvement in alliances in general. Finally, we present a contribution of PARTS’ 
Rules in relation to Telefonica’s (decision to form an) alliance with WorldCom.
Players
Telefonica as a Player in the Unisource game
Telefonica entered Unisource in 1993 and left the alliance in 1997. The company 
had Added Value to Unisource and almost all of that was formed by the Spanish 
company’s Latin American assets. However, during Telefonica’s presence in 
Unisource this Added Value was never seized upon. Essentially, Telefonica had 
joined Unisource because it expected the alliance to bring Added Value to TISA, 
its international division. But with the geographical concentration of Unisource 
never even reaching Latin America let alone providing Added Value to operations 
in that region, Telefonica did not make the expected gains from its Unisource 
involvement, much less any substantial ones. The upshot of this was that when the 
new management team entered Telefonica’s ranks, it did not want to be in the 
Unisource game any longer. Nalebuff and Brandenburger prescribe when a player 
should enter or stay in a game and use Added Value as the indicator steering this 
decision-making process. According to their framework Telefonica was right to 
enter the game and Unisource was right to grant it access. But as time passed it 
became apparent that Unisource was not tapping into the dormant Added Value 
reservoirs (i.e. Latin American markets, operations and assets). As we highlighted 
in the discussion of the case of Telefonica, Unisource in its entirety never 
generated much Added Value and viewing Telefonica’s membership from the 
alliance’s angle in isolation from the other members is nonsensical: a retrospective 
assessment based on the actual development of Unisource (as opposed to the one 
partners pledged themselves to) reaches the conclusion that none of the partners 
should have been in the alliance because none provided it with or derived much 
Added Value from it. Shifting the viewpoint from the alliance as a whole to 
individual member Telefonica, it can be concluded that the company should have 
acted earlier than it did. The SPts 7 billion loss it incurred in 1996 from its 
involvement in Unisource may have acted as the justification to leave Unisource 
but an earlier assessment to what extent Unisource provided Added Value to
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Telefonica could have prevented the occurrence of that loss. Remaining within the 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger framework, two options had been open to Telefonica 
in that case: leave Unisource or use its influence to change the Rules in such a way 
that the strategic focus would include Latin America. However, with hindsight, 
considering the setup of Unisource, a mere geographical shift may not have been 
enough to capture Added Value from Telefonica’s Latin American presence at the 
time. Telefonica’s Latin American assets that could provide services to TNCs -  
Unisource’s only target -  were in its first stages of development and not yet robust 
enough to add substantial revenue to Unisource’s narrow focus. In other words, 
for Telefonica to derive Added Value from its alignment with Unisource it needed 
to do more than changing the Rules to include Latin America: it also needed to 
include the provision of services to residential customers in that region. Such a 
shift would resemble a landslide and, considering Unisource’s increasing 
defensive outlook it seems unlikely that Telefonica would have been able to 
achieve such an offensive shift, leaving departure as the only sensible strategic 
option. The exact moment when Telefonica should have done this may be difficult 
to determine but certain is that it continued as a Player in Unisource much longer 
than made strategic (and financial) sense. Clear is, however, that Co-opetition has 
a practical contribution to this element of Telefonica’s case. In PARTS, current 
and potential Players are advised to assess their situation continuously in order to 
conclude whether they should be in a certain game or not. They need to measure 
the Added Value they possess in relation to the game and let that be their lead.
Had Telefonica applied this rigorously then they would have drawn the conclusion 
to leave Unisource at a much earlier stage. That would have saved them from 
much of the loss they made from their extended involvement.
Added value
Telefonica’s decision to leave Unisource
We just made the observation regarding determining at what time it was evident 
that Unisource was not the right game for Telefonica to be in for supporting its 
plans in Latin America. We mentioned the difficulty in deciding the optimal 
moment when it was certain that none of the pledged plans on that region would
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ever be materialised through Unisource.138 Eventually this problem was “solved” 
when Villalonga became Telefonica’s CEO. He, very clearly, assessed 
Telefonica’s involvement on basis of the principals of Added Value and concluded 
that the company should leave the flagging alliance immediately to join an SB A 
that would be serving the Spanish company’s international strategic goals. The 
company’s Latin American operations had been the linchpin in its international 
strategy and were set to become even more important in future plans. Contrary to 
agreements made when Telefdnica joined, Unisource did not appear to have any 
strategic direction towards Latin America. In other words, Unisource did not have 
any Added Value to Telefonica in the Latin American game because such a game 
did not exist from Unisource’s perspective, hence Villalonga’s termination of the 
alliance’s membership. On the face of it that was an unprecedented and rather bold 
move even taking into account that Villalonga came into Telefonica as an outsider 
without prior links to the CEOs of the other Unisource members.139 Yet, a correct 
application of Co-opetition would have resulted in more CEOs having taking such 
drastic steps because Telefonica’s involvement in Unisource was by no means the 
only case in which an SBA did not generate the desired result to individual 
members. The fact that Villalonga sought to exchange an alliance based on a 
defensive strategy for more offensive options was consistent -  and therefore not 
surprising -  with a change towards a more overall aggressive approach towards 
the company’s international strategy under that new management. Co-opetition’s 
notions of Added Value provide us with the (analytical theoretical) explanation 
why Villalonga’s Telefonica took such an unprecedented and brash move when 
most others in the industry in comparable situations did not.140
138 We refer to the optimal moment in this context to the timing after Telefonica’s entrance - when 
initially it appeared that there was Added Value to be accrued to both Telefonica’s operations and those 
of Unisource - but before Telefonica suffered SPts 7 billion in losses. At some point in time it became 
clear that Telefonica should not be in the Unisource game because, due to Unisource’s course of 
direction, no Added Value was being unlocked or made of it.
139 The only other time when this occurred in the case of major telecommunication SBAs was when 
AT&T’s Armstrong, then also a new entrant in and outsider to his company, pulled his company from 
WorldPartners / Unisource and entered Concert II.
140 From Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s examples we conclude that Players are considered to be at the 
level of companies and governments, not individuals. However, the influence of Villalonga on the 
course of Telefonica and consequently on the company’s current position has been so determining that 
his status borders that of a separate Player. Comparably (and perhaps an even stronger example), 
WorldCom was personified by its CEO Bernard Ebbers and he may merit a Player status too since it is 
impossible to consider WorldCom’s dynamics separate from Ebbers. Telefonica’s strategy in the period 
between June 1996 and July 2000 is also inseparable from Villalonga (and his team, which he had 
hand-picked). Whilst a discussion on whether individuals should be considered as Players is an
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Added Value and Telefonica* s involvement in alliances
Earlier we pointed out that the separate elements that form PARTS function in a 
highly integrative manner. Because of that we have already made a number of 
important observations on Added Value in the Player section on Telefonica 
because particularly these two elements are closely related in the Co-opetition 
framework. Here we would like to add an observation on Telefonica and Added 
Value in a more general sense. This links to an analytical theoretical contribution 
of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory and it sheds an important light on 
Telefonica’s performance in alliances and to what extent such alliances have 
contributed to Telefonica’s international strategy. Telefonica’s Added Value 
started from the time its Latin American assets became robust and ever since the 
company has had substantial Added Value in many respects. In Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s terms, during the 1990s Telefonica was a welcome Player to join 
the game of many others. Not only could the company choose which of the break­
up fractions it wanted to join with after the intended link-up to Concert perished 
due to the demise of that alliance. In addition to invitations from BT and MCI 
WorldCom, Telefonica had offers to join Deutsche Telekom, AT&T and KNP to 
name but the most overt and concrete ones. In all cases the interested parties 
mostly valued Telefonica’s position in Latin America. However, in spite of the 
industry-wide considered Added Value in this region Telefonica has never been 
able to realise it in an SB A. That Added Value has been formed via a number of 
Latin American tactical partnerships as opposed to through a major alliance. We 
already discussed the failure to unlock more of Telefonica’s Latin American 
Added Value through its involvement in Unisource. Similarly, Concert did not 
succeed in doing this either because the projected entity broke up before 
Telefonica’s membership was operational. Even in the alliance with MCI 
WorldCom that it chose out of a host of possibilities, its (Latin American) Added 
Value was never unlocked through alliance participation. We observe, therefore, 
that whilst Telefonica continues to have much Added Value in the 
telecommunication industry in general, it is largely due to purchased assets and 
from some tactical moves and it has not been possible to augment this Added 
Value through involvement in SB As.
interesting one, it is outside the scope of this thesis, which -  relating to that question -  limits itself to
assessing whether Co-opetition has validity at the micro level.
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Rules
Telefonica and its alliance with MCI WorldCom
We would like to demonstrate one more example of Co-opetition’s contribution to 
telecommunication alliances. It concerns an example of the applicability of Rules 
to our case of Telefonica. When WorldCom had lured MCI away from the merger 
with BT, Telefonica could choose which of the games it wanted to enter as a 
Player: the new to-be-created MCI WorldCom game or the broken-pieces of BT’s 
Concert game. As discussed Telefonica realised that its initial preference to play in 
both games at the same time was not realistic and it chose the MCI WorldCom 
game, eventually. However, consulting Co-opetition’s framework, and the section 
on Rules in particular, would have provided Telefonica with the strategic 
knowledge that entering the MCI WorldCom game through forming an alliance 
with that company was not a good choice. To be sure, Telefonica had Added 
Value as a Player in the game with WorldCom because WorldCom had few Latin 
American assets and could in one sweep establish a strong presence in Spain 
through association. In turn WorldCom, or then MCI WorldCom had plenty of 
Added Value to Telefonica who was still looking for a US partner. Also, 
Telefonica’s modest exposure in Europe would receive a positive boost through a 
linkage with WorldCom. Through synergies the two together would create a larger 
pie which, provided shared fairly, could benefit both. But an alliance between the 
two would also require the changing of Rules that had been embedded and proved 
to be successful. As Nalebuff and Brandenburger indicate -  although they primary 
concentrate on laws but they mention customs and what we refer to had become 
customs -  when it comes to changing the Rules one should not attempt to change 
those that are ingrained. Telefonica’s move to follow MCI to WorldCom would 
need the changing of such ingrained Rules. Until then WorldCom’s strategy had 
been a successful one but it had not featured SBAs. It success and creation of 
Added Value was one hundred percent due to acquisitions and mergers. Similarly, 
Telefonica, in spite of its membership in the Unisource alliance, had built all its 
Added Value by going-it-alone, i.e. through the parts of its strategy that had not 
featured working with a partner. For the two to function in an alliance they would 
both have had to change their tested and successful strategy that rested on a 
mixture of building and buying operations (see first chapter of the thesis in the
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section on “Ways to execute an international strategy”) and replace it with an 
alliance-based strategy. The downfall of MCI WorldCom firmly ended all 
possibilities for success of the alliance and the integration of the two US 
companies into one merged entity may have distracted that new entity too much to 
work on building its alliance with Telefonica. But in the time before WorldCom 
was under legal scrutiny and its officials became subject to indictments the 
alliance never took off either. Yet at this time, MCI WorldCom did work on at 
least two acquisition bids (Nextel and Sprint) of which one, the latter, was an 
absolute mega-deal. In other words, if the digestion of MCI by WorldCom was a 
distracting factor to the merged company then it was subjectively so: it distracted 
MCI WorldCom from its alliance obligations vis-a-vis Telefonica but substantially 
less so from preparing further mergers. This further proves that MCI WorldCom 
was more interested in acquisitions than building an alliance. Telefonica, itself not 
a company with a convincing alliance record either, would, with Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s theory have realised this and understood that its alliance with 
MCI WorldCom would only have a chance to succeed if both parties would 
drastically break their ingrained customs, something Co-opetition discourages as a 
road to take. The practical contribution provided by the Rules section of PARTS 
spelled out to Telefonica that the formation of an SB A with MCI WorldCom was 
not a strategically sound move and one that should have been avoided.
Conclusion o f  P A R T S’ contribution
Our starting point with regard to Co-opetition was to discover whether the theory 
could be stretched from its intended macro-level analysis to a micro-level. An 
affirmative answer could be of great potential benefit since the application of that 
theory can contribute positively to the phenomenon we place at the centre of our 
thesis: Strategic Business Alliances. In order to determine this we split Co- 
opetition’s potential contribution in an analytical theoretical and a practical one. 
We then assessed the presence of such contributions by applying Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s interpretation of their PARTS framework to our three 
telecommunication cases. Below follows a schematic overview o f that application.
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Players Added.
Value
Rules Tactics Scope
Analytical
theoretical
contribution
BT and AT&T 
Concert alliance
Sprint’s position 
in the wake of the 
dispute within 
Global One
BT and MCI 
Concert alliance 
and the coming to 
a merger II
BT and AT&T 
Concert alliance
Telefonica’s 
decision to leave 
Unisource
Added Value and 
Telefonica’s 
involvement in 
alliances
MCI and the 
withholding of 
information on its 
performance
Practical
contribution
BT and MCI 
Concert alliance 
and the coming to 
a merger
Telefonica as a 
Player in the 
Unisource game
BT and MCI 
Concert alliance 
and the coming to 
a merger I
BT and MCI 
Concert alliance 
and the coming to 
a merger II
Telefonica and its 
alliance with 
MCI WorldCom
BT and MCI 
Concert alliance 
and the coming to 
a merger
MCI and the 
withholding of 
information on its 
performance
Determining 
ownership of the 
Global One 
business after its 
demise
BT and MCI 
Concert alliance 
and the coming to 
a merger
We can now conclude this chapter with the observation that Co-opetition can 
apply to micro-level situations. As the table shows, in our cases Co-opetition 
contributes both in an analytical theoretical and a practical sense. The analytical 
theoretical contributions facilitate the understanding of important developments as 
described in our chapter on the cases. Because there is still much unknown about 
the SBA phenomenon, this function of Co-opetition is a welcome one to those 
interested in alliances from a scientific angle. Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
theory allows itself to be an additional analytical tool in a scientific assessment of
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SB As. We also distinguished Co-opetition’s practical contributions. Here the 
contribution lies in the provision of advice to those engaged in or contemplating 
entering into strategic alliances. Compared to other more traditional ways 
described in our first chapter, the relative novelty of this way of “doing business” 
calls out for useful paradigms and by featuring SB As in the telecommunication 
industry we found that the structured and coherent format of Co-opetition’s 
PARTS can perform that role. In sum, the PARTS framework helps with the 
theoretical analysis of SBA dynamics and it provides a beacon in the challenging 
terrain practitioners need to steer their alliance through.
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War versus Peace: assessing our expansions of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
mindset against our cases
Assessing Hamel's theory against our cases
As we indicated above, the reason why we selected Hamel’s theory on inter­
partner learning is twofold. Firstly, with our base theory (Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s Co-opetition) addressing business in general, we could not be 
certain that enough linkage would be present in their theory to relate to our cases. 
Our cases feature one specific and fairly specialised aspect of business, strategic 
alliances, and there was therefore a possibility that the levels of abstraction of the 
theory would be to high to match with our practical analysis of the cases. We 
believe that the previous section has shown that Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
theory does allow for an assessment. In spite of this “self-sufficiency” of Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger’s theory within the parameters of this thesis, Hamel’s theory 
has not been rendered redundant from an analytical level vis-a-vis our cases. That 
is because we had established a second reason for choosing Hamel. As we 
observed, the basic notion of Co-opetition rests on the two notions “war” and 
“peace”. Those contrasting notions that form one mindset make individually an 
attractive proposition to be tested against each other. In other words, in order to 
observe which of those two elements of the Co-opetition mindset would apply best 
to our particular cases we had to lift the notions and magnify them. In the case of 
the war mindset, Hamel’s theory was elected due to the fact that it takes a fairly 
radical, almost Machiavellian aggressive, position on alliances. It is our belief that 
this was just as close as a theory on alliances can resemble war. Therefore, in this 
section we will assess to what, if any, extent Hamel is a suitable theory to interpret 
the developments we have witnessed in our three SBA cases in the 
telecommunication industry. We will use the hypotheses we distinguished at the 
end of our discussion of Hamel’s theory.
Hypothesis 1:
SB As are not an alternative to markets or hierarchies but an independent mode of 
organisation. In other words, SBAs are a static mode with no relation to the
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markets and hierarchy continuum rather than a dynamic mode that can take any 
position between market and hierarchy.
One of the first observations we made with regard to Hamel’s theory is that SBAs 
should not be considered as a “half-way house” on route from market to hierarchy. 
In other words, contrary to Williamson’s TCE take on SBAs, Hamel rejects this 
dynamic character of alliances141. Hamel maintains that alliances are not an 
alternative to either market transactions or the hierarchy of full ownership.
Applied to our cases this would mean that alliances would not be treated as a 
transitional vehicle to arrive at a hierarchy but would be considered as an mode of 
organisation with a different purpose (in a moment we will observe what this 
purpose is, according to Hamel).
Assessing some of the developments in our cases, we conclude that Hamel’s 
perception is at odds. Most explicitly in the Concert alliance between BT and 
MCI, the partnership evolved from an SB A and it was the full intention of both 
parties to transcend their co-operation into a merger, i.e. a hierarchy. In the case of 
Concert II, the partners did not reach this advanced level but it is highly likely 
that, had the alliance performed better BT and AT&T could have worked towards 
a hierarchy. The increase of the scale of co-operation after the conclusion of the 
SBA (i.e. the subsequent conclusion of their partnerships in Canada, Japan and in 
the mobile phone segment) allows for an interpretation that the two were moving 
towards more hierarchical relations. In any case, there is little evidence that they 
treated the alliance as a static station to satisfy their internalisation goals as Hamel 
proclaims alliances should.
Hypothesis 2:
Central aim of SBAs is the internalisation of skills not assets.
Following from the previous assessment, Hamel does grant alliances with a 
dynamic dimension, albeit not the organisational mode we just made reference to. 
As stated, to Hamel alliances are a temporary membrane which partners use to
141 As we will see shortly, he does accept a different type of dynamics with regard to alliances.
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fulfil their most important short term goal: the acquisition of skills. The intention 
to acquire skills differs substantially from the intention to acquire assets. Hamel 
does not consider alliances appropriate to acquire assets; those should be acquired 
through other organisational modes. Alliances are, however, highly suitable for the 
acquisition of skills. The dynamic dimension is embedded in the rule that a partner 
should only use the alliance for as long as the sought-after skills have not been 
acquired sufficiently. Once that has occurred the alliance should be left and 
independence from the alliance and the, then, soon to be former partner should be 
sought.
Whilst we witnessed a fair amount of departures from our alliances and we 
observed a high level of dynamics in relation to alliance membership142, in no 
instance were such departures the consequence of the departing member having 
satisfied its internalisation objective. In the case of Telefonica leaving Unisource it 
was in fact almost the opposite: the Spanish company left the alliance because it 
considered that it did not derive any value from it rather than because it had 
deducted all it intended to gain from the partnership. Similarly, other departures 
were not due to Hamel’s prediction either.
Hypothesis 3:
Intangible assets are the primary rationale behind the formation of SBAs.
In Hamel’s theory, the ultimate purpose for alliances is to internalise intangible 
assets. These assets are virtually invisible and difficult to imitate. They can be of 
great value and imperative to possess for a company. Using an alliance as a 
temporary vehicle to obtain such assets through close observation of a successful 
partner may be the only way to succeed. Assuming that what Hamel considers the 
most appropriate use of alliances is copied in the SBAs in telecommunications we 
reviewed, one would expect that such intangible assets would be at the centre of 
the rationale behind most of the alliances or behind the most important ones.
142 We have concentrated our discussion primarily on actual alliances and a very small number of 
confirmed negotiations between potential partners that did not materialise. Had we include only 10% of 
the speculations in our discourse this dynamics character would have bordered chaos.
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In any case concerning the latter group, the evidence from the cases does not 
appear to bear this out. Whilst it is more than conceivable that obtaining intangible 
assets has played a fringe role in some, perhaps most of the alliances, intangible 
assets were never the main reason for the alliances. The alliances were about 
gaining access to markets, customer bases, infrastructure and similar tangible 
assets. Considering the amounts involved in the alliances we reviewed it is 
difficult to see how shareholders would allow them to be primarily about 
“invisibles”.143
Hypothesis 4:
Inter-partner learning is an endogenous tool parties use to increase their bargaining 
power. There is a constant process in which parties use their (increased) 
bargaining power in order to change the alliance so they can appropriate more 
value from it.
Contrary to Nalebuff and Brandenburger who provide us with a well-balanced mix 
of the two, Hamel does not devote much attention to the part about value creation. 
His theory and the normative elements in his treatment of alliances in the article 
are almost exclusively about value appropriation. That may not be a big problem 
for our analysis since the subjects of our cases had little to contribute on the matter 
of value creation: all alliances shrank their owners’ pies because none of the 
alliances we surveyed made a profit. Concentrating on the value appropriation
143 Having said that, in the pharmaceutical industry it is less exotic to fork out high amounts for 
intangible assets, in fact some of the most important deals in that sector are about invisible assets. An 
important reason for this is that the rationale behind alliances in pharmaceuticals is often different from 
that in telecommunications. It became apparent in a number of acquisitions o f small, successful and 
efficient drug developers by larger hierarchies that the acquired small unit’s performance dropped 
almost immediately after the takeover. After analysis it was concluded that an important reason behind 
the turnaround was the changed situation within the erstwhile small company. Then, productivity 
flourished because of the company’s informal atmosphere, short lines of command, etc. With the 
inclusion of the company in the hierarchy after the acquisition, more funds and other tangible assets 
were available to personnel of the small company but the intangible assets that were imbedded in its 
smaller size had all been gulped by the larger hierarchy. In order to maintain the positive elements from 
the small but add the benefits of the large company, alliances were used as a more appropriate mode. 
The difference with the telecommunication industry is that in telecommunications a contribution of a 
small company is far less often as ground-breaking and important to a large telecommunication 
operator because the type o f markets are completely different. With this in mind it is important to note 
that conclusions drawn with regard to Hamel’s theory -  or the other theories -  relate strictly to the 
telecommunication industry.
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another problem may emerge. Hamel discusses value appropriation in terms of 
bargaining power between the partners. The changes in the difference in 
bargaining power between the partners are reflected in changes in the alliance. 
When one party increases its position vis-a-vis its alliance partner, it will look to 
increase its proceeds from the partnership or, in Nalebuff and Brandenburger 
terminology, increase its size of the pie. Hamel admits that many of the changes 
derive from exogenous factors but he distinguishes inter-partner learning as an 
important endogenous factor (one that parties can influence).
Considering the type and the nature of our research, it appears that an assessment 
of this element of Hamel’s theory is outside our scope. However, if  Hamel is 
correct and this notion of sifting bargaining power due to endogenous learning (or 
any of the exogenous factors) had occurred in our cases, we would have witnessed 
formal changes in the alliance structure. Changes did occur but clearly for 
different reasons than the ones Hamel predicts. At the same time, it can even be 
argued that in the case of Deutsche Telekom the stable 50 -  50 relationships over 
three interpretations proves the opposite: it is unlikely that the relative positioning 
of the two operators was constant and completely equal over a period of seven 
years. Within Hamel’s assessment we would have had to observe at least some use 
of bargaining power by the partners during that extended time with the aim of 
increasing their size of the pie.
Hypothesis 5:
With the ultimate aim of seeking independence of one’s alliance partner, 
internalisation by both partners will lead to a race to learn.
Finally, normatively, Hamel describes alliances in terms of partners that attempt to 
achieve independence from the alliance and their partner as soon as possible. In 
order to become independent a firm needs to have internalised what it set out to 
internalise. However, since the alliance partner will do the same, a race to fulfil its 
internalisation objective before its counterpart does, will emerge. This race to 
learn will characterise Hamel’s alliances and termination of the alliance will 
follow once, at least, one partner has completed its internalisation programme.
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Once again, there is no evidence to suggest that our cases were driven by Hamel’s 
race to learn on the road to independence, neither during their existence nor in the 
reasoning behind their termination. Still, independence was sought eventually in 
all our cases, but not due to partners racing each other in endeavours to learn from 
their partner before they would succeed in doing so. One possible explanation why 
the race to learn was not observed in our cases is offered by Hamel’s own theory. 
One of the preconditions, the intent to learn, will be low when alliance partners 
consider the alliance as an alternative to competition rather than as a temporary 
vehicle for improving competitiveness versus the partner.
Based on Hamel how appropriate is the “war” element in our alliances? 
Considering the break-ups and the healthy dose of contention we witnessed in our 
cases, the conclusion that Hamel, as representative of Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s war mindset, would be a suitable theory for our cases seemed 
plausible. However, based on our assessment of the central notions of Hamel’s 
theory in relation to developments from our cases, it proves that this is not the 
case, after all. Little, if  any, of his theory is reflected in the important 
developments we witnessed in the telecommunication alliances we assessed. We 
will now turn to the theory that represents the peace mindset and assess how well 
that one relates to our cases. That assessment is later followed by a conclusion on 
the appropriateness of the war and peace mindset to SBAs in telecommunications.
Assessing Madhok’s theory against our cases
As was the case with the choice for Hamel’s theory, Madhok’s theory was chosen 
for two reasons. We already mentioned in the part that assessed Hamel’s theory 
that the first reason, our hedge-strategy in case Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
framework would prove to be too general to apply to a topic within business as 
specific as SBAs, has proved to be too pessimistic. In the section above we trust 
that we have shown that Co-opetition does allow for the assessment of our cases 
without the need for supplementing the theoretical framework with more 
specialised theories on alliances. However, also similar to Hamel’s case,
Madhok’s theory was elected for a second reason. Co-opetition’s central element, 
the new mindset in business consists of two pillars: war and peace. We selected
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two articles that we consider strong representatives of those two contrasting pillars 
and discussed them both in the theory section of this thesis. Now, as we have just 
done for the war dimension of the mindset, we will assess the applicability of the 
peace dimension against our cases. Here too, we will try to establish whether the 
central notions of the theory presented are in accordance with developments we 
experienced in our telecommunication cases. We will use the hypotheses we 
distinguished and mentioned at the end of our discussion of Madhok’s theory.
Hypothesis 1:
Madhok’s central theme is that the presence of a sufficient amount of trust will 
decrease dissatisfaction with alliances. Given this, we will be able to attribute 
possible dissatisfaction in our case alliances to a lack of trust.
In order to assess this hypothesis we will first need to establish which of the 
alliances of our case studies featured dissatisfaction. It is important to indicate that 
Madhok, presumably consciously, uses the term dissatisfaction in his article and 
not termination or dissolution. In other words, our pool of possible qualifiers is 
somewhat larger than had his concern be alliance break-ups. Furthermore,
Madhok does not explicitly define dissatisfaction but we interpret it as a feeling by 
at least one of the partners that the actual execution, the results or the development 
-  current or expected in future -  of the alliance are less than hoped or expected.144 
Based on the review of the cases we consider that there was dissatisfaction in 
Concert I and Concert II; in Global One; in Unisource and in Telefonica’s alliance 
with MCI WorldCom. In other words, of our reviewed cases, we exclude the 
eunetcom and Atlas alliances.145
Concert I
As indicated, of all major alliances in the telecommunication industry this is 
arguably the one alliance that came closest to a desired level of performance.
From an objective point of view there is the fact that this is the only SB A that
144 We will have to restrict the interpretation to those situations in which such feelings came to the 
surface through actions, statements or other forms of expression. Dissatisfaction that remained internal, 
whether on the level of the individual manager (which is in fact Madhok’s orientation) or, less likely, 
on the firm’s level will fall outside our radar and assessment.
145 Telefonica’s planned alliance with BT and MCI never passed beyond the stage of agreement and 
will not be considered for that reason.
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approached its break-even point and would almost certainly have reached it had its 
members not sought to fortify their relation through a merger. Thereby, we do not 
suggest that BT and MCI should not have decided to merge their operations 
because that intention was a sound one considering the parameters of the industry 
and the situation in which the alliance was. It is merely to indicate that there was 
little amiss with Concert I and, but for one, admittedly crucial, development this 
alliance would have been struck off the dissatisfaction list. But starting with 
MCI’s profit warning and all subsequent developments till WorldCom*s 
successful acquisition of MCI, dissatisfaction did manage to creep into Concert I.
It will not need further elaboration that BT’s reaction to the profit warning, MCI’s 
refusal to accept a discount on the sale of their shares and, possibly even MCI’s 
management readily acceptance of WorldCom’s acquisition offer are all 
indications of dissatisfaction. It is our task to assess whether, in any way, trust or 
the breach of it, played a (substantial) role. If we analyse MCI’s behaviour then 
there is little doubt that the release of a profit warning that would be considered as 
a crucial development was not pre-briefed to its long term alliance partner soon to 
be merger spouse. Whatever the relationship between the two partners was before 
-  and that relationship appeared to be trustful considering the plans to merge - that 
move made for a severe breach of trust. If we turn to BT, however, their reaction 
to the profit warning, perhaps to some extent understandable, can also not be 
qualified as trustful. We will return to this when we discuss the second hypothesis.
Concert II
It could be argued that this alliance lacked trust almost from its inception. AT&T’s 
acquired IBM’s global network business on 8 December, less than half a year 
since the announcement of the formation of Concert II on 26 July 1998. 
Irregardless of whether there was a legalistic loophole in the Concert II contract 
not to include that business in the SBA, keeping it outside its partnership with BT 
was a violation of trust between partners. Furthermore, BT establishing its own 
extra-Concert II corporate business division was equally trust-busting. Further 
evidence of trusts violations in the Concert II alliance comes from AT&T’s 
acceptance of NTT’s investment in the company while AT&T and BT had an 
exclusive agreement through Concert to use Japan Telecom for their operations in 
Japan.
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Global One
Perhaps the most obvious violation of inter-partner trust within our cases occurred 
in Global One. Much like MCI, Deutsche Telekom failed to inform its long­
standing partner on an imminent development that carried importance. But in this 
case the silent treatment concerned a matter right at the centre of the partnership: 
an acquisition of a third party. The reaction of France Telecom, in word and deed, 
shows overtly that the partner had considered this self-interested behaviour on 
Deutsche Telekom’s side as unexpected (and unwelcome), hence a breach of trust 
(see Madhok’s definition of trust). The consequent court cases, contentious 
termination of Deutsche Telekom’s membership in Wind and France Telecom 
acquisition of E-Plus in Germany were immediate indications of retaliatory 
reactions after trust had been breached.
Unisource
With Villalonga at Telefonica dissatisfaction with Unisource led to a withdrawal 
from the alliance. This is not to say that without Villalonga Telefonica would not 
have been dissatisfied with is Unisource membership. Villalonga entered 
Telefonica in July 1996. The first consolidated figures came at the end of his first 
year as a CEO and showed big losses strictly due to its involvement in Unisource. 
It is conceivable that his predecessor or any other CEO would have been 
dissatisfied with the Pts 7 billion loss. But another matter is whether this 
dissatisfaction was due to a breach of trust in any way. We do not see an argument 
for this. A different explanation than breach of trust needs to be sought for 
Telefonica’s dissatisfaction (see below, in our section on Different Agendas and 
the cases).
Telefonica and MCI WorldCom
Dissatisfaction in the Spanish operator’s other qualification for this hypothesis, its 
SBA with MCI WorldCom, showed itself in complete inaction by either of the 
partners. Despite the freedom to choose from a pool of interested candidates, 
Telefonica elected wrongly because the alliance never lifted itself off the paper 
that contained the signatures. Since both parties signed with free will, we consider 
their apathy as dissatisfaction. The question is, whether it was also a breach of
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trust. We believe it was not. Trust in Madhok’s definition includes mutual 
expectations regarding each other’s fulfilment of perceived obligations. The 
agreement both parties signed was a list of actual and perceived obligations, 
including endeavours to make the partnership a success. By this definition both 
parties were in breach of trust. However, because both parties did so in equal 
measure and none of the parties has expressed its dissatisfaction in deeds such as 
civil court action for compensatory claims or otherwise, Telefonica and MCI 
WorldCom may be technically in breach of trust but conceptually within the 
subject of alliances there are no consequences to such a breach. Had either of the 
parties suffered financially or strategically from the aloofness of its partner it 
would have been more plausible to consider this a breach of trust. Perhaps the 
underlying notion is that our initial statement on this matter should be revised: 
maybe parties were not dissatisfied with the lack of movement of their planned 
SBA. Certainly, our analysis of this issue in the Rules section of “Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger and Telefonica” seems to be consistent with that: both Telefonica 
and MCI WorldCom were in essence not the SBA-type of companies and 
therefore content not to play the alliance game but instead continue to focus on 
their successful method of executing their international strategy. That does, 
however, leave us with the question why they entered into the alliance in the first 
place.
Hypothesis 2:
In those cases where we can attribute dissatisfaction to a lack of trust we can 
identify those case where there was an absence of the structural component of trust 
and those cases where there was an absence of the social component.
To recap in short, the structural component refers to the fact that two parties will 
both gain when they synergise. They will refrain from self-interested behaviour 
because doing so will jeopardise their partnership which means that they will 
destroy their own current or potential value. We derive from this that if  parties to 
an alliance do not have any synergy (left) and their association does not generate 
added value, the structural component of trust is absent and self-interested 
behaviour will prevail. The social component of trust is the glue that keeps the
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relationship steady in cases of individual or mutual turbulence. Inevitable periods 
of unbalanced value appropriation will not lead to dissatisfaction of a partner 
(which may materialise in self-centred behaviour) because the social component 
provides enough trust for the partner to wait till a turnaround of its fortune.
The assessment of the first hypothesis has left us with the following three alliances 
to assess against the second hypothesis: Concert I and II as well as Global One.
Concert I
In the case of Concert I the structural component of trust was certainly present.
The fact that the partners attempted to deepen their existing relation through 
moving from an alliance to a merger underlines that. The more contentious 
question is whether their relationship also had a social component. The initial 
reaction may be that they did not and that this is why the merger plans eventually, 
after WorldCom’s timely intervention, collapsed. Further evidence for a negation 
of the social component is the reaction of BT management regarding its MCI 
counterparts, which we have assessed in the Tactics section on “Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger and BT”. It can also be argued that the pressure from BT’s 
shareholder is predominantly responsible for the loss of MCI. The reason why 
WorldCom had the opportunity to enter the game was due to the pressure on MCI 
to accept the discounted bid. This exposes the earlier mentioned weakness in 
Madhok’s theory from the other dimension’s side (earlier we asked how the social 
component enforces the structural one). In order to show this, let’s assume that BT 
management did not want to lose the merger deal with MCI and was, therefore, 
prepared to show its dissatisfaction with regard to the profit warning situation but 
would not upset relations between the companies too much. We already 
established that there was a clearly present structural component. Considering also 
that this was the best example of a functioning SBA in telecommunications, it 
means by definition that there was in fact a large structural component. If, as 
Madhok indicates that the two dimensions reinforce each other, why was it that in 
this case the social dimension was not reinforced by the very strong structural 
dimension? There are two ways out of this dilemma. First is that the violation of 
trust by MCI was so large that, although functioning, no reinforcement mechanism 
of the structural component could “save” the social one. That is the easiest way 
out but we believe an unsatisfactory one. Where does this leave other alliances
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that had a smaller structural component? Second possibility is that the 
reinforcement mechanism Madhok mentions does in fact not materialise in 
practice. This possibility is awkward and equally unsatisfactory. Based on the 
developments we have to conclude that the social component was either absent or 
not present in the needed quantity. But the larger question is how does the 
reinforcing interaction of the two components materialise?
Concert II
In the second Concert alliance, the structural component was still present, 
although arguably less than in Concert I and also to a lesser extent than it seemed 
at the start. It was less than Concert I because in Concert I both BT and MCI had 
over time grown towards each other and the mutual hostage position was more 
prevalent than in the case of BT and AT&T (certainly from AT&T’s side). Also, 
during the short time that the alliance lived, the synergetic value slid due to 
reasons we discussed earlier. As for the social component, examples of self- 
interested behaviour were evident and make for an easy conclusion that the social 
component of trust between the two partners was weak, at best.
Global One
Here it is even more doubtful that there was a structural component. Objectively, 
the losses that the venture made do not point towards the existence of this 
component. Also, with both parties having been allowed relative freedom to have 
an international strategy outside the alliance, doubts can be raised over whether 
they were really in a mutual hostage situation. We also saw the biggest exposure 
of self-interested behaviour of our cases with Deutsche Telekom’s offer to be 
Telecom Italia’s white knight. None of this indicates that the structural component 
of trust in this alliance was strong. As for the social component, strangely enough 
this component must have been present and, arguably, stronger than one may 
consider at first glance. Until the final blow, there had been one previous potential 
SBA-buster when Deutsche Telekom teamed up with Enel in 1997. Also, the 
continued sluggish performance of the alliance and Deutsche Telekom’s 
frustration with the role of the French government appears to be indications of the 
“thick skin” mentality that is associated with the social component. Alternatively, 
such tolerance can be explained by considering that Madhok’s propagated search
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for flexibility and ability to co-ordinate operations through trust was met 
independently in their extra-SBA operations by these partners.
Based on Madhok how appropriate is the “peace” element in our alliances? 
Contrary to Hamel, in this representative theory of the peace part of Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s mindset we have found a number of situations in our cases where 
Madhok’s theory proved to be an analytical tool to assess the cases. While some 
vagueness remains with the theory itself, there is merit in using Madhok’s 
foundations when one assesses SBAs in telecommunications. In our concluding 
section we will return to this when we place Hamel versus Madhok.
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Conclusions
Building on much of the previous chapter in which we matched the different 
theories with our cases we will now finish with a concluding section that 
summarises the main concluding parts found in previous sections of this chapter. 
Our approach in this chapter will be to start with the more specific concluding 
elements and migrate towards the more general and central points we conclude 
from our research on Co-opetition and SBAs.
The issue o f Different Agendas on the development o f the alliance 
We will initiate this concluding section with a brief application of the Different 
Agendas issue to our SBAs. Of our alliances all but one qualifies for an 
assessment in this manner. The demise of BT and MCI’s Concert I was not due to 
different agendas on the development of the alliance, at least not before the 
agendas were dominated by the conflict due to the profit warning. Whilst that 
could be considered as a divergence of agendas too (in which MCI’s agenda reads 
“merge with another company” and that of BT read “still to merge with MCI but 
at the newly negotiated price”), we feel that this situation is conceptually different 
from when Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom’s agendas were dominated by 
their conflict. In that case, the existence of the different agendas was likely to be 
present for some time at the very least. Furthermore, the issue that dominated the 
agendas in the Global One case was a reflection of the different or diverged 
agendas whereas in the case of Concert I the dominating issue was in itself not a 
reflection of different agendas. Quite the contrary, it could be argued that precisely 
because MCI realised that agendas were synchronised that it decided to hide the 
bad news as long as it did because it expected a negative reaction from its partner 
or perhaps anticipated the call for a reduction in the sale’s price. Therefore, with 
Concert I we have mentioned the only SBA free from this analysis.
Starting with BT’s other alliance. Concert II, we consider that the divergence of 
the agendas occurred over time. Due to its relatively early detection the partners 
had the option to continue or dissolve the alliance. They choose to dissolve, rather 
than continue due to the changed market conditions and their own shifted 
priorities. Although mutual openness was not as high as it could have been, parties
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dissolved amicably also because the level of commitment, both financially and 
operationally had still been modest. We therefore attach the following scores on 
the variables we identified in chapter two to this alliance:
Concert II -* Early detection Terminate Harmonious
Considering the course of action in Global One’s case with hindsight, the 
conclusion can be drawn that parties’ agendas diverged from the beginning of the 
alliance. The proof for this can be found in the separate international strategies 
that the parent companies had. Firstly, had they had synchronised agendas there 
would not have been a reason for such extra-Gl activities. Moreover, if  they had 
had the same agenda their separate projects would have shown more similarity. In 
the beginning it was not realised by the parties that they operated on such different 
agendas. But once Deutsche Telekom showed that it had realised it the 
consequences were termination of the alliance in a confrontational atmosphere.
Global One -> Late detection Terminate Confrontational
Telefonica’s involvement in Unisource as well as its planned alliance with MCI 
WorldCom can be characterised as situations in which the agendas diverged from 
the beginning of the alliances. In the first case it led to Telefonica leaving the 
alliance, albeit harmoniously; in the second case Telefonica did not need to leave 
the alliance because the alliance never actually took place. So although in neither 
case the alliance actually terminated, it did terminate Telefonica’s membership to 
either alliance.
Telefonica’ s-> From the beginning Terminate Harmonious
alliances
Looking at the outcome of our cases makes for the following interesting 
conclusion: irrespectively of when the different agendas where detected, the 
alliances were all terminated.
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Conclusions on the war and peace mindset
Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Co-opetition is based upon what they call the new 
mindset. This new mindset builds on the criticism that Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger harbour towards the traditional conception of business. In this 
traditional conception business is exclusively considered in terms of competing. 
With reference to classical works on competitiveness the authors liken that 
approach to the mindset of war. They propagate the inclusion of mindset that does 
not only concentrate on the war dimension of business but also incorporates the 
peace side. This peace side is reflected in co-operation. As a consequence they 
prescribe the peace and war mindset which means that in business at some times 
one needs to adopt the war mentality whilst at other occasions the preferred 
mentality is that of peace. Whilst realising the message of Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger that in all aspects of business both elements of the mindset need to 
be exercised, we have sought out to see whether in the cases we use in this 
research the alliances are more likely to reflect the war side or the peace side of 
the mindset. We did this through magnifying the two opposing elements of the 
mindset with two articles that are positioned at the far side of the spectrum in their 
respective area of the mindset. In other words, one article represents peace -  and 
we feel convincingly so -  whilst the other article is a strong representative of the 
war dimension in the mindset. We assessed the articles’ theories through a number 
of hypotheses: five in the case of the war side and two in the case of peace side of 
the mindset.
The war article was a theory from Hamel and features inter-partner learning. We 
conclude that little of the developments we witnessed in the cases on alliances in 
telecommunications have to do with Hamel’s theory. Contrary to his assertion we 
found that alliances are used as a intermediate organisational mode between 
markets and hierarchies. This was evidenced by the fact that companies sought to 
upgrade their alliance status to a full merger one or by the fact that alliances 
shifted on the markets and hierarchy curve towards the hierarchy side through a 
number of further integrative measures. Hamel also proved to be wrong with 
regard to his prediction that alliances are about the internalisation of skills not 
assets. In all our cases we found that assets are at the centre of the alliances not
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skills nor the internalisation thereof. On the subject of assets, Hamel, furthermore, 
maintained that intangible assets, due to their difficulty of obtaining them will be 
the focus of alliances. Here too it appeared that another element of Hamel’s theory 
does not relate well with the type of alliances we reviewed. Instead all the 
alliances were about tangible assets, be that infrastructure, customer bases, access 
to geographical markets and more. Also on the prediction that inter-partner 
learning will form the basis for a partner to improve its position within the alliance 
through the use of continuous rounds of bargaining was Hamel incorrect. Whilst 
an imbedded approach to firmly accept or reject that hypothesis is beyond our 
current research, given the absence of the changed positions within the alliances as 
a consequence of such rounds of bargaining we can safely conclude that there 
were none. Finally, Hamel distinguishes a race to learn between alliance partners 
in which the speed of inter-partner learning determines the longevity of the 
alliance. Also on this final point did we not see a match with our cases. The inter­
partner learning dimension in our alliances was modest at best and certainly not a 
determining factor in the longevity of, or other ways deciding in the course of the 
alliance. Having demonstrated the elements that led to the conclusion of a 
rejection of the war dimension of the mindset in our alliances, we now turn to the 
article that represented peace. The central notion in the magnifying article of this 
mindset was trust. This article was written by Madhok. We assessed two 
hypotheses. In the first we had to determine whether possible dissatisfaction at the 
alliances could be attributed to a lack of trust. In three of the five alliances we 
were able to do so. In the second hypothesis we needed to identify whether we 
would be able to distinguish a structural component from a social component in 
those alliances that we had identified in the first hypothesis as in agreement with 
Madhok’s theory. Not only did this prove to be possible, we were also able to 
assess alliances on the presence of the structural and / or social component of trust.
In conclusion, we clearly found that the alliances of our cases were more about 
issues of trust. This is not to say that in our alliances partners operated in a trust­
worthy manner with each other. As we saw, there were some clear examples of the 
opposite. What is means is that in the type of alliances we featured in this thesis, 
issues of trust, whether present or violated prevailed over issues of war. The 
meaning of this is that when it comes to the large SBAs of the type that we have
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assessed, partners are not primarily concerned with the extreme elements of the 
war mindset. They are closer to the extreme elements of the peace dimension of 
the mindset. That means that it is more about co-operation than about competing 
when it comes to inter-partner relations. From what we gathered from the cases, 
parties in an alliance in the telecommunication industry attempt to eliminate the 
inter-competitive possibilities as much as regulators allow them. This is by no 
means a tautological statement. Nor does this mean that this is universal for all 
alliances in all industries. By comparison, we assessed large global alliances in 
telecommunications. Does the same conclusion hold for alliances in 
telecommunications where a small firm, for instance at the cutting edge of mobile 
technology, enters into an alliance with a large incumbent that is not at the 
forefront of technology. Will in that scenario, the peace mindset also prevail over 
the war one? And what is the situation with regard to other industrial sectors? Is an 
alliance between two major car producers as much about peace or do the 
competitive war elements enter into the relationship? We will return to this in the 
paragraph on Suggestions for future research at the end of the thesis.
Conclusion on Co-opetition
Finally, we provide some conclusions on Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Co- 
opetition. We believe that their theory, in spite of the fact that it makes a general 
appeal to business, has great merit for the subject of SB As, both analytical 
theoretically to those studying this phenomenon and practically to those engaged 
in alliances. Had all our cases taken the Co-opetition theory to heart some of the 
heart and headaches could have been prevented. We have already made our 
observations regarding their peace and war mindset, albeit interpreted through 
other scholars. Furthermore, Co-opetition’s Value Net (especially when extended 
to include the second or even third tier competitors, complementors, suppliers and 
customers) provides the firm with a good overview of the different roles the same 
player could take vis-a-vis the company. It can also help discovering “odd” and 
unexpected actors in the role of complementer, for example. The theory’s greatest 
“added value”, however, is in the PARTS section. Firstly, from an analytical point 
of view much is to be drawn from the theory. In addition to that, Co-opetition also 
proved to have practical value.
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Admittedly, with the advantage of hindsight, BT management could have known, 
had it carefully assessed the Scope part, that WorldCom could have been attracted 
by a lower price for MCI, especially after relations between management of the 
two companies had turned sour. WorldCom had done nothing but acquisitions in 
the years prior to then. Also, after its latest acquisitions of MFS and UUNET 
increasing its long distance appeal was almost a given. Before that, BT could have 
saved itself the loss of MCI had it earlier resorted to bring GTE into the game as a 
three-way partnership rather than after WorldCom had already made its bid. BT 
shareholders would do well to take a few leaves from Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger’s book, too. They underestimated the true Added Value of MCI 
because since its departure their BT’s international strategy has never recovered. 
Also, they are at least partly responsible for the entrance of a bigger player in the 
form of WorldCom. MCI merely needed to have glanced over the section on 
preserving the fog to know that hiding the information on the profit warning 
would only have made real sense if it would never have come out. Short of an 
amazing turnaround in the days before the actual warning, that seems implausible. 
On the other hand, MCI did come out as a winner of the situation (till WorldCom 
crashed) and they benefited handsomely from the Added Value entering Player 
WorldCom had to them. BT’s lessons from its second Concert alliance could 
include that Added Value does not operate in a vacuum. When market conditions 
changed, parents turned inwards and the already exaggerated Added Value of 
Concert II disappeared. Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom and all companies 
that end up in a similar situation can learn from Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s 
Texas Shoot-Out. The lengthy negotiations about the sale of Global One to either 
Deutsche Telekom or France Telecom could have been prevented (especially since 
the two negotiating companies were perhaps not looking forward to meet each 
other every day considering the sour course their relation had taken). There is no 
reason to assume that a Texas Shoot-Out leads to an unsatisfactory outcome, if 
played properly, which is not hard to do. Sprint CEO Esry could very well have 
read Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s section on Players. Bringing in WorldCom 
when negotiations with its company’s alliance partners had reached a dead end 
was (almost) a strategic and lucrative pinnacle. Finally, the most important lesson 
for Telefonica has to be that it linking up for an alliance with a company that has
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only shown interest in acquisitions is bound to become a challenge. If, in addition 
to that one’s own company has the same characteristic, the project approaches the 
state of impossibility.
Finally, we consider that Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s theory has proven 
theoretical academic value and provides a number of lessons to the type of 
alliances we featured. Although, as we indicated in the section on the cases, such 
alliances in the telecommunication industry were fairly special and have become 
largely absent since the early 2000s, Players in other sector where alliances are 
still much in vogue do themselves a favour by going over Co-opetition while they 
still have an SBA.
227
Summary of conclusions
We will now summarise the findings of our research. These findings can be 
categorised in three sections which correspond with the three issues we have 
addressed in this thesis.
Periphery findings: the issue o f Different Agendas 
Within the wider subject of alliances, the instability factor receives ample 
attention. However, such attention is generally of anecdotal nature and attempts to 
map the perceived inherent instable nature of alliances theoretically are all but 
total absent. We have taken initial steps on this path by magnifying one possible 
dimension of the instability: the issue of Different Agendas among partners in an 
alliance. We provided a scenario-based theoretical construct and applied it to all 
but one of the SB As we reviewed in our empirical section.146 Our construct 
operated on the following scenarios. The occurrence of Different Agendas could 
either be detected early on in the alliance’s existence or late. The detection could 
lead to a termination of the alliance or a continuation, probably with altered 
conditions. A final set of variable outcomes was the nature of the relationship 
between the partners after the discovery of Different Agendas. In this case scores 
could be harmonious or confrontational. The application to our cases led to the 
conclusion that after the detection of Different Agendas the relationship could 
either be characterised as harmonious or confrontational. But more salient was is 
the other conclusion we could draw from our cases. It did not make any difference 
when the occurrence o f Different Agendas was detected, in all cases the detection 
led to termination of the alliance.147
Sub-central findings: the War and Peace Mindset
We have sought to operationalise Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Mindset which 
has a war and a peace dimension. Hamel’s inter-partner learning represents the
146 Concert I was excluded from this analysis; see the discussion of this conclusion for our motivation 
to do this.
147 We are aware that the number of our cases is too small and the approach of this part in the research 
too “peripheral” to present this as hard evidence. The treatment of the Different Agendas issue should 
be considered as an invitation to further develop this, and subsequently other, aspects of the instability 
argument and thereby transcend the current anecdotal treatment of the issue. See below, the section on 
Suggestions for future research.
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war side of the mindset and Madhok’s trust-based approach represents the peace 
side. We then assessed our cases against the central notions of both approaches.
Regarding the war dimension in our cases:
• Contrary to Hamel’s vision, alliances were considered intermediate 
organisational modes between markets and hierarchies;
• Also, contrary to Hamel, skills nor the internalisation thereof appeared to 
be at the centre of our alliances;
• Not, as Hamel suggest, intangible but tangible assets formed the focus and 
raison d’etre of our alliances;
• Partners did not appear to attempt to improve their relative position vis-a- 
vis each other through inter-partner learning and, subsequently, exploit 
this in rounds of negotiations;
• The race to learn that, according to Hamel, takes place between partners 
was completely absent too. Consequently, longevity of our SBAs was not 
determined by that factor as Hamel predicts.
Regarding the peace dimension in our cases:
• Madhok’s assertion that possible dissatisfaction in alliances can be 
attributed to a lack of trust was proven and consistent with three in five of 
our cases;
• Following that we needed, in those three cases, to be able to distinguish 
trust in a structural and social component to prove validity. Not only were 
we able to do that we actually could also assess the alliances on those 
components.
We can, therefore, conclude that our type of alliances is more consistent with the 
peace side of Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Mindset than with the war side.
Stated differently, our SBAs were more about co-operation than about competition 
as far as inter-partner relations concerns. This finding reflects our empirical 
findings: within the telecommunication alliances we assessed the companies 
attempted to eliminate the inter-competitive possibilities as much as regulators 
allowed them.
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Central findings: Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Co-opetition 
In spite of the fact that Co-opetition is intended to appeal to business strategy in 
general we consider the theory of great merit to the specialised subject of SBAs, 
which, as we established at the start of our thesis, is in dire need of applicable 
theoretical frameworks. Our treatment of empirical casework revealed theoretical 
and analytical contributory value of Co-opetition. The application of PARTS 
provided us with a number of examples of this value, some of which we will 
summarise here.
• Scope: BT management would not have been caught out by WorldCom’s 
bid for MCI had it assessed this element of PARTS;
• Players: An earlier introduction of GTE into the game would have averted 
the loss of MCI as a merger partner;
• Added Value: BT shareholders would not have underestimated MCI’s true 
value to their company had they assessed it according to the parameters 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger proclaim;
• Tactics: Had MCI reviewed the section on “Preserving the fog”, it would 
have known that hiding the information that resulted in the profit warning 
would backfire and jeopardise its merger intension with BT;
• Players: Consistence with Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s assessment the 
introduction of WorldCom changed the game with BT to MCI’s benefit;148
• Added Value / Scope: BT’s expensive lesson on Concert II was that added 
value is not an absolute measure operating in a vacuum. The changed 
market conditions completely destroyed the (already overrated) added 
value of the SBA;
• Tactics: Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom could have prevented 
lengthy, awkward negotiations on the dissolution of Global One had they 
followed Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s Texas Shoot-Out application;
• Players: In accordance with Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s prediction, 
when Sprint brought in MCI WorldCom it completely changed to game to 
its benefit. By doing this it almost turned dead-end negotiations with its
148 Until WorldCom’s fraudulent practices were exposed.
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Global One partners into the biggest acquisition in corporate history with 
Sprint as a large beneficiary;
Rules: For Telefonica forming an SBA with MCI WorldCom was contrary 
to Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s advice. It would require a radical change 
of engrained practices of both MCI WorldCom and Telefonica and those 
specifically are not the type of Rules Co-opetition suggests changing.
231
Suggestions for future research
One of the first suggestions we made in this thesis regarding a desired direction of 
future research was related to the ownership and control paradigm. As far back as 
the 1930s academia has engaged itself with issues of ownership and control in 
business and theoretical contributions have migrated from referring to a single 
national form to a parent company with overseas (wholly-owned) subsidiaries. We 
indicated that these well-established paradigms have little applicable value to the 
more recent and diverse phenomenon of SBAs. However, our call for new 
paradigms of ownership and control to adequately cover alliances should be 
considered as a direction to work towards in a much longer term than our current 
suggestion for future research refer to. We propose to concentrate research efforts 
first on more incremental areas before developing a potentially grand theory on 
ownership and control. Considering the absence of clarity in defining alliances 
(see chapter 1) it is no surprise that the existence of a developed theoretical body 
on alliances is left wanted.
In this thesis we take a first step in considering an existing theory as a possible 
framework to assess alliances. Having shown the applicability of this theory to our 
cases, our first, and most logic suggestion for future research would be testing Co- 
opetition on alliances in different sectors and industries. SBAs in the automotive 
sector, airlines, pharmaceuticals and the steel industry have some completely 
different features due to the differences in the industries they refer to (Mytelka 
1990, Ojode, 2004, Vassolo, Anand and Folta, 2004). For example, the traditional 
regulatory aspects we witnessed in the telecommunication industry are absent in 
the automotive industry. To be sure, if  a proposed alliance is deemed to be anti­
competitive industry regulators will sanction the deal in a similar fashion as would 
be the case in telecommunications. However, although not entirely regulatory- 
free, car companies contemplating alliances are generally not bothered by golden 
(state) shares and possibly civil servant legacies, universal service requirements, 
network development and interconnection fees, or “cherry-pickers”. The presence 
or absence of these matters directly influences a company’s alliance strategy. 
Similarly, the airline industry (also highly regulated, infrastructural, typically high
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fixed costs, small profit margins due to low-cost operators, brand-driven) differs 
from the pharmaceutical industry (driven by R&D, healthier profit margins, 
“focused” regulation, highly fragmented) and so on (Kangis and O’Reilly, 2003). 
These differences lead to different types of alliances and our first suggestion for 
future research is to assess Co-opetition’s applicability on different types of 
industries and sector. The outcome of such studies will either promote Co- 
opetition to a generally valid theoretical framework for alliances or prove it to be 
more applicable to some sectors than to others.
The aforementioned is our primary suggestion. A secondary relates to Co- 
opetition’s Mindset. Without some of the logistical restrictions we faced in our 
research, a more embedded approach may be possible with regard to the testing of 
the peace and war dimension in alliances. A detailed mapping of the scores on 
these dimensions by different types of alliances would make for extremely 
valuable research output. We maintain that the inter-partner learning versus trust- 
based approach is a useful mark to build on but suggest collecting empirical 
material through either inside observation or extensive interviewing. However, 
much like we encountered, participants’ reluctance to divulge potentially strategic 
information may be a stumbling block to this suggestion.
Finally, our third suggestion for future research refers to our periphery subject of 
Different Agendas. Our scenario-based theoretical construct is intended as the first 
building stones to develop a theory on Different Agendas in first instance and 
around the entire instability argument as a wider goal. Our suggested approach in 
this case would be to focus on one single alliance as a longitude study with a 
separate researcher as analysts at the each of the individual alliance partners and 
one analysing the collective membrane. After a set period, initially three to five 
years, the researchers will compare the interpretations of the individual companies 
and to what extent this was reflected in the collaborative membrane as well as how 
the partner interpreted the other partner’s output. This will reveal if and when 
agendas differed. However, potential weak point in this approach is that co­
operation of the companies with this research is unlikely to come from those 
partners to an SBA that intend to operate on a hidden agenda from the outset.
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